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ABSTRACT 
 
Using the knowledge-based view, this study seeks to understand the relationship 
between firm strategic orientation and interorganizational knowledge management in 
strategic supply chain alliances of high technology firms. Unique to prior literature, this 
study relates three dimensions of strategic orientation (alliance, leadership, and learning) 
with two modes of interorganizational knowledge management (knowledge creation and 
knowledge acquisition) and measures the impact of knowledge management on firm 
performance. Data was collected through self-response survey completed by top 
executives of high-technology firms. Multiple regression analysis was used to test the 
theoretical hypotheses.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the past few years, scholars have paid increasing attention to the role of knowledge 
in gaining competitive advantage leading to the emergence and development of the 
knowledge-based view of strategic management (Eisenhardt & Santos, 2002). The 
discussion on knowledge management arises from a growing recognition of the 
importance of knowledge in the ‘new knowledge economy’ and its impact on 
organizational competitiveness1. An important premise of the vast literature on 
knowledge management is that organizations exist within a ‘network’ of information & 
knowledge relationships (Kogut, 2000) and it is the effective management of information 
& knowledge ‘flows’ at these organizational boundaries that significantly influences 
organizational competitiveness.  
In recent years, an increasing number of organizations are entering into relationships 
with other organizations to create value through continuous knowledge management 
(Hagedoorn, 1993; Robertson & Yu, 2001). Such interorganizational knowledge 
management has been proposed as a fundamental strategic process and an important 
means by which organizations may achieve sustainable competitive advantage in the 
future (Contractor & Lorange, 2002; Inkpen, 2002; Podolny & Page, 1998; Powell & 
Brantley, 1992; Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996). In fact, some scholars have argued 
knowledge management to be the very raison d’etre of interorganizational relationships 
(Salk & Simonin, 2003: 253).  
                                                 
1 Knowledge management refers to the generation, capture, and dissemination of knowledge (Argote, 
McEvily, & Reagans, 2003; Coakes, Bradburn, & Sugden, 2004; Hussi, 2004; Poh-Kam, 2000). 
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An organization’s relationships with its supply chain partners are perhaps the most 
important of its relationships (Ketchen & Giunipero, 2004; Wathne & Heide, 2004). 
Though multiple theoretical lenses have been used to study supply chain relationships 
(e.g. Transaction Cost Economics, Resource Dependence Theory, Resource Based View), 
the knowledge-based view has emerged as a particularly appealing theoretical framework 
for examining issues related to supply chain relationships (Desouza, Chattaraj, & Kraft, 
2003; Hult, Ketchen, & Slater, 2004). While knowledge management between supply 
chain partners is acknowledged to be important to firm performance and improved 
outcomes (Hult, 2003; Ketchen & Giunipero, 2004), how a firm’s strategy relates to 
interorganizational knowledge management and how knowledge management across 
organizational boundaries contributes to firm performance is not yet clear. Thus, 
understanding the relationship between organizational strategy and interorganizational 
knowledge management and how this knowledge management impacts firm performance 
is an important, yet under-researched, topic.  
1.1 Towards a Research Question 
There seems to be a general consensus among researchers and practitioners alike, that 
strategic interorganizational relationships with supply chain partners are central to 
gaining and sustaining competitive advantage in fast-changing global markets (Hult, 
Ketchen, & Nichols, 2002). The success of Dell Computers is attributed, in part, to its 
strategic alliances with its important suppliers. Walmart and Proctor & Gamble, both 
leaders in their industry, have a close, collaborative supply chain relationship that has 
helped both firms create new value and is mutually beneficial. M. Rajakannu, General 
Manager at Wipro Technologies, a leading global IT firm, recently declared “If we don’t 
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collaborate with our customers we are not going to survive in this business. … This is the 
reality we are facing day to day. In fact, it is a matter of survival for a company like 
Wipro…” (Chatzkel, 2004: 13). Top managers in organizations of different sizes and 
nationalities see alliances with their supply chain partners as a “core necessity” to 
compete successfully and globally. It is believed that interorganizational knowledge 
management improves a firm’s ability to offer new products, innovate its processes, 
deepen its competitive competencies, and positively influences sustained organizational 
success.  
Different strategic management theories provide unique and valuable insights into the 
management of strategic supply chain alliances (Ketchen & Giunipero, 2004). The 
knowledge-based view is one such strategic management theory that has the potential to 
contribute to a greater understanding of interorganizational knowledge management in 
strategic supply chain alliances. Unlike other, more developed strategic management 
theories, the knowledge-based view is still emerging as a distinct theoretical paradigm 
(Eisenhardt & Santos, 2002) and has recently been used to understand strategic 
interorganizational relationships (Choi & Lee, 1997; Ding & Peters, 2000; Grant & 
Baden-Fuller, 2004). According to the knowledge-based view, in a world of accelerated 
technological change and heightened uncertainty, organizations should form alliances 
with their suppliers and customers to gain new knowledge and compete more effectively 
(Podolny & Page, 1998; Poh-Kam, 2000). 
1.2 Research Objective 
There is a large body of literature under the broad umbrella of the knowledge-based 
view (Eisenhardt & Santos, 2002). In the knowledge-based view of strategic alliances 
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(Choi & Lee, 1997), organizations gain access to knowledge in two ways (Podolny & 
Page, 1998): First, they gain new knowledge by acquisition of knowledge from other 
organizations (knowledge acquisition perspective). Second, they gain new knowledge by 
creating knowledge de nouveau through their relationships with other organizations 
(knowledge creation perspective)2.  
Templeton and Snyder (2000) suggest that knowledge management between 
organizations is enabled by strategic organizational factors and is also influenced by 
contextual factors (such as the alliance environment). In turn, interorganizational 
knowledge management is related to positive outcomes like firm performance. Fig 1.1 is 
a simple depiction of this cause-effect relationship.  
Insert Figure 1.1 about here 
This study adopts a close adaptation of the above general cause-effect model as a 
starting point and digs deeper to understand interorganizational knowledge management 
better.  The framework in this study incorporates (i) strategic orientation of the firm and 
(ii) inter-firm diversity between alliance partners to explain knowledge creation and 
knowledge acquisition through strategic alliances and examines the relative impact of the 
two modes of interorganizational knowledge management on firm performance. The 
complexity of the knowledge base of the industry in which the firm competes is included 
as a moderator variable influencing the relationship between interorganizational 
knowledge management and firm performance.  
                                                 
2 It is noted that other typologies incorporate elements of the knowledge creation/ knowledge acquisition 
distinction in varying degrees. Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman (1996) suggested that over time in some 
alliances firms are able to imitate and internalize the knowledge skills of their partners, while in other 
alliances firms are able to specialize and develop new knowledge skills by building on their existing 
knowledge. Grant and Baden-Fuller (2004) argue that some alliances are vehicles for acquiring and 
absorbing partners’ knowledge, while other alliances provide partners access to each others knowledge to 
generate new knowledge. Though these scholars use different labels for the types of alliances, the common 
idea is of alliances as either for new knowledge creation or for acquiring partner’s knowledge. 
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The objective of this research is to increase our understanding of the 
relationship between firm strategy and knowledge management in strategic supply 
chain relationships and the influence of interorganizational knowledge management 
on firm performance. 
 
1.3  Relevance of Research 
Though the generation of new knowledge for research and practice has been “an 
enduring mission” of the Academy of Management (Van de Ven, 2002), a considerable 
gap exists between management research and actual management practices in 
organizations (Pfeffer, 1998). Managers and executives find little value in research 
findings and researchers seldom value the insights of managers in setting their research 
questions or interpreting their results (Rynes, Bartunek, & Daft, 2001). The inspiration 
for this research project came from interactions with top executives in the IT industry 
who reported strategic alliances with their customers as important for gaining competitive 
advantage and competing effectively in their industry.  
It has been suggested that a major reason for this is the lack of agreement between 
academicians and practitioners about the importance and relevance of a particular topic 
(McFarlin & Chelle, 2005). Given the scholarly and practitioner interest in the general 
area of this dissertation (knowledge-based view of strategic alliances in the supply chain), 
there are several ways in which this research will be of interest to both research scholars 
and managerial practitioners. Because knowledge-based view is an emerging theoretical 
framework, many of the most significant theoretical and managerial questions in the area 
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of knowledge management in strategic alliances have neither been asked nor addressed in 
the literature (Inkpen, 2002).  
1.3.1 Relevance for Theory 
In the last few years the knowledge-based view (KBV) has slowly emerged as a 
credible and legitimate theoretical lens to aid our understanding of how firms survive and 
compete in today’s economy (Eisenhardt & Santos, 2002; Choi & Lee, 1997). 
Knowledge management in supply chain relationships is seen as crucial to firm 
performance (Ding & Peters, 2000). Unfortunately, despite the volume of work published 
on knowledge management, there is little empirical research that relates knowledge 
management to firm strategy or organizational performance. The limited numbers of 
academic studies that address these relationships are generally characterized by restricted 
scope in terms of both theory and measurement.  
On the theoretical side, there has been limited understanding of how firm strategy is 
related to knowledge management and how knowledge management is related to 
organizational performance (Inkpen, 2002; Teece, 1998). The relationship between firm 
strategy and knowledge management has not been adequately hypothesized or 
empirically investigated. The growing body of literature in the area of knowledge 
management in strategic alliances is largely focused on knowledge management as the 
end itself, rather than the means to enabling superior firm performance. Additionally, 
measurement of knowledge management is limited to product innovation measures or 
measures of patent activity3 (e.g. Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 2002). Thus, existing 
                                                 
3 Levin, Klevorick, Nelson, and Winter (1987) enumerate a range of reasons why in most industries, 
especially high technology industries, patent counts may not be a valid or reliable measure of performance: 
(1) In many industries, imitators can legally copy ‘around’ the patented technology, as it is generally 
difficult to prove that the imitator has made a copy (e.g. complex electronic systems), (2) Some innovations 
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studies lack well-defined variables related to each other in a nomological network, 
testable with statistical techniques and suited to predict specific outcomes.  
The unique characteristic of strategy field’s perspective on knowledge management, 
one that distinguishes it from other disciplines, is the field’s focus on the link between 
knowledge management, firm strategy and performance. Strategic management’s 
distinctive contribution to the understanding of knowledge management is the suggestion 
that firm strategy should be related to knowledge management and that knowledge 
management should be judged by its impact on organizational performance (Eisenhardt 
& Santos, 2002). Thus, the limited nature of prior work represents a serious gap for the 
field of strategic management. A better understanding of the relationship between firm 
strategy, knowledge management, and organizational performance would be relevant to 
the field of strategic management.  
This research builds on recent work on interorganizational knowledge management 
and the extant literature on organizational strategy and strategic alliances to present a 
nomological network that relates organizational strategy to interorganizational 
management in strategic supply chain alliances. Locating variables in a well-specified 
network with clear relationships with antecedents and consequences is important to the 
development of any new theory. Organizational strategy is the corner stone of the 
strategic management literature and supply chain management is an important field of 
inquiry that sees firms as embedded in a network of upstream (seller) and downstream 
(seller) relationships. Thus, this study makes an important contribution to the field of 
                                                                                                                                                 
are almost impossible to patent because proving their novelty is prohibitively expensive (e.g. micro-
electronics), (3) In some technological domains, scientific advancement is so rapid that patenting is 
meaningless (e.g. micro-electronics), and (4) in other situations, innovations are not protected legally 
because the cost of imitation, in terms of money and time, is almost as high as the cost of developing the 
technology in the first place (e.g. electronics, industrial machinery).  
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strategy and supply chain alliances by using the emerging knowledge-based view to 
understand interorganizational knowledge management in strategic supply chain 
relationships.   
1.3.2 Relevance for Practice  
If there is one uncontested piece of advice for management practitioners that most 
management scholars would enthusiastically agree upon, it is this: An organization’s 
competitiveness in today’s economy depends more than anything on knowledge 
(Eisenhardt & Santos, 2002; Ichijo, von Krogh, & Nonaka, 1998; Nonaka, 1991; 
Sanchez, 2001). According to Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995): 
In an economy where the only certainty is uncertainty, the one sure source of lasting competitive 
advantage is knowledge… Successful companies are those that constantly create new knowledge, 
disseminate it widely throughout the organization, and quickly embody it in new technologies and 
products.  
In the current hyper-competitive knowledge-based global economy, an organization’s 
relationships with its strategic partners comprise an important part of its overall strategy 
(Contractor & Lorange, 2002; Faulkner & De Rond, 2000; Venkatraman & 
Subramaniam, 2002).  
It is no wonder then that knowledge management has emerged as a key issue for 
practitioners interested in creating value through interorganizational relationships 
(Sharkie, 2003). Even though it is believed that knowledge management in strategic 
alliances is under managerial control (Kidd, 1998), management scholars have largely 
failed to provide “reliable, deep, and broad insights as well as practical tools” to guide 
and support practitioners working in this area (von Krogh & Roos, 1996: 227). Foss and 
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Mahkne (2003) criticize the extant literature on knowledge management as being useless 
for practitioners as it does not provide “much in the nature of firm guidance” (p. 79).  
As this study seeks to further our understanding of knowledge management in 
strategic alliances, it will be potentially valuable to management practitioners. It will help 
managers better understand knowledge management in strategic alliances, its relationship 
with firm strategic orientation, and its impact on firm performance.  
The results of this research will be shared with managers of companies who 
participate in the study by offering them a practitioner report. Scholars have 
suggested that sharing our findings with practitioners may be more effective when 
done in ways other than publishing in top-tier research journals (Boland, Singh, 
Salipante, Aram, Fay, & Kannawattanachai, 2001). Participants who are not included 
in the sample will benefit from publication of articles based on this research in 
practitioner-oriented journals which are already beginning to publish work in this area 
(e.g. Harvard Business Review, California Management Review, Journal of 
Knowledge Management). Publication in journals read by practitioners is more likely 
to reach a wider audience in the practitioner community (Spencer, 2001). It is hoped 
that combining these multiple methods of knowledge sharing will help make this 
research more meaningful and useful for managers and executives.  
In the last few years, knowledge management has virtually exploded as a research 
topic and also emerged as one of the most influential new organizational practices 
(Foss & Mahkne, 2003). Interesting research questions and practitioner concerns arise 
because managing knowledge within an alliance is inherently complex. Thus, 
knowledge management in strategic alliances is one of those (rare) areas which are of 
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interest to academics and executives. Thus, this study is considered relevant for both 
theorists and practitioners.  
This study proceeds in the following order. The next chapter reviews the extant 
literature on firm strategy and the knowledge-based view in strategic alliances. The third 
chapter proposes hypotheses relating interorganizational knowledge management to 
strategic orientation and firm performance. The fourth chapter describes the sample, the 
research methodology, and the measures to test the hypotheses. The fifth chapter 
discusses the analyses and results of this study. The last chapter discusses the findings 
and implications of this study, acknowledges limitations, and provides recommendations 
for future research.   
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The present chapter reviews relevant literature to understand the impact of firm 
strategy on knowledge management in strategic alliances and the impact of 
interorganizational knowledge management on firm performance. It has three main 
sections. The first section provides a review of the literature on organizational strategic 
orientation. It builds on a vast body of literature to present a multidimensional, 
comparative approach to understand organizational strategic orientation.  The second 
section provides a review of the knowledge-based view. It starts with an introduction to 
the knowledge-based view of strategic management followed by a brief comparison of 
knowledge-based view of strategic alliances with other theoretical frameworks looking at 
the same phenomenon. An extensive review of the literature related to the two modes of 
knowledge management, knowledge acquisition and knowledge creation, follows. The 
last section reviews the literature on the relationship between knowledge management 
and firm performance.  
2.1 Strategic Orientation 
Strategic orientation is an overarching concept that describes the philosophy of an 
organization’s management towards understanding and managing its internal and external 
forces for a more favorable alignment (Gatingon & Xuereb, 1997; Manu & Sriram, 
1996). It reflects and determines the relative strategic emphasis of an organization 
towards its various stakeholders (customers, competitors, partners, employees). It 
encompasses a broad set of principles which influence organizational competitiveness. It 
enables organizations to adopt a strategic posture that its management believes will 
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facilitate superior performance. It determines the organizational culture and provides 
norms for behavior both inside and outside the organization. It provides a ‘unified 
direction’ to the organization which is of primary importance in competing effectively 
(Dess, 1987). As such, strategic orientation is at the heart of the strategic management 
discipline (Hitt, Dacin, Tyler, & Park, 1997; Venkatraman, 1989)4. In the following 
pages, I review the extant literature on strategic orientation.  
Strategic orientation is an organization’s fundamental way of doing things (Noble, 
Sinha, & Kumar, 2002). It reflects the top management’s perspective of their 
organization (Mintzberg & Westley, 1992). Strategic orientation defines the personality 
of the organization as it is the predisposition of top managers in an organization to 
behave in a particular manner with respect to the factors that are of concern to them. 
Organizations may change their strategic orientation but change is very infrequent and 
will depend on how deep-seated or fundamental the orientation is to the organization’s 
identity (Alzira & Easterby-Smith, 1994). Thus, even though change is possible, strategic 
orientation is relatively enduring and stable across time and situations.   
Over the years various approaches have been used to examine and understand 
organizational strategic orientation. Past research on strategic orientation can be divided 
                                                 
4 I recognize that Market Orientation (MO) is widely used, especially in the strategic marketing literature, 
to explain why some organizations perform better than others. However, MO is a limited concept- First, it 
deals primarily with the marketing activities of the firm. This is evident in the marketing bias in its various 
definitions. For example, Kohli & Jaworski (1990) define it as “a philosophy of business management, 
based upon a company-wide acceptance of the need for customer orientation, profit orientation, and 
recognition of the important role of marketing in communicating the needs of the market to all major 
corporate departments” (p. 3). Second, it ignores the creative potential that is the reason for the success of 
many firms. It focuses on the discovery of latent needs and ignores the organizational ability to create new 
needs de neaveau (Kaldor, 1971; Kara, Spillan, & DeShields, 2005). Thus, strategic marketing’s focus on 
marketing orientation ignores many other important aspects of organizations- It completely overlooks the 
supply side of organizations (Robertson & Yu, 2001) and also ignores the relationships an organization 
develops with other organizations (Hunt & Lambe, 2000). Unlike strategic orientation that influences all 
aspects of an organization including its culture, MO is one aspect of an organization’s culture (Heiens, 
2000) and hence limited in its influence on firm behavior.       
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into three broad types (Morgan & Strong, 1998; Venkataraman, 1989): The narrative 
approach that emphasizes verbally describing the holistic nature of strategy in its context 
(e.g. Andrews, 1971; Huntsman, 1994). This often involves employing qualitative 
methodologies like case studies. The classificatory approach that suggests that 
organizations can be grouped on a priori conceptual grounds or derived categorizations 
according to the nature of strategy they emphasize (McKelvey, 1975). A vast majority of 
research in strategic management has taken this approach and employed conceptual 
classifications (i.e. typologies such as Miles & Snow (1978) and Mintzberg (1973)) and 
empirical classification (i.e. taxonomies such as Miller & Friesen, 1978) to explain 
organizational strategy. The comparative approach identifies and measures the key 
dimensions of strategy that together reflect an organization’s orientation towards the 
variety of forces that affect its performance (Venkataraman, 1989). The focus here is less 
on categorization into one particular cell (as in typologies and taxonomies) but on 
measuring the differences along a set of dimensions that collectively describe the strategy 
construct. Comparative approaches, by definition, are multidimensional and better 
capture the key aspects of organizational strategy. These approaches allow inter-firm 
comparison even in the same strategic group, a major shortcoming of the other 
approaches. Unfortunately, the comparative approach has seldom been employed in the 
strategic management literature and so there is limited guidance on how many and what 
dimensions of strategy may be considered important. 
2.1.1 Strategic Orientation as a dimensional construct  
As the identification of appropriate dimensions is a necessary starting point for 
adopting a comparative approach, an extensive literature review was undertaken. Based 
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on a literature review of strategic management articles published in top-tier journals and 
practitioner journals, it was felt that three major strategic orientations of the firm can be 
identified from the factors that significantly impact organizational competitiveness and 
performance: alliances (relationships), leadership, and learning.  
The first dimension relates to the notion of interorganizational relationships as an 
important part of competitive strategy (Contractor & Lorange, 2002). As organizational 
strategy has evolved from product-market positioning in individual businesses or 
industries to competing through forming relationships with other organizations (Porter, 
1985; Venkatarman & Subramaniam, 2002), an important issue for both researchers and 
practitioners is to understand organizational preference for the type of interaction in their 
alliances (Spekman, Forbes, Isabella, & MacAvoy, 1998). Does an organization prefer 
“stormy open marriages” (Roehl & Truitt, 1987) or would it rather have “harmonious 
relationship” with its partners (Zeng & Chen, 2003)? This dimension is referred to as 
alliance orientation. The second dimension deals with the behavioral style of the people 
who formulate, implement and alter organizational strategies, what is referred to as 
organizational leadership, strategic leadership (Hambrick & Pettigrew, 2001), top 
management team (Davis & Useem, 2002), dominant coalition (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986), 
or the upper echelons (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). This dimension is referred to as the 
leadership orientation of the organization.  The third dimension deals with the learning 
style adopted by the organization. Organizations are believed to be cognitive enterprises 
(Argyris & Schon, 1978) actively trying to make sense of events in and around 
themselves (Weick, 1995). Different organizations have different ways of making sense 
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of their context, that is different firms have different learning styles (Fiol & Lyles, 1985). 
This dimension is the learning orientation of an organization.  
These three dimensions were settled on for a variety of reasons: 
1. In reading the diverse literature streams, it appeared that these three dimensions 
capture key elements of many business strategy approaches. For example, customer 
orientation (Gatingon & Xuereb, 1997) and market orientation (Kohli & Jaworksi, 
1990) that are fundamental to the marketing literature would be subsumed within the 
alliance (relationship) orientation dimension here. Technological orientation (Grewal 
& Tanushaj, 2001) would be subsumed primarily under leadership orientation and, to 
a lesser extent, under learning orientation. Cost orientation (Song & Xie, 1995) will 
be a small, but important, part of the leadership orientation here. Thus, the three 
dimensions, which are conceptually unique, seem collectively to capture much of the 
breadth of a firm’s strategic orientation. 
2. The identification of the three dimensions of strategic orientation significantly 
overlaps with the work of Hitt and colleagues (Hitt, Ireland, Camp, & Sexton, 2001; 
Ireland, Hitt, Camp, & Sexton, 2001) and Dess and Lumpkin (2001) discussing the 
domain of strategic activities that organizations need to engage in to compete 
effectively. According to these scholars, inter-organizational relationships, top 
management style of governance, and organizational learning have a strong influence 
on an organization’s ability to compete in competitive industries and gain competitive 
advantage. Similarly, if firm strategy refers to the process of making sense of the 
activities inside and outside the organization (Mintzberg, Lampel, & Ahlstrand, 
1998), then the three dimensions of strategic orientation significantly overlaps with 
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Weick’s (1995) work on relationships, actions, and beliefs as the basis of sense-
making5.  
Organizations are often attributed human characteristics- for example, aggressive, 
determined, imaginative, responsible, and secretive (Walsh & Ungson, 1991). This 
tendency to anthropomorphize non-human phenomena is quite common and accepted in 
organizational literature (Balmer & van Riel, 1997; Glynn, 1996; Moorman & Miner, 
1997). Thus, if strategic orientation is seen as a reflection of “what the organization really 
is”, the study of strategy can progress by recent advances in the study of human 
personality which studies “what the person really is” (Bromley, 2001). This is because (a) 
psychological attributes are commonly used to describe organizations- business firms, 
educational institutions, and other types of organizations- in media, daily conversations, 
and research literature and (b) organizational personality shows the same distribution of 
attribute frequency in free response data as found for individual personality, reflecting the 
existence of shared views about the entity in question (Chun, 2001). The study of human 
personality has been significantly advanced by reducing a large number of personality 
characteristics into five broad factors commonly known as the Big Five (Digman, 1990; 
Wiggins & Pincus, 1992). The probability of using a similar approach to understand firm 
strategy offers an interesting, provocative, and potentially useful way to advance the state 
of theory in this field. The three dimensions- alliance, leadership, and learning- are 
proposed here as the Big Three of firm strategy.      
                                                 
5 It is relevant to mention here that leadership orientation and learning orientation as explained here map on 
to Weick’s (1995) detailed discussion of action-driven and belief-driven sense-making fairly well. 
However, the explanation of alliance orientation here is only informed by Weick’s discussion of 
relationships as important to sense-making, and in fact, significantly departs from Weick’s work.   
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One of the most important objectives of research is to understand the phenomena of 
interest “by sinking shafts, as it were, at a few critical points” (Galton, 1890: 380; 
Lubinski, 2000). The approach adopted here sinks a manageable number of “deep shafts” 
at three critical points. Organization leadership has always been accepted as an important 
influence on organizational performance by strategy scholars. In the last decade, learning 
has also come to be recognized as an important influence on performance in the 
management and marketing literature. In more recent times, relationships or alliances has 
become the “third leg in strategy theory”, joining the older two legs of leadership and 
learning (Contractor, Kim, & Beldona, 2002: 493).  
Theoretically, these legs are distinct because they face very different managerial 
problems and tasks. Further, though all three legs are vital to the competitiveness and 
performance of an organization, the relative importance of the three vary based on the 
organization and the industry it competes in. In other words, though the three dimensions 
are components of a firm’s strategic orientation, each individual dimension independently 
influences firm behavior and performance separately. Furthermore, each of these 
dimensions can be seen as continuum, the two ends of which influence organizational 
competitiveness in different ways (see Day (2000) for relationship orientation as a 
continuum, Covin (1991) and Miller & Friesen (1982) for leadership orientation as a 
continuum, and Wijen (2002) for learning orientation as a continuum).  
It is important to acknowledge here that the terms alliance orientation, leadership 
orientation, and learning orientation are not new. The general notions of these three 
dimensions are quite common in extant literature in various disciplines. However, no 
single framework was found that integrates all three dimensions. It is notable that the 
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literature associated with different disciplinary streams of work tends to emphasize, and 
similarly to disregard, particular dimensions. The marketing literature (e.g. Journal of 
Marketing) commonly addresses aspects of relationships with customers, sometimes 
addresses aspects of organizational learning, and seldom addresses relationships with 
suppliers (upstream relationships). The supply chain management literature (e.g. Journal 
of Supply Chain Management) addresses aspects of relationships with suppliers and 
customers, periodically addresses aspects of new product innovation, and generally does 
not address firm leadership. The management literature (e.g. Strategic Management 
Journal) routinely discusses firm leadership and learning, sometimes discusses 
relationships with customers (upstream relationships) and seldom discusses relationships 
with suppliers (upstream relationships). In presenting the three dimensions as a set, these 
diverse literatures and thought-streams are integrated into a single, workable, 
generalizable framework that helps to understand and compare firm strategy.  
2.1.2 Alliance Orientation 
Organizations that choose to enter into strategic alliances do so to gain competitive 
advantage that can not be gained by the firm “in isolation and can only be created” 
through the relationship between the partners (Dyer & Singh, 1998: 662; Muthusamy & 
White, 2005). The benefits of an alliance relationship exceed those that could be gained 
from either going alone or other forms of inter-organizational relationships such as spot 
transactions (Barringer & Harrison, 2000; Tallman, 2000). These benefits include 
reducing the risk inherent in new product development, overcoming budgetary 
constraints, and gain access to resources not otherwise available to them (Muthusamy & 
White, 2000).  
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Organizations that are alliance oriented, rather than independent oriented, are willing 
to forego the freedom of viewing each transaction as a ‘discrete exchange’ that can be 
decided based on transaction costs alone (Parkhe, 1993). Independence-oriented 
organizations avoid being dependent on other firms and carry out some functions 
themselves and outsource other functions through hands-off relationships with other 
organizations (Mitchell & Singh, 1996). They believe in “one-shot deals in which costs 
are everything” (Uzzi, 1997: 41). They are also more likely to vertically integrate, 
funding activities with internal resources to avoid relationships with firms in their supply 
chains (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). On the other hand, alliance-oriented organizations 
believe that market competitiveness can be improved by establishing relationships with 
other organizations, rather than going alone in the market6. They believe, like the 18th 
century New England theologian Jonathan Edwards, that the nature of being is relational 
rather than individual. As firms in the same industry can either have an independent 
approach or an alliance-oriented approach (Mitchell & Singh, 1996), firms that have the 
latter are not forced by industry-level factors but instead chose to be relational rather than 
independent. Thus, alliance orientation refers to an organization’s willingness to find, 
develop, and manage alliances (Lambe, Spekman, & Hunt (2002) call it ‘alliance 
competitiveness’; Kale, Dyer, & Singh (2002) term it ‘alliance capability’). 
Organizations with an alliance orientation are more willing to enter into strategic 
alliances with other organizations compared to those that lack such an alliance.  
                                                 
6 Competing in the market through forming alliances may not only be better and more effective than 
competing alone, but under the right conditions, it may also be easier.    
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Organizations can either adopt a cooperative or a competitive orientation towards 
their alliance partners7 (Kogut, 1989; Madhok, 2000; Zeng & Hennart, 2002). Viennese 
philosopher Martin Buber described these two ways of forming relationships as I-Thou 
and I-It respectively. In the former, we treat others with mutuality and togetherness (in 
business terms, “we are in this together and we will sink or swim together”), and in the 
latter we treat others as a means to an end (in business terms, “how can I get what I need 
from this organization?”). Organizational orientation towards their alliance partner 
significantly influences the evolution of the relationship throughout its life as well as its 
outcome (Das & Rahman, 2002).   
A cooperative alliance orientation involves pursuing mutual interests and harmonious 
interdependence in alliances. Organizations with such an orientation prefer to form 
alliance relationships that are characterized by close information, social, and process 
linkages, and mutual commitments (Day, 2000; Dyer & Singh, 1998). These 
organizations are willing to look at the alliance relationships as a way of expanding the 
pie (Jap, 1999), such that organizational outcomes and joint outcomes benefit both the 
partnering organizations. Instead of a ‘them and us’ approach, these organizations try to 
develop a ‘collegiate’ pattern that can be beneficial to both organizations (McAdam, 
2000). They emphasize collective interests, common benefits, and win-win for both 
                                                 
7 In reality, these two ways of relating to your partners (cooperative & competitive) may not be as black 
and white. An organization with a cooperative orientation towards its partner may also have some 
competitive elements and a competitive oriented organization may have a cooperative side. Nonetheless, 
one way of relating generally predominates and the two may be treated as opposite poles of a continuum. 
The ideas presented and developed here resonate with the ideas of other alliance scholars in the literature. 
Koza & Lewin (1998) emphasize organizational motivation as an important determinant of its tendency to 
form cooperative or competitive alliances. Salk & Simonin (2003) discuss an organization’s collaborative 
orientation and distinguish between participatory and antagonistic modes of collaboration roughly 
paralleling the distinction between cooperative and competitive modes of collaboration above. Madhavan, 
Gynawali, & He (2004) propose and identify clustering and countering as two modes of alliance 
networking based on the cooperative and competing motive of partnering respectively.  
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partners, reflecting an underlying belief in collaboration and relational connectedness. 
They believe in “integrative arrangements” where they can pool resources with their 
partners and promote mutually beneficial solutions (Uzzi, 1997: 50). For example, Cargill 
has formed close relationships with many of its customers enabling the former to 
combine its capability in developing sugar replacements with the customers capabilities 
in making chocolates to develop products for more health conscious customers.  
In adopting a cooperative orientation, organizations proactively plan to combine their 
resources with resources of their partners to expand the joint capabilities of both the 
partnering organizations (Borys & Jemison, 1989). Because organizations can not possess 
all the resources necessary to compete effectively, dependence on alliance partners is 
seen as a way of accessing valuable resources without an intention to ‘hollow out’ the 
partner (Grant & Baden-Fuller, 2000). Firms are able to access the resource base of their 
partner firms and build on those resources and capabilities to develop new resources and 
capabilities. Cooperatively oriented organizations allow their partners to access their 
important activities so as to have access to the present or future contributions of their 
partners (Zeng & Hennart, 2002).  
A cooperatively oriented firm always emphasizes involving their alliance partners at 
various levels in the organizations. Partners are invited to join in the firm’s strategy 
formulation and implementation. Their experiences, foresight, and suggestions about the 
business are given high importance and considered at the strategic level (Jap, 1999). 
Cooperatively oriented organizations place strategic emphasis on understanding the 
contributions their partners can make to their processes and vice-versa (Polonsky, 
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Schuppisser, & Beldona, 2002). Moreover, these contributions need to be sustained and 
not episodic (Doz & Baburoglu, 2002). For example, informants in Fuji Xerox observe: 
“We ask our suppliers to come to our factory and start working together with us as early in the 
development process as possible. The suppliers also don’t mind our visiting their plants. … Early 
participation on the part of the supplier enables them to understand where they are positioned within 
the entire process. Furthermore, by working with us on a regular basis, they [see] how to bring in 
precisely what we are looking for, even if we only show them a rough sketch” (Imai, Nonaka, & 
Takeuchi, 1985).  
 Such a close cooperation requires significant affective and resource commitments on 
the part of an organization (Johnson, 1999). Because organizations have limited 
resources, even the most cooperatively oriented organizations can have really cooperative 
alliances with only a few other organizations.  
A cooperative orientation allows organizations to effectively leverage the alliance 
management know-how that they have gained from managing their previous alliances. 
Organizations that have been in cooperative alliances in the past are confident and 
experienced in their ability to recognize and cooperate with other appropriate 
organizations. Past experiences with collaborative alliances positively influence the 
cooperative orientation of an organization (Anand & Khanna, 2000). Experience and 
alliance-related knowledge gained through these close relationships further reinforces the 
cooperative orientation of the firm, making it more favorably inclined towards such 
relationships. 
Organizations with a cooperative orientation work with their partner so that they can 
earn higher economic rents than they could on their own at the same time that their 
partners can also earn higher rents than they could on their own (Kogut, 2000). These 
  22
organizations believe that their unique orientation enables them to create a network, a 
‘spider-web’ (Peters, 1992) of alliances that help them to identify new, valuable 
synergies. The network with the cooperative oriented organization at the center creates a 
distinct stream of rent known as Coleman rents that are available to each of the partnering 
organizations (though may be to varying degrees). This network is such that rents accrue 
not only because of the relationship between the cooperatively oriented organization and 
its partners but also because of the relationship that these partner organizations form 
between themselves due to the unique orientation of the cooperative organization. This 
unique characteristic of cooperative oriented organizations, termed tertius iugens (latin 
for ‘third who joins’), reflects their willingness to connect their alliance partners by either 
bringing together previously disconnected actors or facilitating new coordination between 
already connected actors (Obstfield, 2005). In a supply chain context, this can be done by 
connecting different suppliers and/or different customers with each other as well as 
connecting various suppliers and customers with each other. A very visible example of 
such a network is Toyota’s network of relationships with its partners (Dyer & Nobeoka, 
2000). Toyota has a cooperative orientation which enables it to work with its network 
partners in such a way that both Toyota and its partners realize substantial benefits from 
working together. Simultaneously, Toyota has been able to create an interconnected 
network that has strong linkages between its partners too. With its philosophy of 
‘coexistence and co-prosperity’, Toyota has convinced its partners that their performance 
is intricately tied to the continued performance of Toyota and other partners in the 
network.    
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A competitive alliance orientation views the relationship as a zero-sum game where 
one organization wins at the expense of the partner organization (Day, 2000). They see 
themselves as competing with their partners for a fixed-size pie that has to be shared 
between partners (Gulati & Wong. 2003; Jap, 1999). This is a typical win-lose situation. 
If one organization gains something, the other loses and vice versa. Whenever one 
partner manages to increase its share of the pie, it diminishes the share of one or more of 
the other partners. Competitively oriented organizations believe it is their job, their duty, 
to win, to gain as large a share of the pie that they possibly can. They seek to maximize 
their share of the pie as they emphasize private benefits for themselves from the 
relationship (Gulati, Nohria, & Zaheer, 2000). The alliance becomes a ‘battlefield’ 
(Tsang, 1999: 212) and the competitive oriented organization wants to win the war and 
take the largest slice of the pie. These organizations believe in “distributive 
arrangements” that aim for zero-sum solutions (Uzzi, 1997: 51).  
Competitive alliance oriented organizations believe in behaving opportunistically- 
“self interest seeking with guile” (Williamson, 1975). Organizations behave 
opportunistically whenever they believe such behavior to be beneficial after considering 
any potential steps that the affected organization may take through legal retaliation or 
other types of retaliatory behavior (Das & Rahman, 2002).  Competitive alliance oriented 
organizations tend to behave opportunistically and deceive their partners. They are 
always looking for ways to act dishonestly, cheat on their partner and/or shirk from their 
responsibility towards their partner. Examples of opportunistic behavior include, but are 
not limited to, withholding or distorting information, failing to fulfill promises or 
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obligations, late payments, delivery of substandard products, falsification of reports, bait-
and-switch tactics, and violation of agreements (Das & Rahman, 2002).  
Competitive alliance oriented organizations seek to hold their partner organizations 
hostage by trying to increase their asset specificity- the degree to which assets are 
specific and specialized- to the relationship (Kogut, 1988). They do so by getting their 
partners to make investments in specialized tooling, equipment, or procedures (Stump & 
Heide, 1996). At the same time, they underinvest in alliance-specific assets/skills to avoid 
being held hostage by their partners (Zeng & Chen, 2003). They carefully limit their 
contribution to the alliance while making maximum efforts to have their partners 
contribute significantly to the alliance (Zeng & Hennart, 2002). They also believe in 
maximizing their receptivity to the resources of their partner while limiting the 
transparency of their own organization (Hamel, Doz, & Prahalad, 1989). This creates an 
environment of suspicion and distrust in the alliance (Donaldson, 1990).  
Competitive alliance oriented organizations view strategic alliances as a vehicle to 
acquire their partners’ resources unilaterally. The alliance is a sort of ‘Trojan Horse’ 
(Hennart, Roehl, & Zietlow, 1999: 15) which enables the competitively oriented 
organization to enter the castle of the other organization and research its resources 
(namely the resources the partner is bringing to the alliance). This means that such 
organizations are always in a race with their partners to acquire the majority of the 
resources as fast as they can and then get out of the alliance. Their interest is in applying 
the acquired resources to areas in which the organization can reap benefits that accrue 
only to it, and not to its partner (‘the leakage problem’; Hamel, 1991). They actively 
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compete with their partners to acquire the majority of the resources, apply them to areas 
of self-interest and improve their own competitiveness (Kogut, 2000).  
Organizations with a competitive orientation believe in competing with their partners 
so that they can earn rents that accrue only to them and not to their partners. They 
arbitrate the relationship between firms that they partner with but that only have a loose 
relationship with each other at the best. They earn a distinct stream of rents, known as 
Burt rents, because they occupy unique positions in the network that enables them to 
leverage the resources and capabilities of their partners for their own benefit without 
having to bring them together (Kogut, 2000). This unique characteristic of competitively 
oriented organizations, termed tertius gaudens (latin ‘for own purpose’), reflects their 
willingness to either keep their partners separated from each other or to play them off 
against each other as long as it serves their own interest. The proclivity for this type of 
action is evident in Burt’s (1992) work on structural holes where he argues that by 
occupying unique, structural holes these actors position themselves between two 
disconnected parties to manipulate or exploit them for the actor’s own benefit. Digital 
Equipment Corporation was an example of such a firm that partners with suppliers and 
customers but only to the extent that it can appropriate rents that accrue from the alliance 
only for itself without much regard to the needs or desires of its partners.   
Studies have found that organizations can be either competitively oriented or 
cooperatively oriented and both types of orientations helps firms meet their market 
objectives. Hamel (1991) found that many organizations in his sample were clearly 
competitive alliance oriented. These organizations saw alliances as a ‘short circuit’ to 
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fulfill their interests. Many other organizations had a cooperative alliance orientation and 
saw alliances as important for creating mutual value.  
2.1.3 Leadership Orientation  
Leadership orientation refers to the way organizational leadership makes decisions 
and acts to lead by engaging in innovative activities, undertaking risky ventures, and 
competing proactively in the market (Barringer & Bluedorn, 1999; Covin & Slevin, 1991; 
Stevenson & Jarillo, 1990). Organizational leadership refers to the top management or 
dominant coalition in any organization. The leadership of any organization, big or small, 
is responsible for giving purpose to the collective effort of organizational members, and 
causing willing effort to be expended to achieve that purpose (Jacoba & Jacques, 1990). 
Leaders are continuously involved in making sense of what people are doing together so 
that people will commit and volitionally act in the interest of their organization (Weick, 
1995; Drath & Palus, 1994). Leaders that favor change and innovation to obtain a 
competitive advantage for their organization, demonstrate inclination to take business-
related risks, and believe in proactively competing with other firms will be more 
successful than others, especially in competitive environments. Leaders employ 
leadership style unique to the circumstances of their organization and its competitive 
environment (Jago, 1982; Lowe, Kroeck, & Sivasubramaniam, 1996) and because top 
management people have a dominant style for handling certain situations, differences 
among organizational leaders on leadership orientation has important implications for the 
market competitiveness of their organization. This means that though leaders may be 
innovative, proactive, and take risks, different leadership styles will involve different 
approaches to innovate, compete proactively, and take risks.  
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Strategic management literature suggests entrepreneurial leadership orientation and 
managerial leadership orientation as two distinct styles of leadership (Michael, Storey, 
& Thomas, 2002; Rowe, 2001). Entrepreneurial leadership involves a different style, a 
different set of reasoning, thinking, and behaving processes called effectuation while 
managerial leadership involves causation (Sarasvathy, 2001a). Managerial leaders think 
and act differently than entrepreneurial leaders (Busenitz & Barney, 1997; Sarasvathy, 
Simon, & Lave, 1998). Entrepreneurial leaders use heuristics in their decision-making 
more extensively than managerial leaders (Busenitz & Barney, 1997). They are also more 
likely to make important decisions based on limited (and insufficient) information (Keh, 
Foo, & Lim, 2002). Consequently, entrepreneurial leaders often make significant leaps in 
their thinking leading to ideas that are not always very linear and factually based. Thus, 
an entrepreneurial mindset is different from a managerial mindset and impacts 
organizational competitiveness in different ways (McGrath & Macmillan, 2000).  
Entrepreneurial leaders simultaneously experiment with multiple alternatives to a 
generalized end goal (Sarasvathy, 2001a) using a flexible ‘real options’ approach 
(McGrath, 1999). This approach involves starting with an ‘umbrella’ vision (e.g. King 
Gillette’s initial idea of selling something that customers would want to buy repeatedly)  
(Mintzberg et al., 1998), followed by ‘testing the waters’ by first committing small 
amounts of resources to discover whether further investment in a particular option is 
justified. If the initial investment leads to a favorable outcome, then they commit more 
resources to the pursued option, otherwise this options is either modified or shelved and 
alternatives options are pursued. Alternative options are pursued and given up, revised 
and recast, through action and interaction, with other stakeholders throughout the process 
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(e.g. the ‘evolution’ of the PDA industry. c.f. Bayus, Jain, & Rao, 1997) (Sarasvathy, 
2001a).  
Entrepreneurial leaders demonstrate proactive behavior in the market by creating 
opportunities where none seem to exist. They significantly influence the structure of the 
industry (e.g. Herb Kelleher at Southwest) and create new needs and wants (or anticipate 
needs and wants that even consumers are not aware of) (Kumar, Scheer, & Kotler, 2000). 
They are continuously engaged in creative imagination (Chiles, Bluedorn, & Gupta, 
2005; Sarasvathy, 2001b) followed by dynamic interaction and negotiation with other 
market players (e.g. Steve Jobs dream of the digital music market) in an effort ‘to take us 
from the world we live in to the world we want to live in’ (Sarasvathy, 2001b). They are 
involved in the creation of new opportunities and markets through their path creation 
activities (Garud & Karnoe, 1995; Sarasvathy, Dew, Velamuri, & Venkataraman, 2003), 
i.e. organizations with entrepreneurial leadership are ‘market-driving’ (a.k.a the market 
for overnight document delivery or the market for one-way moving trucks) (Kumar & 
Scheer, 1998).  
Entrepreneurial leaders take risks by launching “their boats into the haze of an 
uncertain market, hoping to win pioneering advantage” (Millins & Forlani, 2005: 52). 
They are explorers by nature, willing to venture where no one has gone before and can 
not wait to get there before others (e.g. phone credit cards launched by Sam Pitroda’s C-
Sam). Their biggest fear is to ‘miss the boat’ (Dickson & Giglierano, 1986), i.e. they are 
afraid to end up waiting too long before they act, lest someone else has already mapped 
the unknown by reaching there before them (“I feared regret more than I feared failure” 
says entrepreneurial leader Taryn Rose, CEO of the $20 million Taryn Rose International 
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(Overholt, 2005)). They face great survival risk due to market and technological 
uncertainties as reflected in memorable phrases like “the pioneer is the one with the 
arrows in its back” and “the first to market is the first to fail" (Robinson & Min, 2002). In 
being the first to launch their boat in previously unchartered waters, entrepreneurial 
leaders are guided primarily by their intuition and gut feeling (Kumar, Scheer, & Kotler, 
2000; Mitchell, Friga, & Mitchell, 2004). They believe that risk is an inherent part of 
doing business and believe in succeeding through will-power and persistence, investing 
what someone has called “brave equity”, even when others consider their idea to be too 
risky or even unfeasible (Sarasvathy et al., 1998).  
In short, entrepreneurial leaders strive to create new opportunities through their 
creative imagination and introduce new products and technologies that anticipate the 
future needs of the customers. They follow their ‘gut feel’ and are constantly trying to 
push the existing frontiers ‘a little more’.  They ‘stretch’ their organizational capabilities 
as well as leverage resources and capabilities from other organizations and individuals in 
their network as they try to ‘go where no one has gone before’. Thus, organizations with 
an entrepreneurial leadership often exhibit characteristics of a ‘prospector’ organization 
(Miles & Snow, 1978).   
Managerial leadership orientation refers to a leadership style that engages in and 
supports a market-focused, ‘customer-value centered’ strategy to enhance the financial 
performance of the organization (e.g. Kevin Rollins at Dell) (Rowe, 2001; Vorhies & 
Harker, 2000). Managerial leaders rely on simple, backward-looking decision heuristics 
and commit slack organization resources to research and innovate in the neighborhood of 
their existing technologies and practices (Miller & Arikan, 2004). They develop cultures, 
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processes, and structures that support and encourage a stream of innovations in a select 
technological domain. They thoroughly analyze each opportunity in advance to ensure 
they make optimum investments (Ansoff, 1994).  
Managerial leaders demonstrate proactive behavior by continuously scanning the 
environment to discover opportunities and take pre-emptive action in response to the 
discovered opportunity (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). Their proactive behavior is driven by 
the demands of the market (‘You have to ask questions, actively listen, and then act”, 
says one CEO (Overholt, 2005: 74)), i.e. firms with managerial leaders are market-driven 
(Jaworski, Kohli, & Sahay, 2000; Narver, Slater, & MacLachlan, 2004) or ‘customer-led’ 
(Slater & Narver, 1998, 1999)8. They search for opportunities in current markets (e.g. 
Dell’s move to sell printers to its existing customer base) as well as enter new markets 
with current products (Dess, Ireland, Zahra, Floyd, Janney, & Lane, 2003). They discover 
existing opportunities (Kirzner, 1973) and exploit them by combining existing resources 
in new ways (Schumpeter, 1942) (e.g. P.K. Scheerle, President and CEO of American 
Nursing Services who saw a shortage of trained nurses and started a staffing agency that 
provides hospitals with well trained nurses (Overholt, 2005)). Thus, managerial leaders 
exhibit proactive behavior that is path-dependent (Garud & Karnoe, 2000).  
Managerial leaders take risks by committing resources to projects under uncertain 
conditions. Because they make large and risky resource commitments that can result in 
costly failures, they are concerned with trying to minimize the magnitude of their risk and 
do not wish to ‘sink the boat’ (e.g. John Sculley of Apple Computers). When committed 
                                                 
8 A leading Scandinavian PC manufacturer in Holmqvist’s (2004) study reported that their product 
innovation is based on “customers’ real needs and demands”. Customers phoned, faxed, or emailed the 
manufacturer’s support department to “make complaints or suggest improvements to existing products”. 
This information is documented and then “discussed at meetings with employees from the development 
department, which was directly responsible for product development” (p. 77).   
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to risky projects they consider all possible contingencies (Cooper, 2000) to make sure 
that they have thought of ways in which the magnitude of failure can be minimized 
(Dickson & Giglierano, 1986). Thus, their approach is to minimize the size of the boat 
they may sink, in case things do not turn out as planned (Dickson & Giglierano, 1986; 
Millins & Forlani, 2005).  
In short, managerial leadership excels at uncovering existing opportunities, 
identifying existing customer needs, and offering goods and services to meet these 
existing needs. They place a strong emphasis on market sensing, listening to customers, 
and learning about competitors. They understand the superior capabilities of their 
organization well and leverage these distinctive capabilities to gain competitive 
advantage in the market (Day, 1994). Thus, organizations with a managerial leadership 
often exhibit the characteristics of the ‘analyzer’ organization (Miles & Snow, 1978) 
Though leadership orientation can have universal positive performance implications 
(firms with innovative leadership that is willing to compete proactively and take risks 
will perform better than firms whose leadership does not), the performance of 
entrepreneurial and managerial leadership orientation is context specific, so that the 
relationship between the type of leadership orientation and organizational outcomes also 
depends on the characteristics of the external environment (Miller & Friesen, 1982). For 
example, managerial leadership orientation can have a positive association with firm 
performance when the environment is more stable (Priem, Rasheed & Kotulic, 1995), 
while entrepreneurial leadership orientation can improve firm performance when the 
environment is less stable (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). Even in the same industry (e.g. 
computers), entrepreneurial and managerial leadership orientation can have a different 
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impact on firm performance because of firm-specific factors. For example, HP was 
relatively unsuccessful under an entrepreneurial leader like Carleton ‘Carly’ Fiorina 
while it appears to be more successful with a managerial leader like Mark Hurd. On the 
other hand, Apple computers success can primarily be attributed to its entrepreneurial 
leader Steve Jobs while managerial leader John Scully was booted out of Apple due to his 
failure to lead the company effectively.  
2.1.4 Learning Orientation 
Learning orientation refers to the willingness of an organization to bring about 
relatively stable changes in their way of thinking about the strategic issues and challenges 
facing the organization (Chaston, Badger, & Sadler-Smith, 2000; Baker & Sinkula, 
1999). All organizations are guided by the ‘mental schemas’ shared by their members 
(Weick, 1995). The dominant mental schema shared by most members, also referred to as 
the ‘dominant logic’ of the organization (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986), provides 
organizational members a simple and powerful way of thinking about the issues and 
challenges confronting the organization. The dominant logic functions as a filter for 
scanning data, a lens for interpreting data, and an integrating framework for the existing 
organizational knowledge (Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2001). It determines most 
organizational thinking and underlies the different arguments, implicit models and 
underlying narratives throughout the organization (von Krogh & Grand, 2000; Weick, 
1995). It produces an ‘intrinsic harmony’ within the organization such that ideas that do 
not fit in may be reconfigured or rejected outright (Dougherty, 1992) 
Over time, the dominant logic becomes reinforced in the organization. The capability 
of thoughtful independent action slowly atrophies and organizational decisions become 
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increasingly automatic and habitual (Bettis & Wong, 2003). The continuous 
reinforcement of the dominant logic and the inability to change fossilizes the 
organization, turning it into a “rigid physical imprint of something that was once alive” 
(Bettis & Wong, 2003). This makes it important for organizations to be able to make 
changes to their existing dominant logic through engaging in learning processes (Fiol & 
Lyles, 1985; Slater & Narver, 1995).       
According to organizational scholars9 (Weick, 1995; Senge, 1990), learning processes 
can occur in one of two ways, generative learning or adaptive learning. A generative 
learning orientation involves taking a ‘double look’ at the organization by questioning the 
relevance of existing organizational norms while adaptive learning involves detecting and 
correcting errors in relation to a given set of existing norms (Morgan, 1991). All learning 
systems have a specific learning orientation that reflects the values and practices that 
determines the what, where and how of learning10 (Kim, 1998). There is no ideal learning 
orientation; both generative and adaptive learning orientation may be equally effective 
depending on organizational conditions and the external environment. The differences 
between the two learning styles are due to their underlying differences on mental maps, 
open-mindedness, and reflection. Mental maps are a graphical display of causal 
                                                 
9 The discussion here uses Senge’s (1990) conceptualization of learning orientation as generative learning 
and adaptive learning. The literature on learning is replete with such dualistic conceptions of learning such 
as radical and incremental learning (Miner & Mezias, 1996), higher-level learning and lower-level learning 
(Fiol & Lyles, 1985), deep and surface learning (Brown, 2000), and double-loop and single-loop learning 
(Argyris, 1977 and Argyris, 1992). Senge’s conceptualization appears to be more widely used in the 
business literature (e.g. Gibb, 1995; Slater & Narver, 1995; Sadler-Smith & Badger, 1998; Sinkula, Baker, 
& Noordewier, 1997). It is also worth mentioning that Argyris & Schon (1978) had originally introduced 
the idea of a learning organization to the business literature and distinguished between three ways in which 
organizations learn- detection and correction of error (single-loop), modification of existing norms, 
procedures & objectives in the light of new information (double loop) and learning how to learn (Deutro 
learning). 
10 George Bateson is the intellectual father of the literature on the different styles of learning (Visser, 2003). 
Based on a series of experiments and his deep interest in cybernetics, Bateson came to believe that all 
biological systems (organisms and their social or ecological organizations) are capable of learning.   
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inferences embedded in managerial thinking (Fiol & Huff, 1992). Open-mindedness 
refers to the willingness to question the beliefs that organizational members hold. 
Reflection is the process of framing a problem situation with a view to understand it 
better.  
Mental maps are graphic representations that locate people in relation to their 
information environments (Fiol & Huff, 1992). They provide a frame of reference for 
what is known and believed inside an organization. Fiol & Huff (1992) distinguish 
between ‘strip maps’, which are a simple representation of the competitive landscape of 
the organization and ‘context maps’, which also includes detailed information about the 
context surrounding the different points in the landscape. As the competitive landscape 
changes, the cognitive maps need to be changed. Sometimes only the strip maps need to 
be changed, at other times the contexts maps change too. The process of changing 
cognitive maps may also involve discarding old maps (un-mapping) and developing new 
maps (re-mapping).  
Making changes in maps requires changing one’s beliefs. Not all organizational 
members are equally open to making changes in their beliefs. In all organizations, there 
are two types of beliefs- core beliefs and peripheral beliefs (Lyles & Schwenk, 1992). 
Core beliefs are abstract and lack detail but still provide a common ground for agreement 
among organizational members. They form the most basic of the firm’s purpose and 
goals. Peripheral beliefs are more specific and are beliefs about the goals (or ends) and 
about behaviors appropriate for achieving them (means). Organizational willingness to 
alter beliefs is referred to as open-mindedness (Baker & Sinkula, 1999). Peripheral 
beliefs are more conducive to change as compared to core beliefs. Learning organizations 
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also differ in their relative encouragement of change in core beliefs and peripheral 
beliefs.      
Central to learning is the process of reflection. Reflection is a generic term for those 
intellectual and affective activities in which people engage to explore their experiences in 
order to understand and appreciate them (Atkins & Murphy, 1993). Organization can 
either reflect-in-action or reflect-on-action. Reflection-in-action means to think what one 
is doing while one is doing it. Reflection happens in ‘real time’ and is typically simulated 
by surprise of coming across something that was not expected (Lumpkin & Lichtenstein, 
2005). In an effort to make sense of the situation, organizations reflect on what has 
happened differently than expected and how it can be corrected. The basic understanding 
may be surfaced, probably restructured, but remains embodied in future action. The basic 
assumptions that have influenced action remain unchanged. Reflection-on-action, on the 
other hand, involves a ‘cognitive post-mortem’ (Greenwood, 1993), where organizations 
review the basic understanding that led them to take a particular action. What has 
happened and how things could be different is considered from multiple alternatives. 
Though similar to the ‘what if’ way of thinking (‘counter-factual thinking in Baron 
(2004)’s terms), reflection-on-action is cognitively more profound. It can fundamentally 
change basic assumptions and lead to creation of entirely new assumptions (Cope, 2003). 
This requires a willingness to ask disturbing questions, break through defensive routines 
and uncover hidden assumptions (Argyris, 1993; Argyris & Schon, 1978).  
A generative learning orientation involves organizational willingness to question 
long-held assumptions about its mission and capabilities.  Such an organization is 
continuously reconfiguring its perceptions of its competitive neighborhood as it gains 
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new and different understanding of the environment (Senge, 1990). The organization 
culture in such organizations requires members to be open-minded about challenging 
their core beliefs. This enables organizations to challenge the organizational norms and 
beliefs that guide its behavior based on their interpretation of environmental challenges, 
no matter how different they are from the current interpretations (Argyris, 1993). 
Members are encouraged to individually and collectively reflect on the assumptions, 
rules, and theories that guide the organization. New information from and of the 
competitive environment leads to changes in context maps through a process of un-
mapping and re-mapping. A generative learning orientation involves examining and then 
altering the variables that guide organizational action. It involves significant 
organizational commitment because even though it helps organizations challenge existing 
technologies and create the knowledge domains of the future, it has the potential to be 
disadvantageous in the short run (Lukas & Ferrell, 2000).  
An adaptive learning orientation reflects the organizational willingness to detect 
performance gaps and take steps to eliminate them within the constraints of its existing 
norms. As managers gain more information about the competitive effect of their actions, 
they make changes to their strip maps to help them compete effectively. Adaptive-
oriented organizations interpret environmental responses to their actions and update their 
beliefs about cause-effect relationships in their market. The core beliefs are treated as 
sacred and changes are made to the peripheral beliefs, beliefs about the means adopted to 
achieve organizational goals (Argyris, 1993). Organizational members are encouraged to 
reflect-in-action and search for alternative ways to attain organizational goals 
(Greenwood, 1998). As managers try to make sense of the situation, they reflect on the 
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appropriateness of their means for achieving the chosen goal. Solutions are sought in 
previously understood and tested ways. Failure to achieve desired goals forces managers 
to adopt new courses of action. Though adaptive learning may have long-term 
consequences, the focus is on the immediate effect on a particular activity or aspect of the 
organization (Fiol & Lyles, 1985).   
Both adaptive learning orientation and generative learning orientation can be 
desirable for organizations (Miner & Mezias, 1996). For example, Morgan (1997) and 
Senge (1990) illustrate how organizations are able to adjust to environmental changes by 
‘sticking close to the knitting’ (Peters & Waterman, 1988) as in adaptive learning or by 
redefining themselves as in generative learning (Argyris & Schon, 1978). Even in real-
life, IBM when faced with severe crises in the early 1990s engaged in generative learning 
to reclaim its success, while Walmart has maintained its success due to its adaptive 
learning orientation.  
To summarize the preceding discussion of strategic orientation, three dimensions 
make up the construct of strategic orientation. These three dimensions are alliance, 
leadership, and learning. Each of these dimensions is a polar construct. This means that 
the three dimensions have two distinct styles each- cooperative and competitive for 
alliance orientation, entrepreneurial and managerial for leadership orientation, generative 
and adaptive for learning orientation. All organizations can be compared to each other 
based on their strategic orientation according to their propensity for competing or 
cooperating with their alliance partners, adopting an entrepreneurial or managerial style 
to compete in the market and willingness to engage in generative or adaptive learning.  
2.2 Knowledge-Based View 
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The knowledge-based view has begun to emerge as a powerful and unique theoretical 
framework in strategic management. Any strategic management theory has to answer two 
questions: “Why firms exist?” (Coase, 1937) and “Why firms differ?” (Nelson, 1991; 
Penrose, 1959). According to the knowledge-based view, firms exist because they 
provide generalized institutional capabilities that allow them to create, share, exploit, and 
protect knowledge more effectively than the limited and costly legal institutions that are 
available in the market (Grant & Baden-Fuller, 2004; Liebeskind, 1996). Firms are 
“social communities” in which dispersed knowledge is transformed “into economically-
useful products and services by the application of a set of higher-order organizing 
principles” (Kogut & Zander, 1992: 384). They have superior mechanisms that make 
them better at generating, integrating, and applying knowledge to business activities. 
Thus, it comes as no surprise that scholars consider knowledge to be an essential part of 
explaining the existence of firms (Hayek, 1988). In the knowledge-based view, what 
make firms different are interfirm variations in the management of knowledge. The 
fundamental problem all firms face is how to best utilize the knowledge that its 
employees possess but which is not given to any one individual in totality (Hayek, 1945). 
In other words, firm heterogeneity is a consequence of interfirm variations in leveraging 
widely dispersed knowledge available to the firm (Tsoukas, 1996). Firms that are 
superior at managing knowledge gain competitive advantage by exploiting their 
knowledge to earn economic rents. To summarize, the knowledge-based view of strategic 
management views firms as special, deliberate organizations that outperform markets in 
their ability to manage knowledge and compete with each other to leverage knowledge 
more effectively to gain competitive advantage.  
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Three ideas are critical to understanding the knowledge-based view.  First, Kogut & 
Zander (1996: 503) argue that “a firm (should) be understood as a social community 
specializing in the speed and efficiency in the creation and transfer of knowledge.”  The 
philosophical locus classical for this is G.L.S. Shackle’s argument that “so far as humans 
are concerned, being consists in continual and endless fresh knowing” (1972: 156). Firms 
are seen as deliberate organizations with emergent and self-organizing properties that 
derive from the interactions of its semi-autonomous elements with one another and with 
other actors in the environment. The focus is on the process of knowing (von Krogh, 
Roos, & Slocum, 1994), how knowledge is constructed socially and meaning is created in 
ongoing social interactions between various actors (Brown & Duguid, 2001). Nonaka 
(1991) and Crossan, Lane, and White (1999) are important contributions in this area as 
they seek to understand the process through which knowledge at one level is converted 
into knowledge at another level (e.g. knowledge at individual level to organizational 
knowledge).  
Second, firms grow by recombining their existing capabilities in new ways (Kogut & 
Zander, 1992).  The philosophical locus classical for this is Hayek’s (1945) argument 
that “we not only know different things, we know things differently.” Within 
organizations and across organizational boundaries, economic actors possess knowledge 
that is different from each other and is also organized in different ways. Firms use their 
‘combinative capabilities’ to combine dispersed knowledge in new ways (Nahapiet & 
Ghoshal, 1998). It is these combinative capabilities that enable firms to recognize the 
value of new knowledge, assimilate it and exploit it for commercial gains (Szulanski, 
1996).  
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Third, knowledge is the most strategic asset of the firm (Winter, 1987). The 
philosophical locus classical of this is Polanyi’s (1966) distinction between ‘know how’ 
(performative) and ‘know what’ (declarative). Because ‘know how’ tends to be relatively 
immobile and difficult to imitate, it becomes a challenge to move it within and across 
organizational boundaries (Brown & Duguid, 2001). On the other hand, ‘know what’ 
travels easily across firms and forms the basis for organizational routines (or ‘best 
practices’) that are common across firms competing in the same industry (Eisenhardt & 
Martin, 2000).     
In the last few years, a large number of scholars have been attracted to the 
knowledge-based view. Even as it is impossible to do a traditional literature review of the 
academic work on this topic (because of the breadth of the topic and the heterogeneity of 
contributions), the framework presented in Fig 2.1, partially based on Argote, McEvily, 
and Reagans (2003) and Cummings (2003), can be used to organize the extant research: 
Insert Figure 2.1 about here 
An extensive review of theoretical and empirical papers in the knowledge-based view 
reveal two central premises of the KM literature: One premise is that organizational 
performance is primarily influenced by the way in which organizations manages 
knowledge within their boundaries. The other premise is that organizations exist within a 
‘network’ of information & knowledge relationships and it is the efficient management of 
information & knowledge ‘flows’ at these organizational boundaries that significantly 
influences the organizational competitiveness. While knowledge management 
encompasses a broad spectrum of managerial concerns and activities (Argote et al., 
2003), this study is primarily concerned with interorganizational knowledge 
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management, the management of knowledge across organizational boundaries in strategic 
interorganizational relationships.  
2.2.1 The Knowledge-Based View of Strategic Alliances 
In the last few years interorganizational strategic alliances have increased rapidly 
around the world as more and more companies are beginning to consider the advantages 
of forming relationships with other organizations (Beamish & Delios, 1997; Contractor & 
Lorange, 2002). The popularity of strategic interorganizational relationships has led 
scholars to link the phenomenon to various theoretical frameworks (Gray & Wood, 1991; 
Kogut, 1988). Various disciplines have contributed to our understanding of strategic 
alliances and so it is no surprise that the literature on the topic is highly fragmented 
(Barringer & Harrison, 2000).  
Over the last few years, the knowledge-based view has begun to emerge as an 
integrative and distinct theoretical framework to explain and understand strategic 
interorganizational alliances. It builds on and goes beyond the major existing theories that 
explain strategic alliances- transaction cost economics (TCE), resource dependence 
theory (RDT), and resource-based view (RBV)11. It both incorporates and rejects major 
elements from each of the three widely used theories that explain strategic 
interorganizational alliances.  
As in other theories of strategic alliances, the firm’s ultimate objective to form 
strategic interorganizational relationships in a knowledge-based approach is to enhance 
their competitiveness and create new value (Doz & Hamel, 1998; Gray, 2000; Gulati & 
                                                 
11 Podolny and Page (1998) argue that organizations form strategic inter-organizational relationships 
primarily to derive benefits- alleviating sources of external constraints or uncertainty, minimize total cost of 
production and transaction, and gain access to valuable and rare resources. These benefits are explained by 
RDT, TCE, and RBV respectively.  
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Zajac, 2000). Firms are believed to enhance their competitive position through superior 
management of knowledge (Grant, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Nonaka, 1994; 
Spender, 1996). Strategic alliances and collaborative relationships are seen as powerful 
organizational arrangements that expose organizations to knowledge they did not possess 
earlier (Choi & Lee, 1997; Grant & Baden-Fuller, 2004). Organizations gain competitive 
advantage through strategic alliances by effective management of knowledge across 
organizational boundaries (Coakes, Bradburn, & Sugden, 2004; Ding & Peters, 2000; 
Grant & Baden-Fuller, 1995). 
Thus in a knowledge-based view, organizations are able to successfully compete 
because of access to new knowledge through their strategic alliances with other 
organizations (Choi & Lee, 1997; Powell & Brantley, 1992). The open systems view of 
RDT is, therefore, at the heart of a knowledge-based view of strategic alliances. Like 
RDT, the knowledge-based view is rooted in an open systems framework that argues that 
organizations must engage in relationships with other organizations around them (Scott, 
2003). However, the knowledge based view does not adhere to the RDT view of 
organizations as being “inescapably bound up with the conditions of their environment” 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978: 1). Where RDT is environmentally deterministic, KBV sees 
organizations actively making strategic choices to compete effectively. Also central to 
KBV is the view, key to RBV, that firms differ (Barney, 1991). The notion that firms are 
fundamentally heterogeneous is at the heart of both KBV and RBV. Both RBV and KBV 
also believe that firms can enhance their performance and earn economic rents by 
combining their valuable capabilities with others’ capabilities that are not perfectly 
tradable in the market nor easily developed internally by organizations (Das & Teng, 
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2000). However, in the RBV framework, firms earn Ricardian rents, rents that accrue to 
scarce resources (Barney, 2001; Lewin & Phelan, 2000), while in the KBV framework 
firms earn Fetterian rents, rents that are earned because of the embodiment of knowledge 
in new products and services (Lewin & Phelan, 2000). Though both KBV and TCE deal 
with why firms exist, only KBV seeks to understand how firms can grow and earn 
economic rents. Lastly, KBV recognizes, as does TCE, the problem of ‘appropriability’, 
how to fairly ‘share the pie’ between the partnering organizations (Kogut, 1988; 
Williamson, 1979), yet KBV rejects TCE’s “narrow and particular model” of economic 
actors as “cheats and idlers”, “embezzlers and bank robbers” always seeking to advance 
their interest by stealing from others (Donaldson, 1990: 398; Moran & Ghoshal, 1996: 
60). Where KBV stresses the qualitative advantages (e.g. more communication, higher 
information exchange) of strategic alliances, TCE views economic costs as the primary 
benefit of interorganizational relationships (Tallman, 2000, Madhok, 2000).  
Insert Table 2.1 about here 
In summary, as Table 2.1 illustrates, a knowledge-based view both incorporates and 
rejects major elements of each of the three widely used theories of strategic alliances12. 
Thus, the knowledge-based view is an integrative theoretical framework that builds on 
major existing theories and entails a new way of understanding strategic alliances that go 
beyond any of the existing theories.  
According to the knowledge-based view, interorganizational knowledge management 
is a dynamic process where organizations continually interact with their alliance partners 
                                                 
12 For empirical research using RDT, RBV, and TCE lens to study strategic inter-organizational 
relationships, the reader is referred to Stearns, Hoffman, & Heide (1987), Park, Mezias, & Song (2004), 
and Hennart (1988) respectively.  
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to generate, imitate, or share knowledge (Choi & Lee, 1997). It is not a “one act drama … 
but an ongoing process” (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). The large diversity of research on 
issues related to interorganizational knowledge management can be broadly divided into 
two groups (Song, van der Bij, & Weggeman, 2005; Poh-Kam, 2000): the large body of 
literature on the acquisition of knowledge in interorganizational relationships (e.g. Inkpen 
& Beamish, 1997; Lyles & Salk, 1996; Simonin, 2004; Yli-Renko, Autio, & Sapienza, 
2001), and the relatively less researched topic of knowledge creation through 
interorganizational relationships (e.g. Phan & Peridis, 2000). In this way, it is emphasized 
that an organization’s choice to enter into a strategic interorganizational relationship can 
be distinguished in terms of its motivation to acquire partners’ knowledge or to create 
new knowledge.  
Within knowledge acquisition alliances, the main purpose is to gain competitive 
advantage for one’s organization through knowledge acquisition, a process in which an 
organization primarily acquires its partner’s knowledge in various domains (Hamel, 
1991) to gain competitive advantage. For example, a reputed Japanese car-maker slowly 
acquired its supplier’s knowledge of automotive electronics and set up its own division to 
manufacture automotive electronics components in direct competition to its partner 
(Lincoln, Ahmedjian, & Mason, 1998). Knowledge creation alliances, on the other hand, 
create new knowledge. The focus is on the process of creation of new knowledge through 
the interaction of partnering organizations in a relationship13 (Poh-Kam, 2000). In this 
kind of alliance, the main objective is the generation of new knowledge that does not 
exist yet. For example, organizations with knowledge in their respective domains of 
                                                 
13 This study focuses on supply chain dyads rather than networks of relationships in the supply chain. 
Others (e.g. Kogut, 2000) have noted that firms manage knowledge within their networks to gain 
competitive advantage.   
  45
microelectronics, software, telecommunications, and miniaturization came together to 
introduce the Personal Digital Assistants (Grant & Baden-Fuller, 2004), a product that 
represented the creation of new knowledge domain that did not exist earlier (Madhavan 
& Grover, 1998).  
2.2.2 Knowledge Acquisition  
A great majority of studies in interorganizational knowledge management have 
adopted a knowledge acquisition perspective, assuming that organizations seek to acquire 
knowledge from their relationships with other organizations (Podolny & Page, 1999). 
According to this perspective, organizations enter into interorganizational relationships 
because they believe that the most convenient way to gain new knowledge is by acquiring 
it from other organizations.   For instance, in the international alliance literature, 
organizations from developing markets enter into relationships with reputed multinational 
companies from established markets so they can acquire relatively advanced 
technological and managerial knowledge from their bigger partners and organizations 
from developed countries seek such relationships to acquire their local partner’s 
knowledge of local market, customs, and ways of doing business (Inkpen & Beamish, 
1997).  
Knowledge acquisition is not a one-time act, but an extended process through which 
one organization exchanges knowledge (emphasizing the acquisition of knowledge) from 
other organizations (Argote & Ingram, 2000). Knowledge acquisition across organization 
boundaries occurs through the outright acquisition or imitation of any or a combination of 
repositories in which organizational knowledge resides (Szulanski, 2000). According to 
Walsh and Ungson (1991), organizational knowledge is stored in five knowledge 
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repositories: (a) organizational members, (b) roles and organization structures, (c) 
standard organizational procedures and practices, (d) organizational culture and (e) 
physical workplace structure. Interorganizational knowledge transfer involves 
identification and absorption of desired and useful knowledge repositories. Song, 
Almeida and Wu (2003) found that organizations acquire their partner’s knowledge by 
hiring employees from other organizations. Likewise, technological routines and physical 
workplace structures may be copied from one organization to another. Organizational 
culture can also be replicated (though not perfectly) through communication and training. 
Thus, organizations acquire knowledge from their partners by acquiring their relevant 
knowledge repositories. 
An important concept related to knowledge transfer and organizational learning is 
that of absorptive capacity. Absorptive capacity refers to an organizations ability to 
recognize valuable external knowledge, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial purposes 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Organizations with higher level of absorptive capacity are 
likely to acquire knowledge from other organizations better than organizations with lower 
absorptive capacity. Knowledge acquisition from other organizations is contingent on an 
organization’s absorptive capacity relative to its partners organizations (Lane & 
Lubatkin, 1998). Organizations acquire knowledge better from other organizations when 
partnering organizations have overlapping knowledge domains and compatible norms 
and values (Lane, Salk, & Lyles, 2001). The greater the distance between the knowledge 
domains of alliance partners, the more difficult it is for them to understand and make 
sense of each other’s knowledge. A large distance between the knowledge domains of 
partnering organizations has the advantage of novelty but the problem of 
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incomprehensibility (Nooteboom, 2000). Organizations possessing dissimilar knowledge 
are unable to make sense of each other’s knowledge because prior related knowledge is 
needed to make sense of acquired knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Thus, 
interorganizational knowledge acquisition tends to be path dependent- organizations are 
more effective at acquiring knowledge from partners close to their current knowledge 
domain. Relative absorptive capacity varies along two dimensions (van den Bosch, van 
Wijk & Volberda, 2003). Organizations can differ on their specialization in their 
knowledge domain, the depth of their absorptive capacity, or they can differ in their 
knowledge in domains closely related to what they currently know, the breath of their 
absorptive capacity. Thus, the depth and breadth of current knowledge positively 
influences an organization’s propensity to acquire knowledge from its strategic partners.      
Knowledge acquisition process can be explicit or implicit (Argote & Ingram, 2000). 
When an organization communicates with its partner about a standard operating 
procedure that improves production quality, the transfer process is primarily explicit. 
Knowledge acquisition is primarily implicit when an organization acquires knowledge of 
improving production quality without being able to articulate how the acquired 
knowledge improved the quality of production. It is the causal ambiguity of knowledge 
that determines the explicitness or implicitness of knowledge transfer. When knowledge 
of cause-effect is ambiguous, knowledge transfer is implicit whereas when such 
knowledge is unambiguous, knowledge transfer is explicit. 
Knowledge acquisition can be laborious, time consuming, and problematic 
(Galbraith, 1990; Szulanski, 2000). Transfer of knowledge from one organization to 
another, rather than being fluid, can often be ‘sticky’ or difficult to achieve (von Hippel, 
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1994; Szulanski, 2000). When stickiness is an intrinsic property of knowledge, 
knowledge is ‘difficult to acquire, transfer, and use in a new locus’ because it is 
inseparably related to the process of doing a particular task (Hoopes & Postrel, 1999; von 
Hippel, 1999). When stickiness is characteristic of the process of knowledge acquisition, 
like friction, it does not have an existence of its own, but only comes into play when an 
organization tries to acquire knowledge from another organization by moving knowledge 
repositories from one place to another (Jensen & Szulanski, 2004; Szulanski, 2000).  
Knowledge acquisition often leads to a race between partners to acquire each other’s 
knowledge faster than the other can acquire theirs (Hamel, Doz, & Prahalad, 1989). Such 
races are frequently seen in international collaborative relationships where firms compete 
to acquire knowledge and skill set of their partners: Local firms seek to acquire 
technological and managerial knowledge of their MNC partner while the MNC partner is 
interested in acquiring the knowledge to compete in the local market from their local 
partner (Hamel, 1991). As the partners meet their goals of acquiring knowledge to 
varying degrees, over time the bargaining power of the partner shifts, partner 
interdependency changes and the relationship is destabilized (Inkpen & Beamish, 1997; 
Yan & Gray, 2001). Senior managers in many American and European firms 
acknowledge that relationships with Japanese organizations often result in races which 
the latter won most of the time (Lei, 1997). An inter-organizational alliance between one 
of the largest software manufacturers in the world and a relatively smaller European 
computer systems firm with a strong competitive position in its niche segment gave rise 
to suspicions within the latter that it would be ‘sucked dry’ (Child, 2001). Indeed, Lei 
(1997) warns that managers who do not see their relationships with other organizations 
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are likely to find that inter-organizational relationships turn out to be ‘a dangerous 
vehicle” by which their partners acquire and ultimately internalize their organizations’ 
unique knowledge base and skills.       
2.2.3 Knowledge Creation 
 
A relatively unexplored topic in interorganizational knowledge management in 
strategic alliances is the creation of new knowledge that did not exist earlier, i.e. ex-nihilo 
creation across organizational boundaries. This perspective directs attention to a form of 
interorganizational knowledge management in which each member works with its partner 
in order to create knowledge that neither of them possessed in their own organization 
earlier (Phan & Peridis, 2000). It occurs through a dynamic and cyclic process of 
converting tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge across various levels.  
Explicit knowledge refers to knowledge that can be articulated in a form that can be 
made available to at least some other people in the form of oral or written statements, 
stories, drawings, diagrams, or other representations and can be stored in tangible sources 
such as databanks, manuals, journals, publications etc. to exchange through various 
means of online or offline transmission. For example, home-page trafficking software 
collects inputs from various sources and combines them to create knowledge (e.g. path 
and log analysis) that is not available elsewhere (Nonaka, Reinmoller, & Toyama, 2001) 
and does not exist before being created by the relevant softwares (McFadyen & Cannella, 
2004). However, “knowledge that can be expressed in words and numbers only 
represents the tip of the iceberg of the entire body of possible knowledge” (Nonaka, 
1994: 16), what Polanyi (1966) famously phrased as “we know more than we can tell”. 
This component of knowledge, the “circle of the unexpressed” according to German 
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philosopher Hans Lipps, can not be articulated or codified because it is impossible to be 
accurately expressed in language. It can be knowledge based on experience (e.g. 
knowledge of playing a piano or riding a bicycle) (Polanyi, 1966) or knowledge that is 
context-specific (e.g. knowledge of proper behavior in a wedding is deeply tied to the 
time and place of the ceremony) (Hayek, 1945). Tacit knowledge constitutes a vast and 
endless part of individual knowledge and includes the entire background of one’s 
experiences, a large and possibly infinite number of unarticulated assumptions and 
unconscious thoughts (Kikoski & Kikoski, 2004) leading German philosopher Hans-
Georg Gadamer to call it ‘the infinity of the unsaid’.  
Nonaka’s Knowledge Creation Framework 
Nonaka (1994) and Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) build on the distinction between explicit 
and tacit knowledge to explain the creation of new knowledge. They argue that tacit and 
explicit knowledge are not mutually exclusive, but that new knowledge is created through 
a continuous interplay between tacit and explicit knowledge as knowledge is 
systematically converted from one form to another. Interacting individuals with different 
types and contents of knowledge quantitatively and qualitatively expand tacit and explicit 
knowledge (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). As more and more actors become involved in 
the knowledge conversion process, the interactions become larger in scale and faster in 
speed (Inkpen, 1996). Thus, knowledge creation is a spiraling process of ‘social 
conversion’ (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995), where knowledge spirals upwards in the 
organization (Inkpen, 1996). Knowledge is enriched and extended as social actors at 
different levels interact with each other and with their environment. Nonaka (1994) 
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proposed a 2 x 2 grid of knowledge creation. Figure 2.2 shows the characteristics of the 
four modes of knowledge conversion.  
Insert Figure 2.2 about here 
During the four stages of the knowledge creation process, explicit and tacit 
knowledge complement each other. The interaction between the two types of knowledge 
is amplified through the four modes of knowledge conversion (socialization, 
externalization, combination, and internalization). The four stages of the model are 
explained briefly below: 
I. Socialization: At this stage, tacit knowledge is converted into tacit knowledge. 
Knowledge creation processes are initiated when individuals share their thoughts and 
experiences. Joint activities, such as being together, spending time, living in the same 
environment, observation and practice are important, no written or verbal instructions 
and other formal communication channels (Nonaka & Konno, 1998). The informality 
of the situation relaxes everyone, and allows deeper communion. Nonaka & Takeuchi 
(1995) note the off-campus meeting to ‘brainstorm’ to solve difficult problems held 
by Honda where people seek harmony by sharing life experiences- drinking, eating, 
generally chatting, and taking communal baths in a hot spring.  
II. Externalization: This involves converting individual tacit knowledge to explicit 
knowledge. Analogies, metaphors, hypotheses, and models are used to articulate tacit 
knowledge (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). People know more than they can tell 
(Polanyi, 1966). As people try to bridge the gap between what they know and what 
they can express, they reflect on the potential reasons for the difference by searching 
for something in terms of something else. Attributes of one domain are used to better 
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understand some aspects of another domain (Beatty, 2004). For example, Senator 
John Kerry’s comparison of CEOs of companies outsourcing jobs to other countries 
to Benedict Arnold immediately brings to mind the image of some one who is willing 
to compromise their country for selfish reasons. Metaphors are laden with rich 
symbolism and make abstract concepts more concrete by borrowing from a familiar 
domain. Intuition is combined with deduction and induction to generate a concept that 
is meaningful and practical at the same time. Thus, externalization combines the use 
of metaphors, analogy, and model to create new explicit knowledge from tacit 
knowledge. Knowledge conversion, at this stage, is a social process where the shared 
perception is articulated into concepts in an ongoing dialogue (Hussi, 2004).  
Intangible, tacit knowledge is converted to tangible, explicit knowledge which can 
now be shared with other organizational members in an easily understandable form.  
III. Combination: This mode involves the conversion of explicit knowledge into more 
complex sets of explicit knowledge (Nonaka & Konno, 1998). Thus, the key issues at 
this stage are communication, diffusion, and systemization of knowledge. New 
concepts generated in the previous stage are communicated to organizational 
members who can then combine it with their existing knowledge to organize it into 
larger knowledge structures (Hussi, 2004). Telephones, emails, meetings, and other 
groupware resources are used to communicate and combine discrete explicit 
knowledge. Recipients then reconfigure knowledge through sorting, adding, 
combining, and categorizing of their knowledge. Knowledge created in formal 
education and training at schools is an example. Thus, it comes as no surprise that 
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leading companies like McDonalds, Infosys, etc. have their own management training 
schools where they run short courses for their employees. 
The combination mode is also seen when middle level managers break down and 
interpret the grand visions of top management to operationalize them, creating new 
systemic knowledge in the process (Hussi, 2004). For example, at Wipro, Azim 
Premji, CEO expressed his vision for the company which was then developed into a 
detailed model by the middle level managers. This included a step-by-step road map 
which would take the organization from where it is to where it wants to be (Chatzkel, 
2004).  
IV. Internalization: This mode involves implementing and practicing the newly integrated 
knowledge until it becomes organizational tacit knowledge. Explicit knowledge in the 
form of documentation, manuals, written and oral stories are internalized via 
‘learning by doing’ processes such as simulations or experiments (Nonaka & Konno, 
1998). Explicit knowledge shared throughout the company is converted into tacit 
knowledge by organizational members (Hussi, 2004). Individual members access the 
knowledge base of their group and the entire organizations, motivating them to reflect 
on their knowledge and find themselves in a larger entity (Nonaka & Konno, 1998). 
When most of the members possess certain tacit knowledge, it becomes part of the 
organization’s culture (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). Internalization is facilitated by the 
explicitness of knowledge. It helps if knowledge is documented in written manuals or 
‘oral stories’. Wipro Technologies, for example, has an explicit knowledge repository 
and a tacit knowledge repository. The former are “specific repositories which address 
the needs of explicit knowledge that is captured in the form of documents which were 
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published”. These documents are organized and indexed systematically and when 
somebody looks for particular knowledge, documents that match the criteria will 
show up in the search for them. The latter are yellow pages, discussion groups, and 
chat rooms that connect knowledge seekers with people who have the knowledge. 
People can ask each other questions and try to tap into other’s tacit knowledge. This 
process of tacit knowledge exchange is also captured to increase the richness of the 
repository. 
Though all the four modes are important for knowledge creation in organization, on 
their own each individual mode is only partially useful. The four modes together facilitate 
sustained knowledge creation by taking the organization on a spiral path to the next phase 
of tacit-explicit interaction. Knowledge is created through a series of self-transcendental 
processes, amplifying the interaction between tacit and explicit knowledge (Nonaka & 
Konno, 1998). Thus, the SECI model describes a dynamic process of knowledge creation 
in which explicit and tacit knowledge are exchanged and transformed as people redefine 
the boundaries of their self by acquiring a new view of the world, a new way of thinking 
(Hussi, 2004).  
Nonaka and Konno (1998) propose the Japanese concept of “Ba” as a common space 
where individuals are encouraged to exchange and integrate knowledge. This space can 
be physical (e.g. office, executive lounges), virtual (e.g. e-mail, list serves, chat rooms), 
mental (e.g. shared experiences, executive retreats), or any combination of them (Nonaka 
& Toyama, 2003). Ba enables organizations to collect knowledge from different areas 
and integrate it (Nonaka & Konno, 1998). As knowledge is closely tied to individual 
senses and previous experience, individual come to create the world in ways that are 
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unique to them (von Krogh, 1998). Ba is a platform to get involved in organizational 
knowledge and transcend one’s own limited knowledge (Nonaka & Konno, 1998). 
People possessing knowledge come together and share knowledge organizationally to 
expand the knowledge base of the company. The following quote from M. Rajakannu, 
Head KM Initiative at Wipro highlights how such a common space facilitates knowledge 
conversion: 
Tacit knowledge remains in people’s head….[H]ow do I connect the person who needs 
knowledge with the person who has that knowledge sitting in his head. … This knowledge … is 
something that the person alone has acquired or cultivated because of his or her past experience. It 
is impossible for us to capture the entire experience and put it into explicit document repository. 
Much more valuable is how we connect these two people. That is where we have yellow pages and 
discussion groups, as well as chat rooms. These yellow pages and discussion groups are quite 
popular because they are a platform where somebody can post their query, or go hunt for people 
who are experts. If, for example, I am looking for information on a particular technology, part 
from getting some technical documents on that technology. I can download the document and read 
it if I have time, or I have contact information of experts in that area and I can directly contact 
them and pose my problem to them. I can get a solution much faster because that person’s 
experience will be helping me resolve the problem. 
The process of people exchanging tacit knowledge is also captured so that tomorrow someone 
who has the same problem does not even have to go to the expert. He goes to the archived 
exchange and he sees the entire tacit knowledge exchange being captured there. This is also 
classified with the help of the same taxonomy. The repository is becoming richer day-by-day by 
capturing this tacit knowledge.  
 
Ba provides a physical, mental, or virtual context for individual conversion and to 
move along the knowledge spiral. It is the context shared by interacting social actors, 
who during such interactions evolve through self-transcendence to generate knowledge 
(Nonaka, Toyama, & Nagata, 2000).  
Though Nonaka and Konno (1998) conceived Ba as primarily individual level, 
Nonaka, Toyama, and Nagata (2000) extended the ontological domain to other levels. Ba 
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exists at multiple levels and many of these levels can be connected to form a greater ba 
(known as basho) (Nonaka & Konno, 1998). The self transcends itself when an 
individual enters the team ba. Just as individuals form the ba of team, organization is the 
ba of teams. A firm is a collection of ba, which interact with each other dynamically, 
amplifying the process of knowledge creation (Nonaka et al., 2000). In other words, 
organizational knowledge creation is a process “whereby the knowledge held by 
individuals is amplified and internalized as part of an organization’s knowledge base” 
(Inkpen, 1996: 124).   
Nonaka’s work has focused on intra-organizational knowledge creation. Kidd (1998) 
empirically tested Nonaka’s model for interorganizational knowledge creation in the 
context of Italian-Japanese ventures. He found that the basic principles of Nonaka’s 
model sustain well even in inter-organizational relationships. Organizations create 
internal and external ba. Where internal ba, that is the shared space within organizational 
boundaries, promotes intra-organizational knowledge creation, external ba, that is the 
shared space between organizations, promotes interorganizational knowledge creation. 
Partnering organizations not only know different things, they also know things differently 
(Burns & Stalker, 1966; Hayek, 1948). Interorganizational ba promotes dialectic process 
among organizational members as it enables them to see particular phenomena from 
multiple points simultaneously (Nonaka & Toyama, 2003). It encourages partners to 
‘come out’ and openly share their existing knowledge. It also helps partner organizations 
to access each other’s knowledge base and bring existing knowledge to bear on emergent 
problems (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000), creating new knowledge in the process (Nickerson & 
Zenger, 2004). Organizational members transcend the boundary of their own 
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organization’s ba by participating in inter-orgnaizational ba, and further transcend the 
interorganizational ba, when it is connected to the other organization’s ba. Organizational 
members strive to synthesize various ba, inside, outside and between organizations to 
generate new knowledge (Nonaka & Toyama, 2004). Eventually, the organization’s ba is 
not just the accumulation of knowledge possessed by it or accessible by it, rather it 
possesses the dynamism to continually create new knowledge by building on shared ba 
(Nonaka & Konno, 1998).  
2.2.3.1 Knowledge-based view: From looking in the rear view mirror to looking ahead 
Most extant literature on knowledge management considers knowledge to be socially 
constructed based on subjective interpretation of past events or activities. It has 
recognized the subjective and socially constructed nature of knowledge. People interpret 
past events differently and so have different knowledge of what has transpired. This leads 
to negotiation and compromises in a process of social construction of knowledge. 
However, knowledge develops over time not only because of an increased understanding 
of what has already transpired but also because of creatively imagining the future (Rollier 
& Turner, 1994). For example, the development of consumer VCR industry can not only 
be attributed to the scientist’s familiarity with existing knowledge domains but also to the 
creative imagination of knowledge domains of the future (Lardner, 1987). Early 
exploratory research related to VCR’s was partly based on extant knowledge of audio 
tape recording and partly motivated by General Sarnoff’s (CEO of RCA) imaginative 
idea of “a television picture recorder that would record the video signals of television on 
an inexpensive tape” (Lardner, 1987: 54). The knowledge that influences our present 
actions consists of not only what we have already learned but also our expectations of the 
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future. Knowledge refers not only to acquired knowledge of the past but also comprises 
of expectations for the future. In a world characterized by uncertainty and an unknown, 
unknowable future, individual actors imagine possible future and make subjective 
choices to deal with it. These “flights of fancy” (Ford, 2002: 643) are not necessarily 
grounded in past experiences but are based on imagination related to envisioning 
unprecedented future scenarios. People engage in “thought trials”, imagining future 
alternatives and mentally exploring the possibilities they may lead to (Campbell, 1960). 
Knowledge comes to include an inherently creative component, an act of creative 
imagination (Lachmann, 1986). It is the forward-looking process of creatively imagining 
the future that allows actors to transcend the limits of knowledge rooted in interpretations 
of the past (Ford, 2002). Creatively imagining the future creates expectations of 
alternative futures, most of which tend to be tacit, but some may also be explicit. In the 
last few years there has been a rapid growth in the introduction and adoption of technical 
tools that aim to improve our understanding of the possible future states of the world. 
Organizations are increasingly using forecasting, technology assessment, scenario 
analysis etc. as a way to creatively deal with the uncertainties surrounding the future 
(Rotheli, 1998).     
The view of knowledge as including future expectations allows us to make a 
paradigm shift from the idea of path dependence (Arthur, 1985; Bargett & Burgelman, 
1996) to path creation (Garud & Karnoe, 2001).   The notion of path-dependency 
connects organizational knowledge to specific knowledge trajectories developed over 
time. Knowledge management is seen as a temporal process such that ‘temporally 
remote’ experiences (which are considered insignificant when they occurred) play a key 
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role in the development of organizational knowledge. These experiences gain 
significance post-hoc (Patriotta, 2004). Proponents of a path-dependence perspective 
celebrate ‘where the firm has been’ to explain current organizational knowledge base 
(Nelson & Winter, 1982). Human agency can be seen as one of managers looking in the 
rearview mirror and driving forward (Garud & Karnoe, 2001). Firms learn in the 
‘neighborhood’ of their existing knowledge (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000; Kogut & Zander, 
1992), limiting the discovery of new knowledge close to existing knowledge domains. 
Inability to move beyond local search prevents organizations from gaining knowledge in 
areas that differ significantly from their existing knowledge that may lead to ‘competency 
trap’ (Levitt & March, 1988) or ‘learning myopia’ (Levinthal & March, 1993). Though 
there are advantages of gaining experience in a particular knowledge domain, 
organizational routines may slowly become rigid (Leonard-Baton, 1992; Nelson & 
Winter, 1982) and no longer useful for competing in the future.  
The path creation perspective, on the other hand, is a radical departure from the 
notion of path-dependency. Knowledge management is seen as a dynamic process where 
history is malleable- open to revisions that make it conform to current needs and 
perceptions, and the future is imaginable, unknown but not unimaginable. Organizational 
knowledge is a combination of “a current view of the past” and current views of the 
future (Gioia, Corley, & Fabbri, 2002). Human agency involves “proactively revising 
history” and “project[ing] desired future images” (Gioia et al., 2002: 624) in an effort to 
confront a complex flow of events in the kaleidic world (Chiles, Gupta, & Bluedorn, 
2006; Lachmann, 1986). Path creation processes are set in motion in real time, 
acknowledging that these may be creating inefficiencies in the present, but with the 
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awareness that embarking on these new paths is required to create new futures (Garud & 
Karnoe, 2001). Organizations are motivated to create new knowledge in anticipation of or 
when current knowledge may be deemed inadequate (Ford, 2002), either due to changes 
in the demand side (e.g. change in customer needs) or change in the supply side (e.g. 
convergence of distinct technological fields).  
To summarize the previous discussion, the ability of knowledge-based view to 
provide insight into the nature, circumstances, and management of interorganizational 
strategic alliances is greatly enhanced when knowledge management is seen as two 
different processes of knowledge acquisition and knowledge creation. Moreover, the 
inclusion of future expectations as knowledge allow for the development of a knowledge-
based theory of interfirm relationships that stresses the role of alliances in the 
introduction of novelty in the world around us. This brings the understanding of alliances 
closer to and consistent with the observations concerning contemporary alliance activity 
in the business world. It is commonly observed that many firms have alliances where 
partners compete to acquire each other’s knowledge while other firms have alliances 
where partners work together to introduce new innovations. The knowledge based view 
of strategic interorganizational relationships as knowledge acquisition alliances and 
knowledge creation alliances provides for a suitable theoretical lens to understand 
contemporary knowledge-based alliances.   
2.3 Knowledge Management and Organizational Performance 
For the field of strategic management, making the link between knowledge and 
performance should be one of the most important contributions of the knowledge-based 
view. Yet, this is precisely the area where current research leaves the most desired 
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(Eisenhardt & Santos, 2002). Most researchers either do not address performance at all or 
simply state that certain knowledge management activities (such as knowledge creation 
and knowledge acquisition) will improve firm performance and help gain the firm 
competitive advantage.  
Using a questionnaire to measure perceptions of respondent executives (Managing 
directors, KM officers, or HR directors) from the Spanish manufacturing sector, Ordonez 
de Pablo (2005) found that depending on their knowledge management strategy top 
managers evaluated their performance differently using a multivariate measure of 
perceived performance (industry leadership, future perspective, response to rivals, overall 
success, as well as several perceptual financial measures). Similarly, Gold, Malhotra, and 
Segars (2001) measured the relationship between top management’s perceptions of their 
organization’s knowledge management and performance. They found that top executives’ 
perception of their firm’s knowledge management capabilities related positively to their 
perception of their organization’s ability to identify new business opportunities, 
coordinate development efforts across organizational units, commercialize new 
innovations rapidly, respond quickly to change, increase efficiency, and other factors of 
organizational performance.  
Yli-Renko et al. (2001) examined knowledge acquired by 180 young high-tech firms 
through their downstream strategic relationships. They found that knowledge acquisition 
had a positive correlation with multiple measures of organizational outcomes: greater 
success in new product development, increased technological development, and reduced 
sales costs. Where Yli-Renko et al. (2001) used objective measures of performance, 
Tippins & Sohi (2003) collected data on respondents’ perceptions of performance factors 
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such as firm profitability, ROI, customer retention, and sales growth relative to rivals. 
They found that knowledge management in downstream relationships had a positive 
relationship with subjective measures of performance.  
Tanriverdi and Venkatraman (2005) study knowledge management, not in supply 
chain relationships, but across units in multinational corporations. They conceptualize 
knowledge content in three domains (product, customer, and managerial), and measure 
these using questionnaire items. Archival measures of both accounting-based and market-
based performance (ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q respectively) were used (primarily 
because the sample consisted of Fortune 1000 firms). Consistent with the findings of 
other related published articles (Tanriverdi, 2005), knowledge content had a positive 
relation with organizational performance.  
Overall, one might conclude that these studies, taken in the aggregate, indicate 
general support for a positive relationship between knowledge management and firm 
performance. At the same time, it is to be noted that though both common sense and 
evidence suggests that knowledge management may be positively related to firm 
performance, there is lack of empirical research on whether and to what extent 
knowledge creation and knowledge acquisition in strategic alliances influence firm 
performance differently. The limited empirical research has limited itself to examining 
the influence of knowledge management in general on firm innovation outcomes, 
ignoring the possible differences between the influence of knowledge creation and 
knowledge transfer on the performance of the firm.  
In summary of the previous section, it appears that the knowledge management 
literature (broadly defined) offers theoretical models and arguments that distinguish 
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between the two alternative modes of knowledge management in interorganizational 
relationships, but lack a compelling connection (theoretical and empirical) with firm 
performance. Moreover, as the first section of this review demonstrates, the relationships 
between firm strategic orientation and knowledge management have not been a topic of 
discussion among strategy scholars. This lack of emphasis on the relationship between 
firm strategy and interorganizational knowledge management and between knowledge 
management in strategic supply chain relationships and firm performance is surprising 
given that both of these sets of relationships are central to strategic management research 
(Eisenhardt & Santos, 2002).  
The next chapter uses the literature reviewed in this chapter to derive a research 
model and hypotheses that comprehensively address the research questions. It presents a 
theoretical model that summarizes the hypothesized relationships between firm strategy, 
knowledge management, and firm performance.  
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CHAPTER 3 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
This chapter presents the hypotheses developed to understand the relationship 
between firm strategy and knowledge management in strategic alliances as well as the 
impact of knowledge management on firm performance. The hypotheses presented here 
build on prior research in the areas of firm strategy and inter organizational knowledge 
management reviewed in the previous chapter.  
Figure 3.1 presents the framework that explains the nature of relationships between 
interorganizational knowledge management and its precursors, contexts, and 
consequences. More specifically, the model incorporates (i) firm strategy and (ii) alliance 
organization environment to explain knowledge creation and knowledge acquisition 
through strategic alliances as well as examines the impact of the two modes of knowledge 
management on firm performance moderated by complexity of the knowledge base of the 
industry.  
Insert Figure 3.1 about here 
3.1  Alliance Orientation and Knowledge Management 
Alliance orientation refers to an organization’s desire to form strategic alliances with 
other organizations. Organizations can either be high in cooperative orientation or they 
can be high in competitive orientation. Organizations high in cooperative orientation 
believe in expanding the pie by creating mutually beneficial outcomes for both the 
partners while those higher in competitive orientation seek to maximize the size of their 
share of the pie without any regard to their partner (Gulati & Wong, 2003).  
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Organizations high on cooperative orientation are willing to provide their partners 
with access to important research work being done in their own organization (Hagedoorn 
& Osborn, 2002) and are willing to ‘teach’ their partners about the core aspects of their 
business (DeLong & Fahey, 2000). They do so by taking small but meaningful steps, 
such as sharing the resume of their R&D engineers with their partners and letting them 
chose who they want to work closely with (Gulati, Khanna, & Nohria, 1994), that signal 
their desire to encourage cooperation in the alliance. Unilateral commitments serve to 
credibly convey the good intentions of the firm, removing partner’s doubts about sharing 
its knowledge (Gulati et al., 1994).   
Cooperative organizations also emphasize and encourage informal socialization 
between partnering organizations- for example, face-to-face meetings and Friday evening 
beer get-togethers (Doz, 1996). Informal socialization between employees from 
partnering organizations increases trust between them which makes them more willing to 
share ideas and information that would not have been usually shared in the ordinary 
course of business (Gerwin, 2004). Indeed, Larson (1992) observed that the greater the 
social interaction between partnering organizations, the more intense the exchange of 
business-related information. Joshi & Sharma (2004) note that social interaction provides 
better access to and understanding of customer’s needs and more effective means of 
communicating with the customer.  
Organizations high on cooperative orientation display care, defined as “serious 
attention (heed), a feeling of concern and interest” (von Krogh, 1998), towards alliance 
partners. They engage in extensive dialogue to understand their partners’ problems and 
offer constructive ideas and suggestions to help their partners (Seshadri & Shapira, 2003). 
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This gives rise to active empathy making it possible for organizations to proactively seek 
out instances where they can be of help to their partners. Such organizations are 
interested in working with their partners to identify and understand their needs and 
propose solutions to satisfy them. For example, organizations that have care and affection 
for their partners form alliances with their key customers (von Krogh, 1998) that can be a 
useful source of unique and innovative products (Kristensson, Gustafsson, & Archer, 
2004).   
Thus, cooperative oriented organizations are able to create new knowledge through 
the alliances. In the supply chain context, close relationships between organizations high 
on cooperative orientation and their supply chain partners enables these organizations to 
act as a knowledge bridge between different suppliers and/or customers that may not 
have come together otherwise14. Upstream and downstream partners may not have been 
well aware of each other’s knowledge domains. Their unique status in the supply chain 
provides them with exposure to knowledge domains that they or their partners may not 
have been familiar with earlier (Hargadon & Sutton, 1997) and help them work closely 
with the partners to develop knowledge in new domains (von Hippel, 1988). Because 
cooperative alliance oriented organizations have close relationships with partners on both 
sides they are able to bring them together in a common forum and coordinate efforts to 
expand the size of the pie.  
However, because of their cooperative orientation these organizations are unable to 
make aggressive competitive moves that may harm their partners. They are unable to 
view their alliances as “competitive collaborations” (Zeng & Chen, 2003) and increase 
                                                 
14 As mentioned in chapter 2, cooperative organizations may act as a knowledge bridge between multiple 
suppliers (upstream) or multiple customers (downstream) or suppliers and customers (between upstream 
and downstream).  
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their share of the pie at the expense of their partners (Lado, Boyd, & Hanlon, 1997). They 
also tend to feel uncomfortable relying heavily on formal governance mechanisms such 
as legal contracts to discourage free-riding in alliances (Das & Teng, 2000). Because 
cooperative organizations, by definition, do not see themselves as competing with their 
partners they do not perform well in knowledge acquisition alliances that are geared 
towards acquire partners’ knowledge as fast as possible.  
On the other hand, organizations with a competitive alliance orientation are better 
able to acquire knowledge for their own benefit from knowledge acquisition alliances. 
They have institutionalized systems, such as ‘transfer groups’, to carefully monitor and 
record the acquisition of knowledge from their partners (Simonin, 1999). These groups 
are constantly questioned as to the knowledge they have brought back from interaction 
with the partners. They also have ‘technological gatekeepers’ who are responsible for 
limiting the outflow of knowledge from inside the organization (Hamel, 1991). These 
gatekeepers are responsible for creating an illusion of transparency so that competitive 
organizations can access their partners’ knowledge domains but shield their own 
knowledge domains. Thus, competitive oriented organizations maximize their receptivity 
to their partners’ knowledge, while limiting the transparency of their own (Hamel et al., 
1989).  
Competitive oriented organizations seek to acquire the knowledge repositories of 
their partners through various means. For example, they try to hire ‘knowledge workers’, 
employees who are working on important knowledge domains, from their partner 
organizations (Song et al., 2003). They also try to get access to operation manuals or 
information technology systems that provide them with details of their partners’ 
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operating and technological knowledge without having to make investments in 
developing them.  
Thus, competitive oriented organizations are able to acquire knowledge from their 
alliance partners. In an in-depth survey of eleven companies engaging in international 
alliances, Hamel (1991) found that managers in some competitive oriented companies 
regularly tracked knowledge acquisition through their alliances by asking their employees 
how much knowledge they had acquired from their partner. In the supply chain context, 
such organizations occupy unique positions that enable them to build on knowledge 
acquired from their relationships with their suppliers and customers and leverage it for 
their own benefit (Burt, 1992; Kogut, 2000). They seek to maintain their own alliances 
with their supply chain partners, but are not interested in bringing different suppliers 
and/or customers together. In fact, they are often willing to make their partners compete 
against each other for their own benefit.    
However, because of their competitive orientation these organizations are unable to 
create new knowledge that can be beneficial to both partners. Competitive oriented 
organizations tend to be suspicious of their partners’ motives, decreasing the quality of 
their alliance relationships (Griffith, Harvey, & Lusch, 2006). Because of lack of norms 
of reciprocal fairness in low-quality alliances, there is a reluctance to share knowledge 
freely and to take risks to engage in joint innovation (Larsen, 1992). Competitive 
orientated are likely to have market reputation as a ‘hit and run’ organization (Khanna, 
Gulati, & Nohria, 1998) which decreases their trustworthiness. Partners do not feel a 
strong sense of commitment in alliances with firms that are not trustworthy (Morgan & 
Hunt, 1994), which discourages them from investing in knowledge creation activities 
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that, by definition, need more commitment and time. Competitively oriented 
organizations tend to be paranoid about the future behavior of their partners and rely on 
formal mechanisms to enforce non-opportunistic behavior. However, governance 
mechanisms that rely on third-party enforcement are not conducive to the type of free 
knowledge sharing between partnering organizations that is important for creation of new 
knowledge (Dyer & Singh, 1988). Indeed, using a comprehensive data base of supplier 
relations in the automotive industry, Mudambi and Helper (1998) found that when 
supplier-customer relations are ‘close but adversarial’ they are characterized by low trust 
and formal governance mechanisms such that the “buyer will take advantage of 
competitive weakness of the suppliers to reap short-term gain” (p. 786).  
In summary, some organizations have an organizational culture that encourages 
cooperation with other organizations. Such cooperative oriented organizations occupy 
unique positions in the supply chain that enables them to work closely with the partners 
to develop knowledge in new domains for mutual benefit. Though they are not effective 
at competing in knowledge acquisition races, cooperative organizations are effective at 
working with suppliers and/or customers to create new knowledge that can used by the 
partnering organizations. Competitive oriented organizations, on the other hand, have an 
organizational culture that encourages seeking private gains even at the expense of 
partner organizations. They tend to occupy unique positions in supply chains that enable 
them to benefit from the knowledge acquired from their supply chain alliances without 
sharing those benefits with their partners. Because of their tendency to accumulate the 
knowledge gained from their supply chain partners for themselves, such organizations are 
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effective at knowledge acquisition alliances but are not effective at creating new 
knowledge together with their partners.  
Thus, it is hypothesized: 
H1: Alliance orientation will be related to knowledge management in non-equity 
strategic alliances such that as organizations become more cooperative knowledge 
creation increases and knowledge acquisition decreases in both upstream and 
downstream alliances. 
3.2  Leadership Orientation and Knowledge Management 
The top management of an organization plays an important role in facilitating the 
management of knowledge (Lahteenmaki, Toivonen, & Mattila, 2001; Michel & 
Hambrick, 1992). Though both entrepreneurial leaders and managerial leaders can 
manage knowledge effectively so as to gain competitive advantage for the organization 
(Levinthal & March, 1993), they impact knowledge management in different ways.  
Entrepreneurial leaders create a vision for the future and lead their firm to strive to 
achieve that vision. They engage in activities that drive the market by combining their 
market focus with their creative imagination without being constrained by existing 
technological and other limitations (Kumar et al., 2000). They place strong emphasis on 
developing new product, process and/or technological innovations that provide their 
customers a significant leap in value over what was available to them previously. They 
make substantial platform investments, that is, investments which explicitly create new 
paths for further proactive options for the future (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 1994). For 
example, Thomke and von Hippel (2002) describe how some semiconductor companies 
worked closely with their supply chain partners and invested in creating do-it-yourself 
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tool kits that enable their customers to design their own chips as per their own needs, 
thereby creating a $15 billion market for custom integrated circuits ex-nihilo.  
Entrepreneurial leaders act as a knowledge enabler by establishing procedures and 
policies that facilitate the generation of new knowledge (Ichijo, von Krogh, & Nonaka, 
1998). They encourage new cross-functional and cross-organizational teams to leverage 
the information and knowledge dispersed among employees in both of the partnering 
organizations (Crampton, 2001). These teams are responsible for coming up with 
multiple alternative options that entrepreneurial leaders may chose to influence the 
competitive environment in the future. As entrepreneurial leaders exercise their options 
and commit more resources to some ideas while abandoning others (McGrath, Ferrier, & 
Mendelow, 2004), teams are continuously created and disbanded. Members with varying 
experience come together, work together (formally and informally) for some time, and 
are then regrouped into different teams. By cross-fertilizing ideas across time and space 
within the organization and across partnering organizations, entrepreneurial leaders help 
in connecting multiple knowledge areas (De Long & Fahey, 2000). In fact, using data 
collected from European, Asian, & U.S. computer firms Eisenhardt and Tabrizi (1995) 
found that multifunctional teams help address downstream problems earlier in the process 
and facilitate the embodiment of new knowledge in innovative products. Peterson, 
Handfield, and Ragatz (2003) used data collected from in-depth case studies and mass 
survey to propose and confirm that firms that form cross-functional teams with members 
from supplier organizations are able to reduce problems associated with new product 
development and improve outcomes, especially when technological uncertainty is high.  
In summary, entrepreneurial leaders have a unique ability to understand and bring 
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together diverse knowledge domains. They experiment with multiple options at the same 
time and combine the knowledge generated in these experiments in time and across time 
to create new knowledge. Their visionary nature coupled with their willingness to explore 
uncharted waters leads them to work in knowledge domains that people are not yet 
familiar with. Their ability to involve their relationship partners in the pursuit of their 
vision in meaningful ways (Gupta et al., 2004) facilitates cross-fertilization of ideas and 
helps them become knowledge enablers. For example, in the innovation literature Brown 
and Eisenhardt (1995) find that such leaders play an especially important role in 
facilitating new product innovation by maintaining a disciplining vision that integrates 
multiple perspectives and manages complex technological alternatives. Thus, 
entrepreneurial leadership fosters new knowledge creation through strategic alliances.  
While entrepreneurial leaders foster knowledge creation, such an orientation will not 
be conducive to knowledge acquisition through alliances. Entrepreneurial leaders tend to 
be more interested in creating the markets of the future by rewriting the rules for 
competing in their industry (Kumar et al., 2000), rather than ‘piggy back riding’ on their 
partners to acquire their existing knowledge. New knowledge that redefines the existing 
paradigm is not likely to come from fine-tuning existing knowledge (Tushman & 
Anderson, 1986) acquired from other organizations. In fact, Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 
(1995) found that for uncertain projects in industry segments involving new knowledge 
creation, alliances that sought to acquire technological knowledge from the suppliers so 
as to reduce the time required to introduce new innovative products, were negatively 
related to multiple design iterations (or prototyping) that is so essential to introducing 
new products in the market.  
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It seems reasonable to believe that entrepreneurial leaders will not favor investing 
resources in knowledge domains that are already providing other organizations with a 
competitive advantage. This may be especially true in the high-tech sector where the pace 
of innovation can be so fast that the knowledge that is providing competitive advantage 
today is likely to become the cause of “core rigidities” of tomorrow (Leonard-Barton, 
1992). Though there is no known empirical evidence for the negative relationship 
between entrepreneurial orientation and knowledge acquisition, the discussion here 
suggests that entrepreneurial leadership orientation will be negatively related to 
knowledge acquisition.  
Managerial leaders excel at finding existing opportunities, determining existing 
customer needs, and developing goods and services to meet those needs. Several scholars 
have argued that organizations that focus on serving existing needs tend to be constrained 
within existing knowledge domains and excel at adapting existing knowledge to meet 
those needs (Slater & Narver, 1998). Indeed, Lukas & Ferrell (2000) found that firms that 
are focused on what their customers want are more likely to introduce innovations that 
are incremental adaptations of existing technological knowledge. Thus, it is expected that 
managerial leaders will place a higher priority on investing resources in acquiring already 
existing knowledge from external sources and exploiting it more efficiently than others. 
In a sample of high-technology firms, Yli-Renko et al., (2001) found that efficient 
exploitation of knowledge acquired from the major customer helps firms decrease overall 
sales costs.  
Managerial leaders emphasize the development of stable routines that support and 
encourage a continuous stream of product introductions in current markets as well as 
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existing products in new markets (Dess et al., 2003). Because managerial leaders prefer 
to explore what they are familiar with, rather than venture into unfamiliar knowledge 
domains, they usually work in knowledge domains closely related to their existing 
knowledge. They are likely to be attracted to the knowledge domains in which their 
suppliers and customers are already working in because of their perceived familiarity 
with these knowledge domains. This leads managers to focus on acquiring new 
knowledge for their firm from their alliance partners. Indeed, Yli-Renko et al. (2001) 
found that relationships with a large number of customers expose high-technology firms 
in their sample to new knowledge and helps them acquire knowledge that is close to their 
existing knowledge.   
While managerial leaders encourage knowledge acquisition through their 
interorganizational relationships, they are likely to discourage creation of new 
knowledge. Creation of new knowledge can often destroy existing competencies and 
fundamentally alter the skills and abilities required to compete in the industry (Tushman 
& Anderson, 1986). Because managerial leaders prefer to be cautious and introduce new 
innovations only when the knowledge underlying it is fairly developed (Covin & Slevin, 
1989), they are often hesitant to invest in the creation of new knowledge that can destroy 
their existing competencies. They prefer to invest in either incrementally improving the 
existing knowledge or duplicating the new knowledge by acquiring it from other firms. 
This is consistent with the reality that whereas some firms routinely create new 
knowledge and introduce innovations that can be competence-destroying, it is often other 
firms that ultimately commercialize it profitably (Kumar & Scheer, 1998).  
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Further, new knowledge creation often requires considerable investment over a long 
period of time (Nonaka, 1994). Investment in creating new knowledge is also costly as it 
involves ‘wasting’ precious resources in experimentation and ‘mistakes’ (Nonaka, 1991). 
However, managerial leaders are mostly short-term oriented and are often reluctant to 
invest in projects that have a long incubation period (Miller, 2002). Managerial leaders 
also tend to be cost-oriented and prefer to compete through cutting costs, increasing 
efficiency, and improving financial performance (Rajagopalan, 1996). They are not only 
hesitant, but actively discourage, investing time and resources in creating new knowledge 
as it is a highly uncertain and tedious path through foggy and shifting markets and 
technologies.  
Thus, it is hypothesized: 
H2: Leadership orientation has an impact on knowledge management in non-equity 
strategic alliances such that as leadership becomes more entrepreneurial knowledge 
creation increases and knowledge acquisition decreases in both upstream and 
downstream alliances.  
3.3  Learning Orientation and Knowledge Management 
Learning orientation may have an important influence on knowledge management in 
supply chain relationships (Meyers & Athaide, 1991). Organizations can either be high 
on generative learning or adaptive learning and their learning orientation will impact 
knowledge management in different ways.   
Organizations gain access to many original, valuable, and feasible ideas from their 
supply chain partners (Hult, 2003). Many of these ideas tend to be in knowledge domains 
that are very far from the knowledge domains that organizations may be working in 
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(Tatikonda & Stock, 2003). The level and type of knowledge required by the organization 
to understand and come up with applications for these ideas may be very different from 
the type and level of knowledge that the organization actually possesses. Organizations 
high on generative learning orientation are able to make potentially useful connections 
based on these ideas because of their ability to think in new and different ways 
(Kristensson et al., 2004). This type of learning orientation is more suitable to radically 
changing underlying beliefs, thoughts, and processes that guide an organization (Gersick 
1991). It helps organizations explore new knowledge domains that are inconsistent with 
its existing mental models by facilitating detailed post-mortems by project teams of the 
basic assumptions that have led the organization to its current position (Baker & Sinkula, 
2002; Greenwood, 1993). A business development manager at such a company reported 
that “we hold a postmortem with all the involved parties [other organizations]. We look 
at the original objectives, the implementation, what went right what went wrong” (Lambe 
et al., 2002: 153). Thus, organizations with a generative learning orientation are able to 
leverage new ideas to come up with new alternatives that are combined with previously 
established mental models in innovative ways to create new knowledge (Kristensson et 
al., 2004). Calantone, Cavusgil, and Zhao (2002) find preliminary evidence that 
willingness to continually question existing beliefs and assumptions is positively related 
to new innovations.   
Working with supply chain partners is not easy. As firms get exposed to a large 
variety of ideas and suggestions, there is increasing decision complexity and confusion 
(Sethi, 2000).  In an effort to handle such problems, organizations usually resort to 
simplifying heuristics, ignoring several alternatives, or avoiding in-depth processing of 
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alternatives (Kelley & Staelin, 1987; Weick, 1995). Organizations high on generative 
learning orientation are able to resist these ‘traps’ by creating favorable conditions to 
generate new knowledge from new and radical ideas through a process that von Krogh & 
Grand (2000) call justification. Firms that use justification recognize the existence of 
alternate world views within and across organizations (Moorman & Miner, 1997). 
Individuals or groups with minority views are provided various avenues to make their 
alternatives explicit in the form of concepts, terms, and narratives to allow these to be 
shared with others more effectively (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). For example, in many 
organizations that exhibit generative learning, employees are allowed to spend a 
significant percent of their time generating new ideas, discussing them with others within 
the firm and with partner firms, and getting others to buy into these ideas (Martins & 
Terblanche, 2003). Members of partnering organizations collectively interpret these 
expectations, reason their thinking behind these expectations, and justify their thinking 
and expectations (von Krogh & Grand, 2000). The process of justification forces 
individual expectations to go through the spiral conversion of the SECI model (reviewed 
in Chapter 2) creating new knowledge. This does not mean that the organization discards 
the dominant logic or the existing knowledge structures, but that over time the dominant 
logic shifts towards a new logic, gradually making way for newly created knowledge.  
Firms that are high on generative learning intentionally develop ‘knowledge 
managers’ (Ichijo et al., 1998). These knowledge managers are autonomous leaders who 
are scattered in various parts of the organization and are responsible for encouraging the 
sharing of tacit ideas and expectations. They can be front line employees who interact 
with suppliers and customers to learn their tacit needs and expectations of the future (von 
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Hippel, 1994) or they can be back-office managers who ‘manage by wandering around’ 
and encouraging others to share their tacit ideas within the organization (Nonaka & 
Takeuchi, 1995). What differentiates these managers from other managers is their 
willingness and eagerness to engage in extra-role behavior (Crant, 2000). Because 
explicating tacit knowledge involves a high level of trust and understanding between 
organizational members, these managers go out of their way to forge special relationships 
with their colleagues. They collect dispersed bits of information; interpret it by relating it 
to their rich experience, and act almost as “walking archives” (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 
1995). They are empowered to encourage members of the firm and its supply chain 
partners to share their knowledge with each other within guidelines by purposefully 
introducing ‘creative chaos’15 (McAdam, 2000). Creative chaos is intentionally generated 
‘to stimulate artificial fluctuations … that create breakdowns in the routines, habits, or 
cognitive frameworks of organizational members and may lead to the re-framing of 
events…”  (Johnson, 2002: 394). Generative learning organizations have specific 
guidelines for their knowledge managers that help them focus their intervention and 
ensure that chaos has a positive impact on knowledge creation.      
Despite the conceptual discussion of positive impact of generative learning 
orientation on knowledge creation through alliances as discussed above, there is little 
empirical research on this topic. However, the relationship between generative learning 
and knowledge acquisition through alliances is even less discussed. March (1991) had 
cautioned that firms with a generative learning orientation may suffer the costs of 
experimentation, without gaining many of its benefits. This is because such firms, by 
definition, do not have high degree of shared mental models (Klimoski & Mohammed, 
                                                 
15 Judge, Fryxell, and Dooley (1997) describe it as ‘chaos within guidelines’.  
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1994). Shared mental models are a prerequisite to acquiring new knowledge from 
external sources and converting the acquired knowledge into new products (Madhavan & 
Grover, 1998). They have been found to have a positive impact on firm performance by 
improving the firm’s ability to acquire market knowledge (Baker & Sinkula, 1999). Thus, 
because of lack of a high degree of shared mental models generative learning orientation 
is not conducive to acquiring knowledge from external sources, including partner 
organizations.   
An adaptive learning orientation is “a process of inquiry (often in response to errors 
or anomalies)” through which errors are detected and corrected such that the organization 
carries on with its present way of thinking (Argyris & Schon, 1978; Friedman, Lipshitz, 
& Overmeer, 2001: 757). Organizations with such an orientation continually adjust to 
changes and make incremental adaptations to their existing beliefs and values. These 
organizations prefer to engage in activities that require incremental effort, such as 
working in knowledge domains the organization is intimately familiar with 
(Kyriakopoulos & Moorman, 2004). Not surprisingly, scholars have argued that adaptive 
learning orientation is suitable for incremental innovation that typically involves making 
small changes to existing knowledge (Miner & Mezias, 1996). This encourages 
organizations to invest in acquiring knowledge from other organizations and making 
minor changes to it. Thus, adaptive learning orientation is positively related to knowledge 
acquisition.  
Adaptive learning oriented organizations focus on their existing knowledge bases. 
They are comfortable in building on what they currently know. The tendency of adaptive 
learning organizations to stay in their existing knowledge domains increases their 
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absorptive capacity (Nooteboom, 2000). This is because absorptive capacity develops 
cumulatively and builds on the knowledge the organization already possesses (Zahra & 
George, 2002). Absorptive capacity has a large influence on the quality and quantity of 
knowledge that a firm acquires from outside the firm (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). 
Knowledge acquisition from alliance partners is an important part of knowledge acquired 
from external sources (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). Organizations with an adaptive learning 
orientation have higher absorptive capacity which improves their chances of identifying 
and acquiring externally available knowledge that is potentially valuable (Zahra & 
George, 2002). In a study of Hungarian joint ventures, Lyles & Salk (1996) found that 
higher absorptive capacity led to higher knowledge acquisition from the foreign parent. 
Tsai (2001) studied knowledge management between multiple units of two large 
multinationals and found that organizational units that have higher absorptive capacity 
acquire more knowledge from other units which increases their innovation activity as 
reflected in the new products introduced in a particular year. Thus, adaptive learning 
orientation is positively related to knowledge acquisition from external sources. 
Even as adaptive learning orientation is conducive to knowledge acquisition, it 
discourages knowledge creation. Knowledge creation requires the firm to combine 
different streams of knowledge to generate new knowledge (Nerkar, 2003). However, 
adaptive learning organizations tend to be most comfortable making incremental changes 
to existing knowledge, rather than creating new knowledge that could make their existing 
knowledge obsolete. Though no empirical studies could be found that related to adaptive 
learning to knowledge creation, there is some suggestion in the literature that high 
absorptive capacity is not suitable for creation of new knowledge especially in fast-paced 
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environments like the high-technology sector (Garud & Nayyar, 1994). This is because 
absorptive capacity focuses the firm’s attention on internalizing and imitating knowledge 
available from other organizations (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Thus, adaptive learning 
orientation will be negatively related to knowledge creation in strategic alliances.     
Thus, it is hypothesized: 
H3: Learning orientation will be related to knowledge management in non-equity 
alliances such that as organizations become more generative knowledge creation 
increases and knowledge acquisition decreases in both upstream and downstream 
alliances.   
3.4 Moderation Effect of Interfirm Diversity 
In the preceding pages, the relationships between firm strategy and knowledge 
management in strategic alliances have been hypothesized. This is in line with the work 
of a number of scholars (e.g. Kale et al., 2002; Saxton, 1997) who argue in favor of the 
important role of organizational strategic factors in determining the benefits that firms 
derive from their strategic alliances. However reasonable, this argument ignores the fact 
that though firms form strategic alliances with multiple organizations, not all alliances 
perform equally well. Some alliances involving the same firm and flowing from the same 
organizational strategic orientation perform better than others.   
For instance, Das and Teng (2002: 732) argue that alliances are also influenced by the 
alliance environment, i.e. the various aspects of the organizational, competitive, and 
institutional environment of the alliance. Though all three aspects of the alliance 
environment are important, Das & Teng (2002) suggest that aspects of the alliance 
organizational environment have an especially prominent influence on the alliance and its 
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outcomes. Alliance organizational environment refers to the diversity (or similarity) 
between the partnering firms. Following Parkhe (1991) this study looks at two 
dimensions of alliance organization environment16: resource diversity (Harrison, Hitt, 
Hoskisson, & Ireland, 2001; Overby & Ozcan, 2006) and cultural diversity (Aulakh & 
Madhok, 2002; Pangarkar & Klein, 2001). Interfirm diversity has been found to have a 
significant influence on the quality of the relationship (Sarkar, Cavusgil, & Evirgen, 
1997) and a life-long impact on the alliance (Niederkofler, 1991).  
Resource diversity deals with the resource configuration between partnering 
organizations and relates to the relative dissimilarities across their resources and 
capabilities. The resource configuration of partnering organizations is one of the most 
important factors that need to be considered in initial planning to achieve good alliance 
performance (Harrison et al., 2001). From a resource-based view (Barney, 1991), unique 
and rare resources are a source of competitive advantage. One of the best ways in which a 
firm can access resources that it does not have is through partnering with another firm 
that has different resources. Thus, from a resource-based view, resource diversity 
provides firms with access to resources that they do not currently have and has a positive 
influence on value creation through alliances. The knowledge-based view focuses on the 
implications of this resource dissimilarity on the knowledge management activities of the 
firm.  
Cultural diversity refers to the cultural differences between the partnering 
organizations. Culture influences peoples’ aspirations and behaviors and because 
                                                 
16 Different scholars identify other aspects of alliance organizational environment as important. For 
example, Das & Teng (2002) propose market, competitive positioning, and reputation as other key aspects 
of alliance organizational environment. Overby & Ozcan (2006) propose difference between the principal 
industry that the partner firms belong to as also important. Sarkar et al. (2001) mention operational 
compatibility as the third factor in addition to resource and cultural compatibility.  
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alliances are “socially contrived mechanisms for collective action” (Ring & Van de Ven, 
1994: 96), culture can have an important influence on the dynamics of an alliance. 
Cultural diversity between partnering organizations has been found to decrease partners’ 
satisfaction with the relationship (Pothukuchi, Damanpour, Choi, Chen, & Park, 2002) 
and negatively impact alliance performance (Mohr & Puck, 2005). The knowledge-based 
view focuses on the implications of this cultural dissimilarity on the knowledge 
management activities of the firm.  
3.4.1 Moderation Effects of Resource diversity 
According to the resource-based view, firms possess resources that can be a source of 
competitive advantage when they are valuable, rare, difficult to imitate and not easily 
substituted by other resources (Barney, 1991). When resource diversity is low, partnering 
organizations tend to have similar resources and capabilities whereas when resource 
diversity is high, partnering organizations are exposed to a large pool of resources and 
capabilities that were earlier unknown or inaccessible to them (Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, 
Arregle, & Borza, 2000).  
Taking a knowledge-based view, resource diversity is likely to moderate the 
relationship between cooperative alliance orientation and knowledge creation. Although 
cooperative alliance orientation is expected to be positively related to knowledge creation 
in the alliance as proposed in Hypothesis 1, this relationship is expected to depend on the 
level of resource diversity between the partnering organizations. Firms with high 
cooperative alliance orientation should be able to create more knowledge compared to 
firms that have low cooperative alliance orientation, but actual knowledge creation will 
depend on the firm being able to identify synergies between partnering organizations for 
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mutual benefit. Firms with a cooperative alliance orientation willingly and happily make 
their resources available to their partners. This unilateral commitment serves to test the 
commitment of the partner. When a partner reciprocates, this encourages norms of 
cooperation and patience in the relationship. The partner may reciprocate the gesture by 
allowing access to their resources and capabilities. This has an amplifying effect on 
contributions made by individual partners to the alliance and on partner goodwill. Firms 
that are interested in encouraging cooperation in their alliances try to create synergies 
with partners that bring different resources to the table (Stafford, 1994).  However, when 
resource diversity is low resource redundancy exists. Thus, potentially useful resources 
are not utilized to their full potential. As resource diversity increases, there is less 
resource redundancy in the alliance leading to higher utilization of partners’ resources 
(Das & Teng, 2000). This provides more opportunities for creating synergies at higher 
resource diversity. Indeed, Harrison et al. (1991) found that greater resource diversity 
among merging firms provided more opportunities to create synergies and ultimately led 
to improved firm performance post-merger as reflected in return on equity. Thus, as 
resource diversity increases, cooperative oriented firms will be able to create more 
knowledge in their alliance because they actively utilize more synergies between the 
partners’ resources.  
Thus, it is hypothesized: 
H4(a): Resource diversity moderates the relationship between cooperative alliance 
orientation and knowledge creation such that at lower levels of diversity there will 
be a weaker positive relationship between cooperative alliance orientation and 
knowledge creation and at higher levels of diversity there will be a stronger positive 
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relationship between cooperative alliance orientation and knowledge creation for 
both upstream and downstream alliances. 
This hypothesis can be restated by looking from the opposite ends of alliance 
orientation and interorganizational knowledge management. Resource diversity is likely 
to moderate the relationship between competitive alliance orientation and knowledge 
acquisition in strategic alliances. Although competitive alliance orientation is expected to 
be positively related to knowledge acquisition as implied in Hypothesis 1, the 
relationship will depend on the level of resource diversity in the alliance. Firms that have 
a high competitive alliance orientation should be able to acquire more knowledge from 
their partners compared to firms that have a low competitive alliance orientation, but 
actual knowledge acquisition will depend on the relative opportunity to acquire 
knowledge from the alliance. At low resource diversity, both organizations bring similar 
resources to the table and it is difficult to distinguish between partners’ resources. In such 
a situation, the competitive oriented organization may be able to ‘push’ through with its 
agenda, at least in the short-term, because the other firm will not want to jeopardize the 
alliance by insisting upon a potentially divisive argument over the benefits from 
partnering (Gerwin & Ferris, 2004). However, as resource diversity increases and each 
organization’s resources become more easily distinguishable, the other organization will 
tend to push toward early implementation of an equity principle to decide the benefits 
from the alliance17 (Jap, 2001). Once implemented, this will make it difficult for the 
competitively oriented organization to get maximum asymmetric benefits for itself from 
the alliance. Thus, as resource diversity increases the opportunities to acquire knowledge 
                                                 
17 Equity rule specifies that each member’s payoffs are a function of its contribution to the alliance. This is 
different from an equality rule where each party receives an equal share of the payoffs- a 50/50 split (Jap, 
2001).  
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for self-benefit will decrease and competitively oriented organization will find it difficult 
to acquire knowledge from the alliance. Without a simultaneous consideration of its’ 
competitive alliance orientation and resource diversity in the alliance, a firm is likely to 
encounter a situation in which despite its proclivity to acquire the knowledge, it is not 
able to do so.  
Thus, it is hypothesized: 
H4(b): Resource diversity moderates the relationship between competitive alliance 
orientation and knowledge acquisition such that at lower levels of diversity there 
will be a stronger positive relationship between competitive alliance orientation and 
knowledge acquisition and at higher levels of diversity there will be a weaker 
positive relationship between competitive alliance orientation and knowledge 
acquisition for both upstream and downstream alliances.  
Resource diversity is also likely to moderate the relationship between entrepreneurial 
leadership orientation and knowledge creation. Although entrepreneurial leadership 
orientation is expected to be positively related to knowledge creation in the alliance as 
noted in Hypothesis 2, this relationship tends to depend on the level of resource diversity 
between the partnering organizations. Firms with high entrepreneurial leadership 
orientation have the potential to create more knowledge compared to firms that have low 
entrepreneurial leadership orientation, but actual knowledge creation will depend on the 
firm being able to pursue and innovatively combine new technological and product 
options. Entrepreneurial leaders have an all-consuming passion for the creation and 
pursuit of new opportunities without much regard to the resources they control 
(Stevenson, 1985). They are adept at flexible resource deployment which allows them to 
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pursue multiple strategic options simultaneously. Strategic alliances provide 
entrepreneurial leaders with access to resources from other organizations which they can 
use or leverage as they consider appropriate. When resource diversity is low and there is 
more redundancy in resources of partnering organizations, entrepreneurial leaders will 
have access to fewer new resources, than when resource diversity is high and there is low 
redundancy (Das & Teng, 2000). As resource diversity increases and a larger array of 
resources become available to the firm, entrepreneurial leaders will be motivated to 
embark on even more new project options and seek partner assistance in assessing and 
implementing those options. Scholars have suggested that knowledge creation will be 
enhanced when more strategic project options are pursued (McGrath & Nerkar, 2004). 
Thus, as resource diversity increases the relationship between entrepreneurial leadership 
and knowledge creation will become even stronger. 
Thus, it is hypothesized: 
H5(a): Resource diversity moderates the relationship between entrepreneurial 
leadership orientation and knowledge creation such that at lower levels of diversity 
there will be a weaker positive relationship between entrepreneurial leadership 
orientation and knowledge creation and at higher levels of diversity there will be a 
stronger positive relationship between entrepreneurial leadership orientation and 
knowledge creation for both upstream and downstream alliances.  
This hypothesis can be restated by looking from the perspective of the opposite ends 
of leadership orientation and interorganizational knowledge management. Resource 
diversity is likely to moderate the relationship between managerial leadership orientation 
and knowledge acquisition in strategic alliances. Although managerial leadership 
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orientation is expected to be positively related to knowledge acquisition as implied in 
Hypothesis 2, the relationship may depend on the level of resource diversity in the 
alliance. Firms that have a high managerial leadership orientation are expected to acquire 
more knowledge from their partners compared to firms that have a low managerial 
leadership orientation, but actual knowledge acquisition will depend on the efficiency 
with which knowledge can be acquired. This is because managerial leaders seek targeted 
knowledge the firm does not yet possess in order to efficiently build and develop 
products that can meet customers’ existing needs. Managerial leaders need to enhance 
their firms’ knowledge base quickly and can do so more easily when they partner with 
firms that have similar resources and capabilities and who are believed to possess 
knowledge the firm needs to fill the gaps in its knowledge. Indeed, low resource diversity 
between partners helps reduce coordination costs between partners (Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1996). As resource diversity increases, the cost of acquiring partners’ 
knowledge will increase as it becomes harder to both recognize the targeted knowledge 
and to extract it from its unique context and apply it in a new resource context. Thus, it 
will no longer be economically efficient to compete through knowledge acquisition 
(Gerwin & Ferris, 2004). This is consistent with the idea that alliances that provide firms 
with “inappropriate resources” (those beyond the current scope of the firm’s interests) 
increase the burdens on management and increase the cost of partnering (Deeds & Hill, 
1996: 47).  
Thus, when firms high on managerial leadership orientation partner with 
organizations that have low resource diversity, they will acquire more targeted 
knowledge from the alliance. When such firms partner with organizations that have high 
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resource diversity, they will acquire less targeted knowledge from the alliance. Without a 
simultaneous consideration of its’ managerial leadership orientation and resource 
diversity in the alliance, a firm is likely to encounter a situation in which it is unable to 
efficiently acquire the knowledge that it wants.  
Thus, it is hypothesized: 
H5(b): Resource diversity moderates the relationship between managerial 
leadership orientation and knowledge acquisition such that at lower levels of 
diversity there will be a stronger positive relationship between managerial 
leadership orientation and knowledge acquisition and at higher levels of diversity 
there will be a weaker positive relationship between managerial leadership 
orientation and knowledge acquisition for both upstream and downstream alliances.  
Resource diversity is likely to moderate the relationship between generative learning 
orientation and knowledge creation. Although generative learning orientation is expected 
to be positively related to knowledge creation in the alliance based on Hypothesis 3, this 
relationship tends to depend on the level of resource diversity between the partnering 
organizations. Firms that have high generative learning orientation can create more 
knowledge compared to firms that have low generative learning orientation, but actual 
knowledge creation will depend on the firm being able to question its time-honored 
assumptions about its business. Firms with a generative learning orientation believe in 
questioning long-held assumptions about their mission, customers, capabilities, or 
strategy and adopting a new way of looking at the world (Slater & Narver, 1995). When 
they partner with firms that have low resource diversity, they are exposed to 
technological and market approaches knowledge that are not much different from their 
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own. Due to the similarity of knowledge, there is less questioning of the firms’ current 
way of thinking. Thus, the relationship between generative learning orientation and 
knowledge creation is expected to be weak at low resource diversity. However, when 
there is large resource diversity between the partners, organizations are exposed to 
resources or capabilities that they did not imagine before. This may lead them to rethink 
their existing assumptions about how products and services in their market are offered 
(e.g. books via internet rather than bookstores) or about production processes and 
technologies.  
When generative learning is encouraged and firms have a solid basis to challenge 
their assumptions because of the high resource diversity in their alliance, they explore 
and experiment with knowledge domains further from their existing ‘comfort zones’ and 
creating new knowledge in the process (Katila & Ahuja, 2002). Disagreements between 
partners and within the firm is likely because generative learning can be psychologically 
painful to participants because of the greater challenge experienced and the stress that can 
result (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). Thus, firms that pursue generative learning through 
resource diverse alliances must become highly skilled at channeling these disagreements 
and stress in productive ways. As participants’ capabilities, stress will reduce and 
employees will take great satisfaction in the knowledge created 
Thus, it is hypothesized: 
H6(a): Resource diversity moderates the relationship between generative learning 
orientation and knowledge creation such that at lower levels of diversity there will 
be a weaker positive relationship between generative learning orientation and 
knowledge creation and at higher levels of diversity there will be a stronger positive 
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relationship between generative learning orientation and knowledge creation for 
both upstream and downstream alliances. 
This hypothesis can be restated by looking from the perspective of the opposite ends 
of learning orientation and interorganizatonal knowledge management. Resource 
diversity is likely to moderate the relationship between adaptive learning orientation and 
knowledge acquisition. Although adaptive learning orientation is expected to be 
positively related to knowledge acquisition in the alliance as implied by Hypothesis 3, 
this relationship may depend on the resource diversity between the alliance partners. 
Firms that have high adaptive learning orientation should be able to acquire more 
targeted knowledge which they lack from other organizations compared to firms that 
have low adaptive learning orientation. However, actual knowledge acquisition will 
depend on whether it can identify and recontextualize knowledge that needs to be 
acquired. When firms high on adaptive learning orientation partner with organizations 
that have similar resources and/or capabilities, they can more readily acquire knowledge 
from the partner. This is because knowledge acquisition is enhanced when prior 
knowledge is “closely related to the new knowledge to facilitate assimilation” (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990: 136). These scholars argue that organizational memory is self-
reinforcing in that the more knowledge an organization has of a particular domain, the 
more readily it can acquire more knowledge in the same domain. Thus, adaptive learning 
organizations with their tendency to reinforce their existing knowledge domains will find 
it easier to acquire knowledge from partners with similar resources and capabilities.  
When firms high on adaptive learning orientation partner with organizations that have 
different resources and/or capabilities, they find it difficult to identify and acquire the 
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relevant knowledge of their partner. This is because when resource diversity is high, the 
prior knowledge of these firms is less related to the knowledge of their partners. The less 
the new knowledge is related to the prior knowledge, the more difficult the firm finds to 
acquire it (Cohen & Levinthal, 2002). For example, a firm with a prior knowledge base in 
offering computer products (e.g. Dell) will find it difficult to acquire the knowledge of 
transporting and delivering computers to individual buyers from its supply chain partner 
(e.g. UPS).  Even if the firm has high adaptive learning orientation, the high resource 
diversity will make it difficult for the firm to acquire the knowledge from its partner 
because the new knowledge will be unrelated to its prior knowledge (Zahra & George, 
2002). Without a simultaneous consideration of its adaptive learning orientation and 
resource diversity in the alliance, a firm is likely to encounter a situation in which it is 
unable to identify the knowledge that it can acquire. Firms with higher adaptive learning 
orientation are most effective at knowledge acquisition at low levels of resource 
diversity.  
Thus, it is hypothesized: 
H6(b): Resource diversity moderates the relationship between adaptive learning 
orientation and knowledge acquisition such that at lower levels of diversity there 
will be a stronger positive relationship between adaptive learning orientation and 
knowledge acquisition and at higher levels of diversity there will be a weaker 
relationship between adaptive learning orientation and knowledge acquisition for 
both upstream and downstream alliances.  
 3.4.3 Moderation Effect of Cultural diversity 
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A large body of literature on interorganizational relationships and strategic alliances 
argues that culture significantly influences alliance dynamics and has an important 
influence on the success or failure of an alliance18 (Shenkar, 2001). When partnering 
organizations have similar cultures, cultural diversity is low, but when partnering 
organizations have different cultures, cultural diversity is high.   
Cultural diversity is likely to moderate the relationship between cooperative alliance 
orientation and knowledge creation. Although cooperative alliance orientation is expected 
to be positively related to knowledge creation in the alliance as noted in Hypothesis 1, 
this relationship tends to depend on the level of cultural diversity between the partnering 
organizations. Firms with high cooperative alliance orientation should be able to create 
more knowledge compared to firms that have low cooperative alliance orientation, but 
actual knowledge creation will depend on the firm being able to maintain the ‘creative 
spark’ in its alliance. This is because a cooperative alliance orientation often leads to the 
development of friendly and fairly stable interorganizational routines between partners 
over time (Zollo, Reuer, & Singh, 2002). Routines are “recurrent interaction patterns” 
that are “repetitive, collective, self-actuating, context-dependent, … shaped by history 
and path dependent” (Becker, 2003). When interaction is guided by such friendly stable 
routines managers and employees of both organizations hesitate to criticize each other 
and disrupt the friendly status quo (Beech, MacIntosh, MacLean, Shephard, & Stokes, 
2002).  
                                                 
18 Culture is a generic term used to refer to the collective ‘mental programming’ of people in any group. 
The effect of culture on alliances can be through societal culture (e.g. Black culture, Hispanic culture), 
national culture (e.g. American culture, Japanese culture), corporate culture (e.g. the ‘GE’ way of doing 
things), and business-level culture (e.g. the culture of SW airlines). This study primarily looks at culture at 
the business level.   
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At low cultural diversity characterized by similar values and beliefs in both 
organizations, there is little reason to disturb the friendly routines. However, as cultural 
diversity increases and values and beliefs become more dissimilar, the status quo is 
disrupted more often. The stable routines for managing knowledge between partners are 
likely to be shaken-up requiring new routines to be gradually created. The more often the 
status quo is disrupted, the more often old routines must be discarded, leading to new 
insights that were hidden by previous assumptions. More generation of new knowledge 
should occur (Davenport & Prusak, 2000). This is consistent with Gersick and 
Hackman’s (1990) finding that the habitual routines that emerge in task groups when 
people work together can hinder creativity if they are not disrupted and replaced by new 
routines. Thus, as cultural diversity increases cooperative oriented firms will be able to 
take advantage of more creative sparks in the alliance and generate more knowledge.  
Thus, it is hypothesized: 
 H7(a): Cultural diversity moderates the relationship between cooperative alliance 
orientation and knowledge creation such that at lower levels of diversity there will 
be a weaker positive relationship between cooperative alliance orientation and 
knowledge creation and at higher levels of diversity there will be a stronger positive 
relationship between cooperative alliance orientation and knowledge creation for 
both upstream and downstream alliances. 
This hypothesis can be restated in restated by looking from the perspective of the 
opposite ends of alliance orientation and interorganizational knowledge management. 
Cultural diversity is likely to moderate the relationship between competitive alliance 
orientation and knowledge acquisition in strategic alliances. Although competitive 
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alliance orientation is expected to be positively related to knowledge acquisition as 
implied in Hypothesis 1, the relationship will likely depend on the level of cultural 
diversity in the alliance. Firms that have a high competitive alliance orientation can 
acquire more targeted knowledge from their partners compared to firms that have a low 
competitive alliance orientation, but actual knowledge acquisition will depend on their 
ability to understand the knowledge possessed by their partner. When cultural 
dissimilarity is low, competitive oriented organizations find it easier to acquire their 
partners’ knowledge because knowledge is grounded, or embedded, in an organization’s 
culture or established way of doing things. Indeed, it is the embeddedness of valuable 
knowledge, especially tacit knowledge that is the ultimate source of sustainable 
competitive advantage (Spender, 1996). However, when cultural diversity is high and the 
other firms’ way of thinking about things appears strange and unfamiliar, competitive 
alliance oriented firms find it difficult to acquire knowledge from their partner because 
they are not willing to invest the time and effort it takes to understand the new culture. 
This is consistent with research in international business where it is frequently seen that 
developed market firms (e.g. MNCs from the US) who are interested in acquiring 
knowledge of customers, local markets, and local government policies and regulations 
(Hitt et al., 2000) prefer alliances with partners that have a similar culture (Parkhe, 1991). 
Geringer (1991) reports that interviews with 40 Canadian and Mexican executives 
revealed that Canadian companies entering into alliances with Mexican companies to 
gain knowledge of the Mexican market and consumer preferred firms with similar values 
and goals (e.g. future objectives). Ample evidence suggests that low cultural diversity is 
helpful when firms are unwilling to make the investment to understand the culture of 
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their partner organization. It is no surprise, then, that alliances between competitive 
oriented organizations tend to collapse quickly when cultural differences between 
organizations are high (Shenkar, 2001). Thus, as cultural diversity increases, knowledge 
acquisition by competitive oriented firms decreases.  
Thus, it is hypothesized: 
H7(b): Cultural diversity moderates the relationship between competitive alliance 
orientation and knowledge acquisition such that at lower levels of diversity there 
will be a stronger positive relationship between competitive alliance orientation and 
knowledge acquisition and at higher levels of diversity there will be a weaker 
positive relationship between competitive alliance orientation and knowledge 
acquisition. 
Cultural diversity is likely to moderate the relationship between entrepreneurial 
leadership orientation and knowledge creation. Although entrepreneurial leadership 
orientation is expected to be positively related to knowledge creation in the alliance as 
implied in Hypothesis 2, this relationship tends to depend on the level of cultural 
diversity between the partnering organizations. Firms with high entrepreneurial 
leadership orientation can create more knowledge compared to firms that have low 
entrepreneurial leadership orientation. However, the actual knowledge creation will 
depend on the ability of entrepreneurial leaders to innovatively combine knowledge 
across time and space. When there is low cultural diversity in the alliance, there will be 
less opportunity for entrepreneurial leaders to cross-pollinate different ideas across time 
and space. This is because low cultural diversity constrains the variety and novelty of 
ideas to which entrepreneurial leaders will be exposed. As cultural diversity increases, 
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there will be a wider variety of ideas floating around that can be combined in new ways. 
Entrepreneurial leaders encourage the cross-pollination of these ideas through active 
experimentation to test for relative value. They encourage others to see and act as 
connections that did not exist before. However, this is a dangerous situation as it can 
easily turn chaotic when organizations with different cultural values are brought together 
to create new knowledge. Entrepreneurial leaders have a ‘disciplining vision’ that helps 
specify limits to the chaos and that reduces the potentially paralyzing effect of the chaos 
by converting it into ‘creative chaos’ for useful outcomes (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). 
Research in the product innovation literature finds that product champions who can 
clearly specify constraints and absorb the uncertainty of the chaotic situation facilitate 
innovation (Shane, 1994). Thus, as cultural diversity increases entrepreneurial leaders get 
more opportunities to act to engage in recombine knowledge in new ways. This often 
results in knowledge creation. 
Thus, it is hypothesized: 
H8(a): Cultural diversity moderates the relationship between entrepreneurial 
leadership orientation and knowledge creation such that at lower levels of diversity 
there will be a weaker positive relationship between entrepreneurial leadership 
orientation and knowledge creation and at higher levels of diversity there will be a 
stronger positive relationship between entrepreneurial leadership orientation and 
knowledge creation for both upstream and downstream alliances. 
  This hypothesis can be restated in an identical way by looking from the perspective 
of the opposite ends of leadership orientation and knowledge management. Cultural 
diversity is likely to moderate the relationship between managerial leadership orientation 
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and knowledge acquisition in strategic alliances. Although managerial leadership 
orientation is expected to be positively related to knowledge acquisition as implied in 
Hypothesis 2, the relationship may depend on the level of cultural diversity in the 
alliance. Firms that have a high managerial leadership orientation can acquire more 
knowledge from their partners compared to firms that have a low managerial leadership 
orientation. However, the actual knowledge acquisition will depend on the level of 
investment that managerial leaders will need to make to acquire that knowledge. The 
strength of managerial leaders is in thorough environmental scanning followed by careful 
analyses to set achievable goals in advance.  
When cultural diversity is low and both partners have similar beliefs and goals, the 
coordination between partners is simple. They share similar strategic goals and beliefs 
about the present and future of the industry which keeps coordination costs low and 
facilitates acquisition of knowledge. This is consistent with Rothaermel & Deeds’s (in 
press) argument that biotech companies find it easier to acquire knowledge from other 
biotech companies because of low coordination costs due to cultural similarity. Similarly, 
it has been argued that firms that focus on serving existing markets find it easier to 
acquire knowledge from downstream relationships with firms that share similar beliefs 
about the industry compared to relationships with firms that do not share the same beliefs 
(Christensen & Bower, 1996).  
As cultural diversity increases, partners’ goals and beliefs diverge, and coordination 
costs increase. Managers can no longer easily acquire knowledge as it is not clear if the 
knowledge is germane to the immediate goals they have set for their firm. The knowledge 
that is being acquired needs to be examined to see if it is compatible with and useful to 
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the firm’s goals. If it is not, managerial leaders are not interested in assimilating it in their 
firm because it is not apparent if it will be of much use to compete in the near future. 
Thus, as cultural diversity increases, the required investment to acquire knowledge 
increases for managerial leaders faster than the perceived value of such knowledge.   
Thus, it is hypothesized: 
H8(b): Cultural diversity moderates the relationship between managerial leadership 
orientation and knowledge acquisition such that at lower levels of diversity there 
will be a stronger positive relationship between managerial leadership orientation 
and knowledge acquisition and at higher levels of diversity there will be a weaker 
positive relationship between managerial leadership orientation and knowledge 
acquisition. 
Cultural diversity is likely to moderate the relationship between generative learning 
orientation and knowledge creation. Although generative learning orientation is expected 
to be positively related to knowledge creation in the alliance as noted in Hypothesis 3, 
this relationship is likely to depend on the level of cultural diversity between the 
partnering organizations. Firms that have high generative learning orientation can create 
more knowledge compared to firms that have low generative learning orientation. 
However, actual knowledge creation will depend on the firm being able to challenge its 
own existing beliefs and assumptions. When cultural diversity is low and there are few 
value differences between partners, generative learning oriented firms are able to 
challenge their core beliefs and taken-for-granted assumptions in a more limited way. 
However, as cultural diversity increases, there is an increase in “requisite variety” of 
knowledge structures to match the cultural complexity of the alliance environment. This 
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provides generative learning organizations with access to a larger, more complex pool of 
ideas and values to work with (Davenport & Prusak, 2000). Contradictions to existing 
assumptions about what people want or their preferences must now be considered by the 
firm. This may lend added strength to existing minority views in the organization and 
cause those to be considered more seriously than in the past (Weick, 1995). Thus, higher 
cultural diversity provides the generative learning oriented organization more 
opportunities to engage in higher order learning and create new knowledge.  
Thus, it is hypothesized: 
H9(a): Cultural diversity moderates the relationship between generative learning 
orientation and knowledge creation such that at lower levels of diversity there will 
be a weaker positive relationship between generative learning orientation and 
knowledge creation and at higher levels of diversity there will be a stronger positive 
relationship between generative learning orientation and knowledge creation for 
both upstream and downstream alliances.  
This hypothesis can be restated by looking from the perspective of the opposite ends 
of learning orientation and interorganizational knowledge management. Cultural diversity 
is likely to moderate the relationship between adaptive learning orientation and 
knowledge acquisition. Although adaptive learning orientation is expected to be 
positively related to knowledge acquisition in the alliance as implied in Hypothesis 3, this 
relationship may depend on the cultural diversity between the alliance partners. Firms 
that have high adaptive learning orientation can acquire more new knowledge from other 
organizations compared to firms that have low adaptive learning orientation. However, 
actual knowledge acquisition will depend on whether the firm is able to understand and 
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process the knowledge that may be acquired. When firms high on adaptive learning 
orientation partner with organizations that have a similar language and culture, it is easier 
for them to acquire knowledge of their partner. Adaptive learning organizations tend to 
filter all external knowledge based on their existing values and assumptions. If new 
knowledge appears unrelated to existing knowledge, adaptive learning organizations will 
tend to simply filter it out. When there is low cultural diversity not much translation is 
required to understand partner’s knowledge and assimilate it with the existing knowledge.  
This is consistent with Lane and Lubatkin (1998) argument that when firms ‘get close’ 
and understand each other’s culture- the social context in which knowledge is embedded, 
the relative absorptive capacity of the adaptive oriented firm with its partners increases, 
and they will be more effective at acquiring knowledge from the partner firm. As cultural 
diversity between firm’s increases, partner’s knowledge appears increasingly unrelated to 
the prior knowledge of the firm. The translation required for knowledge acquisition will 
be more difficult. Lane and Lubatkin (1998) argue that as cultural diversity increases, it 
becomes more difficult to understand the social context in which knowledge is grounded 
in the other firm, the relative absorptive capacity will decrease and adaptive learning 
oriented firm will find it more difficult to acquire knowledge, particularly tacit 
knowledge, from its partner. In a study of Hungarian joint ventures, Lyles and Salk 
(1996) found that misunderstandings due to cultural differences between parent firms 
moderated the relationship between firm’s capacity to acquire knowledge (absorptive 
capacity) and the amount of knowledge acquired from the alliance. Thus, cultural 
diversity will moderate the positive relationship between adaptive learning orientation 
and knowledge acquisition such that as cultural diversity increases relative absorptive 
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capacity decreases, thereby reducing knowledge acquisition for adaptive learning 
organizations.  
Thus, it is hypothesized: 
H9(b): Cultural diversity moderates the relationship between adaptive learning 
orientation and knowledge acquisition such that at lower levels of diversity there 
will be a stronger positive relationship between adaptive learning orientation and 
knowledge acquisition and at higher levels of diversity there will be a weaker 
positive relationship between adaptive learning orientation and knowledge 
acquisition for both upstream and downstream alliances.  
3.5 Interorganizational Knowledge Management and Firm Performance 
In a recent critique, Eisenhardt and Santos (2002) lamented that despite the increasing 
popularity of the knowledge-based view, its impact on firm performance has not been 
empirically examined. This is an important criticism as the final test of any strategic 
management theory is its influence on firm performance (Pettigrew, Thomas, & 
Whittington, 2002). Despite the emphasis on knowledge as the most important source of 
a firm’s competitive advantage (Spender, 1996) in the knowledge-based view, the 
relationship between knowledge and performance has been accepted as an article of faith, 
rather than extensively investigated empirically. This omission is probably because 
knowledge management has been proposed to influence other firm-level outcomes such 
as enhancing new product development (Madhavan & Grover, 1998), contributing new 
product success (Yang, Yu, & Lee, 2002), increasing new technological expertise (Russ 
& Camp, 1997), and decreasing costs by improving productivity (Dyer & Noebeka, 
2000). These outcomes have been shown to have a positive influence on firm 
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performance in other studies. This study examines the direct impact of the two modes of 
knowledge management in strategic alliances on firm performance.     
With respect to knowledge creation, Appleyard (2002) examined the interaction 
between three semiconductor firms and their suppliers and found that these firms 
frequently initiated equipment modification projects with their suppliers that led to 
creation of new knowledge in the industry. Rothaermal and Deeds (2004) examined the 
impact of ‘exploration alliances’- alliances that a firm enters into with the motivation to 
discover something new- on new product development in a sample of biotechnology 
firms. They found support for their hypothesis that a firm’s exploration alliances are 
significant in predicting the level of new product development.  
Yli-Renko et al. (2001) studied knowledge acquisition from key customer 
relationships for high-tech firms and found it to have a positive relationship with new 
product development and a negative relationship with sales costs. Lyles and Salk (1996) 
looked at knowledge acquisition from parent companies for Hungarian joint ventures 
(equity-based strategic alliances) and found it to have a positive impact on firm 
performance as measured by increasing business volume, market share, and profitability.  
These findings suggest that both knowledge creation and knowledge acquisition in 
non-equity supply chain alliances will have a direct positive influence on firm 
performance. A number of scholars contend that alliances should either primarily involve 
knowledge creation or knowledge acquisition (Ding & Peters, 2000; Grant & Baden-
Fuller, 2004). Strategic alliances that are ‘stuck in the middle’ and are not clearly 
knowledge creation or knowledge acquisition will be less effective and may even be 
detrimental to firm performance. This is because knowledge creation and knowledge 
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acquisition are expected to demand correspondent firm strategies as hypothesized above. 
It is hypothesized that firms that are unable to choose a consistent strategic orientation for 
interorganizational knowledge management will be ineffective at both knowledge 
creation and knowledge acquisition because of inappropriate combinations of 
incompatible organizational design and reward system elements. 
Thus, it is hypothesized: 
H10: Primary emphasis on either knowledge creation or knowledge acquisition will 
be more positively related to firm performance than mixing knowledge creation and 
knowledge acquisition in the alliance. 
3.5.1 Moderation Effect of Industry Knowledge Complexity 
Industries tend to vary in the complexity of their knowledge base. For example, 
although knowledge may be important for both the computer chip and the potato chip 
industry, the complexity of knowledge required to compete in the two industries is vastly 
different because of differences in the amount, type, novelty, and sophistication of 
knowledge between industries. Systematic industry-level variation in knowledge may be 
substantial due to fundamental differences in markets, technologies, and the expertise 
deployed in each industry (Coff, 1999). Thus, the level of knowledge complexity of the 
industry is expected to influence whether interorganizational knowledge creation or 
acquisition will have a higher positive influence on organizational performance. 
In industries characterized by high knowledge complexity, typically there are 
alternative knowledge domains that may impact products and technologies. Each of these 
domains will involve different knowledge components (Grant & Baden-Fuller, 2004). 
This leads to increased uncertainty vis-à-vis the future knowledge requirements of current 
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products and technologies, expertise and skills in that industry. Firms need to be able to 
integrate different knowledge domains to compete effectively when knowledge 
complexity is high. For example, firms making cell phones need to integrate knowledge 
from more domains compared to firms making simple phones. When knowledge 
complexity is high, it is not easy for an outsider to enter the industry and compete 
effectively because of the experience and accumulated knowledge required to understand 
the current developments in the industry. The knowledge of such industries can not be 
easily articulated in manuals and procedures, making it difficult for firms to compete by 
simple acquiring knowledge. It becomes risky for firms to invest in strategic alliances 
that are targeted at acquiring the existing knowledge of their partner firms. Thus, in 
industries characterized by high knowledge complexity investment in knowledge creation 
alliances will have a more positive impact on firm performance. 
However, creating new knowledge is not inexpensive (Nonaka, 1994). Knowledge 
creation is an inherently time consuming process that requires sustained investment of 
firm resources because of long incubation periods. For this reason, it is likely that the 
costs and incentives of knowledge creation alliances for firms competing in industries 
that have low knowledge complexity will differ from those that are in industries that have 
high knowledge complexity. In industries characterized by low knowledge complexity, 
firms can easily acquire the necessary knowledge from external sources. Important 
knowledge can be articulated easily and recorded in tangible mediums such as records 
and manuals. For example, in the last few decades the technological knowledge of VCRs 
has become commonly available. New firms can easily enter such industries as 
knowledge of different products and technologies is commonly available. The integration 
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of different knowledge domains is quite simple and involves knowledge of fewer areas. 
Firms competing in such industries can expect to compete effectively by using the 
knowledge that has been developed by others. For example, a firm wishing to enter the 
VCR industry today does not need to create new knowledge, it can simply partner with 
firms that are familiar with manufacturing VCRs and acquire the knowledge from them. 
In such industries, rather than invest in creating new knowledge, it is much more 
effecient for firms to form knowledge acquisition alliances to gain knowledge relatively 
quickly. Thus, in industries characterized by low knowledge complexity knowledge 
acquisition alliances will have a more positive influence on firm performance.  
H11: Industry knowledge complexity will have a moderating influence on the 
relationship between interorganizational knowledge management and firm 
performance such that at higher levels of industry complexity knowledge creation 
will have a stronger positive relationship with firm performance and at lower levels 
of industry complexity knowledge acquisition will have a stronger positive 
relationship with firm performance.  
To summarize, this chapter presents the hypotheses to examine the relationship of 
two modes of interorganizational knowledge management with firm strategy and 
performance. It is hypothesized that the three dimensions of strategic orientation 
(alliance, leadership, and learning) will have direct impact on knowledge creation and 
knowledge acquisition. Further, the interfirm diversity between alliance partners is 
believed to moderate the relationship between the three dimensions of strategic 
orientation and the two modes of interorganizational knowledge management. It is also 
hypothesized that knowledge creation and knowledge acquisition alliances will have a 
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more positive impact on firm performance compared to alliances that mix both 
knowledge creation and acquisition. Further, the knowledge complexity of the industry is 
believed to moderate the relationship between the two modes of interorganizational 
knowledge management and firm performance.  
The next chapter describes the sample, the research methodology, and the measures 
used for this study.      
  
  108
CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the methodology used to answer the 
research questions: (1) How does firm strategy affect management of knowledge in the 
strategic supply chain relationships? and (2) How does knowledge management affect 
firm performance?  A good research design is “an important prerequisite” to organization 
studies and can advance our understanding of the many “complex” questions of this field 
(Grunow, 1995: 94). The importance of a good research design becomes even more 
salient in studies of knowledge management because most published research studies in 
this field are either theoretical contributions or practitioner oriented articles while 
considerably less attention has been given to empirical investigation (Hall & Adriani, 
1999). Inkpen (2002) argues that before any advancement can be made in understanding 
interorganizational knowledge management, researchers need to operationalize 
knowledge-based strategic alliances, something that has been largely avoided in extant 
research. In recent years, some scholars (e.g. Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004; Simonin, 1997) 
have empirically examined knowledge exchanges in strategic alliances though they do 
not explicitly use the knowledge-based view as a theoretical lens.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. The first section of this chapter describes how the 
sample of firms was drawn from the target population. The data collection methods are 
described in the next section. The measures used by this study are discussed in the 
subsequent section. The chapter closes with a brief summary.  
4.1 Sample 
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Because the purposes of this study are to examine the influence of firm strategy on 
interorganizational knowledge management and the relationship between 
interorganizational knowledge management and firm performance, the hypotheses need 
to be tested in industries in which interorganizational alliances are common and in which 
knowledge management is expected to be an important factor in alliances. The high-
technology sector meets this criterion. Interorganizational alliances are very common in 
the high-technology sector (Almeida, Phene, & Grant, 2003). It is almost imperative for 
high-tech firms to form strategic alliances with other organizations because a large part of 
innovative activity in high-tech industries occurs through alliances (Hagedoorn, 1993; 
Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). Typically, strategic alliances in the high-tech sector are not 
equity-based (Mowery et al, 1996), thus making firms in this industry particularly 
suitable for our study19.  
The high-technology sector has a “special place” in both entrepreneurship and 
strategic management research (Autio, 2000: 330) because high-technology firms (1) 
tend to inhabit new and emerging industry sectors, (2) are the source of most innovative 
activity in the economy and (3) have been considered as drivers of regional economic 
growth not only in the US (e.g. Silicon Valley in California and Route 128 around 
Boston) but also in other countries (e.g. Bangalore and Hyderabad in India, Hertzelia and 
Tel Aviv in Israel).  
                                                 
19 The definition of strategic alliances adopted in this study is widely accepted in the literature: Long term 
inter-organizational relationships that remain short of full integration of identities, cultures, and capabilities 
(Mitchell & Singh, 1996; Tallman, 2000; Tsang, 1999). Only alliances in which partnering organizations 
remain independent entities are considered ruling out equity partnerships (Mitchell & Singh, 1996).  Equity 
alliances are highly formal and more structured with partner responsibilities and authority clearly specified, 
making them qualitatively different from non-equity alliances in which partner roles are flexible and 
malleable (Osborn & Baughn, 1990). Other scholars (e.g. Wathne & Heide, 2004) in the supply chain area 
have also adopted a similar definition of strategic alliances, confirming that in the unique context of supply 
chain relationships it is useful to consider non-equity alliances as distinct from equity alliances.  
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The high technology sector has also been a focus of research from a knowledge-based 
view in recent years (e.g. Yli-Renko et al, 2001). This is because the high-tech sector has 
been recognized as having some of the most difficult strategic issues, such as rapid 
market changes, fast pace of technological development, and innovation through alliances 
rather within organizations (Shan, Walker, & Kogut, 1994; Williamson, 1999). The 
rapidly emerging theoretical framework of the knowledge-based view with its unique 
focus on knowledge is capable of dealing with these issues and advancing our knowledge 
of how high-technology companies innovate and compete.  
In electing to focus on strategic alliances in the high technology sector, this 
dissertation combines some benefits of both single industry and multi-industry studies. 
Single-industry studies are higher than multi-industry studies in internal validity and 
reliability while multi-industry studies are higher than single-industry study on external 
validity and generalizability (Mulligan, 2002). This is because single-industry studies 
help avoid confounding by industry type (e.g. avoids comparing computer chip 
manufacturers with potato chip manufacturers) and avoid the mixing of industry-specific 
externalities that may work differently or in opposite directions in different industries 
(Baum, Locke, & Smith, 2001). Multi-industry studies offer an examination of which 
effects are statistically significant across studies, and consequently are more applicable 
across a range of industries (Dess, Ireland, & Hitt, 1990). A single industry study helps to 
increase the reliability of knowledge management measures by assuring a more 
homogeneous pool of knowledge management activities. The high-tech sector represents 
a constrained multi-industry sample sharing common industry characteristics (such as 
rapid market change, high innovation activity). This allows for leveraging the above 
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noted benefits of single-industry and multi-industry studies. Based on the distinctive 
characteristics of the high-tech sector, it is judged that the pool of knowledge 
management activities would be sufficiently homogeneous to outweigh the gains that 
could have been possible from doing this study with only one high technology industry. 
Conversely, it was judged that a more broad-based industry sample would threaten the 
reliability of the measures because of the different types of knowledge management 
activities in each industry.   
For the purpose of this dissertation, high technology firms are defined as those in 
computers, telecommunication equipment, electronics, industrial instruments, and 
software, a definition drawn from the American Electronics Association (American 
Electronics Association, 1999). This includes firm in industries with three-digit SIC 
codes 357, 366, 367, 382, and 737 respectively20.  
A random sample of 2500 firms in the above-noted five 3-digit SIC codes was 
generated using the electronic version of the CorpTech Directory of Technology 
Companies. CorpTech is a database of technology companies spanning a number of SIC 
codes. The database has extensive information on 95,553 business organizations. Due to 
the large number and variety of business organizations in the database it was important to 
develop a systematic protocol that would help select firms that closely matched the 
selection criteria. In the first step, firm ownership was used as a selection criterion. The 
CorpTech database lists business organizations as private, public, partnership, unit of 
public, unit of private, unit of partnership, not-for-profit, unit of not-for-profit, unit of 
government, government, and unit of foreign companies. Companies that were 
                                                 
20 This definition of high-tech excludes firms in other industries that may be considered high-technology 
such as biochemistry, pharmaceutical, and alternative fuel engines.  
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subsidiaries of other companies, non-profit companies, and government organizations 
were eliminated leaving 81,672 businesses with public, private, or partnership ownership 
in the dataset. It was believed that companies with private, public, and partnership 
ownership would differ from government organizations, non-profits, and subsidiaries. 
Non-profit companies and government organizations tend to concentrate less on revenue 
and profitability and subsidiaries of large corporations have relatively less autonomy 
compared to private, public, and partnership firms.  
In the second step, firms were screened based on size. This was done in two parts 
based on number of employees and total sales. All firms that had less than 10 employees 
or more than 500 employees or declined to report their employee strength in the database 
were eliminated leaving 59,451 businesses in the database. Then, all firms with annual 
sales less than one million dollars and more than 500 million dollars were eliminated. 
This helped eliminate very small and very large firms from the dataset leaving 24023 
firms in the dataset. Eliminating very small and very large firms from the sample was 
important because such firms tend to differ considerably in resource endowments, 
organizational structure, and strategic issues from the averaged-size firms. Also, as it was 
considered important to focus on single business firms rather than diversified firms, the 
upper limit of 500 employees and $500 million sales volume were considered important 
to eliminate most diversified firms from the sample.  
Next, all firms that reported SIC codes 357, 366, 367, 382, and 787 were selected. As 
the CorpTech database records SIC codes at a 4-digit level, all firms that reported their 4-
digit SIC code as falling under any of these five 3-digit SIC codes were selected. In total, 
firms in thirty four 4-digit SIC codes were selected, reducing the dataset to 9006 
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organizations. Appendix 4.1 provides details of the four-digit SIC codes included in this 
study.  
In the last step, all companies that reported non-US ownership were eliminated 
because foreign firms operate in considerably different institutional and cultural 
environment than domestic firms. The final sample of 8944 firms was used to randomly 
select 2500 firms that were further divided into two samples: The main sample of 1800 
firms and a hold-out sample of 700 firms to be contacted in case of low response rate.  
4.2  Method 
The use of managerial perceptions of firm-level variables like strategy is quite 
common in management research (Lyon, Lumpkin, & Dess, 2000; Naman & Slevin, 
1993) and can be measured in two different ways using a Likert scale. The first method, 
used commonly in business research, requires managers to report their perception of 
relevant firm-level variables on unipolar items that describe their firm in a particular way 
(e.g. “We help our customers anticipate developments in their markets” used by Narver et 
al. (2004) and “Our products/services have many unique features” used by Barney, 
Busenitz, Fiet & Moesel (1996)). The second method, used relatively less in business 
research, requires managers to respond to bipolar items (each item is a pair of opposite 
statements) arranged in forced choice format (the two opposite statements in each item 
are divided by a Likert scale). For example, Barringer & Bluedorn (1995) used a 7-point 
Likert scale to divide bipolar items measuring management style (such as, “The top 
managers of my firm favor low risk projects with normal and certain rates of return” 
versus “The top managers of my firm favor high-risk projects with changes of very high 
returns”).  
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The study was conducted in two stages, an academic phase and a practitioner phase, 
using a discovery-oriented approach (Menon, Bharadwaj, Adidam, & Edison, 1999). A 
discovery oriented approach involves supplementation of theoretical perspective 
(academic phase) with a field-based perspective (practitioner phase) involving senior 
executives (Zander & Kogut, 1995). Scale development started with a literature review 
from which a pool of items was generated for each of the constructs. These initial items 
were refined and adapted through conversations with the faculty expert supervising this 
research.   
An initial survey (Appendix 4.2) was administered to a limited number of academic 
scholars interested in business issues. Of 26 academicians were given the opportunity to 
participate, 14 respondents provided usable responses. Two main objectives of this phase 
were to (1) establish discriminant validity of the strategic orientation measures and 
knowledge management measures and (2) establish that statements believed to be 
opposite to each other were, in fact, opposites. Accordingly, key constructs were defined 
followed by a request to indicate the extent to which items measured the key construct. 
Each item was a pair of statements arranged adjacent to each other based on their 
perceived opposition and respondents were requested to indicate the degree of opposition 
between the two statements. The survey consisted of 19 alliance orientation items, 15 
leadership orientations items, 11 learning orientation items, and 7 knowledge 
management items. Quantitative feedback was collected through the survey instrument 
which was designed to capture views on the validity and appropriateness of items. 
Qualitative feedback was collected through one-on-one meetings with a subset of 
respondent scholars (about 50% of the total respondents). These scholars were 
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encouraged to think aloud and verbalize the logic they followed when answering the 
items. Two important findings from the academic phase were that (1) some items 
appeared to be measuring two or more constructs, and (2) some items in the same item 
set did not appear to be opposite to each other. The research instrument was modified on 
the basis of the qualitative and quantitative feedback received. The data collected at this 
stage were analyzed only visually and items were dropped, modified, or combined based 
on the feedback received. Three alliance orientation items, two leadership orientation 
items, and one learning orientation item were dropped because they could not be 
classified unambiguously under one construct. Please refer to Table 4.1 for items deleted 
at this phase.   
In stage two, the survey instrument was pre-tested on a limited sample of key 
executives who were either currently or had previously been at responsible managerial 
positions in business organizations. The purpose of this phase was to examine (1) 
whether the executives perceived the two statements in each item to be opposite, (2) 
whether the knowledge management measures appeared legitimate, and (3) if the alliance 
orientation measures showed the same pattern for both supplier and customer 
relationships. Two versions of the survey were administered (see Appendix 4.3 a & b for 
a copy of the survey), one with questions about strategic alliances on the customer side 
and other with the supplier side. 16 usable responses (11 customer side and 5 supplier 
side) were received. Most of the respondents (13 of 16) were Caucasian males with an 
average age of about 47 years and work experience of about 23 years, half of them in 
high-technology companies.  
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In examining whether the executives perceived correlations between the two 
statements in each item to be opposite, the correlations ranged from -0.327 to -0.807 for 
alliance orientation (16 items), from .083 to -0.763 for leadership orientation (13 items), 
and -.037 to -0.839 for learning orientation (10 items). Correlation analyses revealed that 
some items had low correlation for the pair of opposite statements. Four alliance 
orientation items, three leadership orientation items and two learning orientation items 
were dropped because of low correlation. One knowledge management item was dropped 
because it was believed to be redundant with the other items measuring knowledge 
management. Please refer to Table 4.1 for items deleted at this phase.   
Some items were rephrased or reworded based on feedback to make them more 
understandable. After dropping these items the correlations ranged from -0.429 to -0.827 
for alliance orientation, -0.246 to -0.763 for leadership orientation, and -0.455 to -0.839 
for learning orientation.  
 A valuable finding from the practitioner phase was that though practitioners saw 
strategic orientation scales as forced choice as expected, they did not perceive knowledge 
creation and knowledge acquisition statements which were framed to refer to the same 
knowledge domain as polar opposites (correlations ranged from -0.229 to 0.296 ). Thus, 
for the actual survey the strategic orientation items were reframed as forced-choice but 
the knowledge management items were retained as single pole items.  
When the pattern of correlation between opposite statements of each item was 
compared between suppliers and customers visually, the pattern was found to be similar 
suggesting no major differences between supplier and customer alliances on alliance 
  117
orientation. Thus, alliance orientation items were asked once as generic to both supplier 
and customer alliances rather than separately for each type of alliance. 
Adopting the two-stage discovery oriented approach facilitated improved face and 
content validity of the measures. It helped increase confidence that respondents 
understood instructions, questions, and response scales in intended ways. The final 
instrument was sent to two retired senior business executives to get feedback on face 
validity. They suggested minor changes to improve readability that were incorporated in 
the final survey (e.g. more white space between text lines on the last page of the survey). 
Appendix 4.4 provides the final survey.  
The target recipients of the survey in this study were senior executives. The strategic 
nature of the survey’s content, the focus on interorganizational issues such as knowledge 
management, and the probing of firm performance necessitates the choice of top 
executives, whose understanding and fields of action pertain to overall organizational 
issues (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Simonin, 1997). Further, they are also the most 
qualified to direct the questionnaire to other individuals in the organizations who are 
competent on the subject. Use of key informants in survey research dealing with 
perceptions of top executives regarding strategic (e.g. Brews & Hunt, 1999; Farrell & 
Oczkowski, 2002; Lumpkin & Dess, 1995; Moorman & Miner, 1995), alliance 
(Rindfleisch & Moorman, 2001; Wathne & Heide, 2004) or knowledge management (e.g. 
Johnson, 2002) issues is common. Alliance researchers have found that when informants 
are assured anonymity, their responses about their own organization and their conduct in 
the alliance tend to be frank and honest (Kandemir, Ghauri, & Cavusgil, 2002; 
Sakakibara, 1997).   
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It was decided that potential informants would be contacted in two waves- 1800 firms 
in the first wave, the balance of 700 in the second if the response from the first wave was 
not sufficient. The procedure recommended and adopted by Sarkar, Echambadi, and 
Harrison (2001) and Kandemir et al. (2002) was followed initially. A letter and return 
envelope was sent to CEOs requesting participation and asking for the contact details of 
senior-level executives knowledgeable about the company’s strategic processes and 
activities (the CEO could identify himself/herself). In exchange for their participation, 
firms were promised a summary of the research findings. A response rate of about 10% 
was expected which Hambrick, Geletkanycz, and Fredrickson (1993) indicate is typical 
for mail surveys with a top management population. This letter was to be followed by 
mailing the survey to firms that agreed to participate.  
It was also decided to collect data from a second key informant in the respondent 
firm. A high correlation in responses from two key informants (a primary informant and a 
secondary informant) would give more confidence that the data collected reflects the 
perception of the firm rather than of a single individual within the firm. Thus, about two 
weeks after data collection from the primary informants was concluded they were sent 
another email requesting them to forward the survey to another informant in their firm. 
This survey was the same survey that they had completed a few weeks back.  
4.3  Measures  
The purpose of this section is to introduce the dependent, independent, and control 
variables used in this study. While some of the scale items are based on past research, 
others have not been employed previously. All measures used in this dissertation are 
perceptual. The use of perceptual responses of key decision makers is quite common in 
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knowledge management research in the interorganizational context (e.g. Lane, Salk, & 
Lyles, 2001; Simonin, 1999). All items were scored on a 5-point Likert scale. 
4.4.1  Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables in this study are related to organizational performance and 
knowledge management in strategic alliances. There are a total of three dependent 
variables- firm performance, knowledge acquisition and knowledge creation.  
Measuring firm performance, the dependent variable of this study, is a major 
challenge for researchers (Li & Simerly, 1998) because of its broad potential domain 
(Venkataraman & Ramanujam, 1987). Most academics and practitioners agree that the 
long-term survival of the company requires attention to a wide range of performance 
measures, instead of the limited and myopic focus on short-term value creation 
(Kerssens-Van Drongelen & De Weerd Nederhof, 1999).   
Thus, a multidimensional model of business performance was used in this study. Such 
a measure reflects the degree of performance across several important aspects. Meyer & 
Gupta (1994: 309) note that unidimensional measures of performance ( such as 
accounting-based return on assets) tend to “run down or lose their capacity to 
discriminate good from bad performance, [and] trigger ongoing creation of new 
performance measures different from and therefore weakly related with existing 
measures”. Thus, researchers and practitioners must pay attention to various aspects of a 
firm’s conduct. This is especially important when dealing with high-level constructs like 
strategic orientation and knowledge management as outcomes may be favorable in some 
dimensions but not in others (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996).  
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Thus, firm performance was measured with a concise version of an instrument 
originally developed by Gupta and Govindarajan (1984) and modified by Covin (1991)21. 
Respondents were requested to rate their current performance, relative to their 
competitors, on various aspects of a firms’ performance (profitability, market share, 
revenue growth, stock price, and product development activities) on a 5-point Likert 
scale. This motivates top executives to focus their firms’ performance comparison on 
competitors that they consider important (Porac, Thomas, & Baden-Fuller, 1989), rather 
than restricting their response frame to researcher-directed specification of a particular 
comparison group (e.g. ‘your largest group’). Respondents were asked to report firm 
performance as both achieved performance (in the last three years) and expected 
performance (over the next five years). They were also asked to indicate the importance 
of all five aspects of firm performance separately. 
Weighted performance was calculated for each firm for achieved performance and 
expected performance. This will be done by summing the product of the importance of 
each aspect of performance (profitability, market share, revenue growth, stock price, and 
product development activities) with the perceived achieved (or expected) performance 
relative to its competitors. The aggregate was then divided by five for public firms and 
four for private firms (Only four of the five performance aspects are important to private 
firms whereas all 5 are important to public firms). 
Interorganizational knowledge management was measured using items that measure 
knowledge acquisition and knowledge creation. In the past, technological knowledge has 
                                                 
21 Gupta and Govindarajan (1984) developed a 12-dimensional performance measure for SBU performance 
which Covin (1991) modified to measure nine aspects of firm financial performance. Longer measures can 
result in respondent fatigue and so this study measured five aspects of performance of which only three 
were financial (profitability, revenue growth, and stock price).  
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dominated the research on knowledge management in alliances (Mowery et al., 2002). 
For this reason, in addition to technological knowledge, this study also included other 
aspects of knowledge management, such as administrative techniques, marketing 
knowledge, manufacturing and production processes, and R & D knowledge, when 
measuring knowledge acquisition and knowledge creation (Salk & Simonin, 2003).  
To measure knowledge acquisition, the items used by Lyles and Salk (1996) were 
adapted. New items were added to measure other aspects of knowledge management as 
noted above. Respondents were asked to indicate on a Likert scale of 1 to 5 their 
perception of knowledge acquired from their alliance partner in various domains. Sample 
items include respondents’ perception of (1) technological expertise acquired from 
partner, (2) marketing expertise acquired from partner, and (3) knowledge of useful 
managerial techniques acquired from partner. Lyles and Salk (1996) found their scale to 
have a Cronbach alpha of 0.88.  
To measure knowledge creation, the items used by He and Wong (2004) were 
adapted. These items ask respondents to indicate on a Likert scale of 1 to 5 their 
perception of knowledge created in the alliance in various domains. Sample items include 
(1) Our relationship with this partner has allowed us to introduce a new generation of 
products that were not available in the market earlier, (2) Our relationship with this 
partner opened up new markets for us that we were both not serving earlier, and (3) Our 
relationship with our partner has allowed us to enter into new technological fields that 
none of us was working in earlier. He and Wong (2004) found the Cronbach alpha for 
their knowledge creation scale to be 0.81.  
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Pretest of the knowledge management measures with practitioners suggested that 
knowledge creation and knowledge acquisition were not seen as opposite to each other as 
noted earlier and so both scales were included in the final survey as measured by single 
pole items. Table 4.1 presents the knowledge management items included in the final 
survey (the non-italicized items) as well as how they were obtained from existing 
literature.  
Insert Table 4.1 about here 
4.4.2  Independent Variables 
To measure strategic orientation, multi-item scales were drawn from the literature. 
Some of the items used were from published studies in the business literature while other 
items were generated based on theoretical arguments in the literature (Table 4.1 presents 
the strategic orientation items and their origins in the existing literature).  
Firm strategic orientation consisted of three dimensions- alliance orientation (12 
items), leadership orientation (10 items), and learning orientation (8 items). Forced-
choice scales were used to measure the three orientations. The two ends of the scale 
measured opposite orientations, such that the alliance orientation scale measured 
cooperative orientation on the low end and competitive orientation on the high end, 
leadership orientation scale measured entrepreneurial orientation on the low end and 
managerial on the high end, and learning orientation scale measured generative on the 
low end and adaptive on the high end. The scales were reverse scored for the analysis so 
that higher values reflected cooperative alliance orientation, entrepreneurial leadership 
orientation, and generative learning orientation, while lower values reflected competitive 
alliance orientation, managerial leadership orientation, and adaptive learning orientation. 
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Though others scholars (e.g. Barringer & Bluedorn, 1995; Covin, 1991; Miller & Friesen, 
1982) have used forced choice scales to measure firm strategy, none of the scales used in 
this dissertation have been used before.  
4.4.3.  Moderator Variables 
The organizational environment of the alliance is reflected in Parkhe’s (1991) inter-
firm diversity in alliances. Measures for resource diversity and cultural diversity were 
adapted from Sarkar et al. (2001) and Aulakh and Madhok (2002).   
The complexity of the knowledge base of the respondents’ industry was measured 
using a four item scale adapted from Zander and Kogut (1995). Respondents were asked 
to report the characteristics of the knowledge that firms require to compete in their 
industry.    
4.4.4  Control Variables 
Data were collected on a number of control variables that may have an important 
influence on knowledge management and organizational performance.  
Firm age: The age of the firm may have an influence on the firm’s management of 
knowledge in its strategic alliances (Zahra, Ireland, & Hitt, 2000). Older firms may be 
better able to manage different aspects of knowledge because of their larger resource 
endowments, while younger firms may be forced to seek knowledge outside their firm. 
Therefore, firm age was included as a control variable.  
Firm size: The size of the firm may influence knowledge management and 
organizational performance (McGrath, 2001). Larger organizations may have more 
resources to devote to their alliances. Firm size was measured as the current number of 
employees.  
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Industry growth: The growth of the industry in which the respondent firm is operating 
will influence knowledge management in strategic alliances in that industry. Firms which 
are operating in high-growth industry environments are more likely to engage in 
interorganizational knowledge management than firms in environments with lower 
growth potential (Lei, 1997). Therefore, industry growth was included as a control 
variable and measured using a 2-item scale – (1) the growth of demand for 
product/services; (2) opportunities for growth and expansion (Dess & Beard, 1984).   
Environmental uncertainty: The nature of the environment in which the respondent 
firm is competing influences its strategy, knowledge management, and performance. 
Environmental uncertainty refers to the rate of change, absence of pattern and 
unpredictability of the environment (Dess & Beard, 1984). Firms can be in more or less 
uncertain environments. Therefore, environmental uncertainty was included as a control 
variable by asking the respondents about the rate of change for product/services and 
opportunities for growth and expansion in their principal industry (Miller & Droge, 
1986). 
CEO Tenure: Strategic management scholars argue that CEO tenure, the duration of 
time the CEO has been in-charge of the organization, has a strong influence on 
organizational strategy and performance (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991). Thus, CEO 
tenure will be controlled by asking respondents to indicate, in years, the tenure of the 
CEO of their organization.  
 
4.4.5 Other Variables 
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Alliance Status: To examine the impact of the key strategic alliances on the firms’ 
business, respondents were asked to indicate how core the alliance was to their firm and 
whether or not a large portion of their business was impacted by this alliance. The 
purpose of this 2-item scale was to measure the variation between supplier and customer 
alliances on this measure.    
 To summarize, this chapter presents the sample, methodology, and measures used 
in this research study. Because supply chain alliances involve relationships at two levels 
(1) between a seller and a (downstream) customer or user and (2) between the seller and 
an upstream (supplier), data was collected from firms concerning both a key supplier 
alliance and key customer alliance. Top executives of high-technology firms were 
requested to complete measures of strategic orientation for their firm, and inter-firm 
diversity and knowledge management measures for a strategic alliance with a key 
supplier (or potential supplier) alliance and a key customer (or potential customer) 
alliance. They were also asked to complete performance measures that included deciding 
the relative importance of five aspects of firm performance aspects as well as their 
achieved and expected performance relative to their competitors over the last three years 
and the next five years respectively. Lastly, they were also asked to report their 
perception of the uncertainty, growth and complexity of the knowledge base of their 
industry.   
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CHAPTER 5 
ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
 
This chapter presents the analyses and results of this research study. As mentioned in 
Ch. 4, data was collected from top executives on their firms’ strategic orientation, 
knowledge management activities in key supply chain alliances, and performance. 
Because the objective was to capture primary data, rather than secondary data, self-
response surveys were believed to be an effective way to collect data. 
5.1  Informant Description   
Potential informants were contacted in two waves- 1800 firms in the first wave, the 
balance of 700 in the second. The contact protocol for the two waves was similar and is 
summarized in Table 5.1. The only difference in the two waves was that in the first hand 
signed, personally addressed letters were mailed to one top executive (President or CEO) 
in each company inviting them to participate in this research project (Kandemir et al., 
2001; Sarkar et al., 2001). The postal mail approach generated low response (24 
responses or 1.3% of the 1800 firms in the first wave) after 5 weeks. The low response 
rate was probably because secretaries and/or personal assistants who serve as 
‘gatekeepers’ restricted access to top executives.  
Insert Table 5.1 about here 
Firms were then contacted through email. Though some email addresses were 
collected from the CorpTech Directory, most email addresses were generated from 
company websites. Visiting company websites also helped eliminate firms that did not fit 
with the criteria (e.g. firms with more than 500 employees, online bazaars that did not 
have sales to other businesses, or local community portals and virtual meeting places that 
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did not make or sell high-tech commercial products or services directly to other 
businesses). In all, 2142 firms were contacted over the two waves. Table 5.2 summarizes 
the reasons for eliminating 358 firms from the complete sample.  
Insert Table 5.2 about here 
The first email inviting companies to participate was followed by another email after 
4-6 weeks repeating the request to participate. Companies that agreed to participate were 
sent the survey followed by two reminders to complete the survey, if they had not 
responded back within 2-3 weeks. Companies that declined to participate were removed 
from the mailing list. Respondents were encouraged to ask questions if they had any and 
were answered via phone or email. For most firms, emails were sent to one e-address 
though in situations where multiple email addresses were available, emails were sent to 
more than one address to increase the probability of response22.  
Data collection started in the third week of November with the mass mail-out of 
request letters in the third week of November 2005. The first email contact was 
established in the third week of December 2005. In all, about 6,000 emails were sent 
between December 2005 and March 2006.  102 completed surveys were received, but 
because 2 surveys were from different respondents in the same firm, 101 unique firms 
completed the survey. 1 of the 101 firms was dropped from the analysis because it had 
1600 employees (maximum firm size for this study was 500 employees and this firm had 
more than 500 employees for some time). Thus, the final sample was 100 firms with a 
response rate of 4.7% of the 2142 sampled firms that appeared to meet all sampling 
criteria.  
                                                 
22 In response to emails to multiple addresses, two completed surveys were received from 1 firm. Data 
provided by the first survey received was the only one of the two analyzed for this study. The second 
survey was considered as completed by the secondary informant.   
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Analysis of informant profile information revealed that 30 informants were the 
senior-most executive in the firm, 54 informants appeared to be direct reports to the 
senior-most executive, and 14 informants were other senior executives but probably not 
direct reports to the senior-most executive. Table 5.3 summarizes the informant profile. It 
should be noted that most of these 14 informants had been nominated by the top 
management to complete the survey questionnaire and/or reported completing the survey 
in consultation with the top management which increased confidence that the data 
collected from them reflects the perceptions of the top management (Huber & Power, 
1985).   
Insert Table 5.3 about here 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, an effort was made to obtain a completed survey from a 
second informant in the respondent firms. Email contact was made with the first 
informant towards this objective. Of the 99 firms contacted (2 completed surveys had 
already been received from one firm as mentioned earlier), only two completed surveys 
were received. Thus, a total number of 3 surveys were received from a second informant. 
Though this sample is too small to use in statistical analysis, it is interesting to note other 
scholars (e.g. Heide & John, 1990) have encountered the same problem when attempting 
to collect data from a second informant. Contact with the primary informants revealed 
that this problem may be due to time constraints imposed on top executives’ time due to 
their busy schedule.  
As all survey research involves potential non-respondent bias (Golden, 1992), a check 
for differences between responding and non-responding firms was conducted. Archival 
data on age, sales volume, and number of employees were provided by CorpTech. 
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CorpTech collects this data from a combination of survey, archival, and estimation 
modeling approaches. For this reason, all data on age, sales volume, and number of 
employees was as reported for the end of fiscal year 2004. The 100 firms that completed 
the survey were compared with the total sample to check if the respondent sample 
differed from the total sample on firm age, sales, and employees.  
Before running the t tests for comparing the two groups, the Levene’s Test for 
equality of variance was conducted. Levine’s Test indicated that the two groups have 
equal variances on age (F = .44, ns), but unequal variances on sales (F = 6.47, p < .05) 
and employees (F = 8.99, p < .01). Thus, the t-test for comparing responding firms with 
non-responding firms involved comparison for groups with equal variances on age and 
unequal variances on sales and employees. The t-test for age (t = .42, ns) and sales (t = -
1.20, ns) were found to be insignificant, but that for number of employees was found to 
be marginally significant (t = -1.86, p < .1).  
Non-respondents did not appear to differ in variance or means from responding firms 
based on age.  There appear to be clear differences in variation on size measures (with 
respondents being more variable in size than non-respondents) but once unequal variance 
on size was taken into account, mean differences in size were either only marginally 
significant (employees) or insignificant (sales) in the direction of greater size for 
responding firms 
The two samples were also compared on ownership and primary SIC Codes. 89% of 
the firms in the total sample were privately held which is very similar to the 90% share of 
privately held firms among responding firms. The respondent sample had slightly higher 
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percentage of software (63.5% compared to 58%)23 and computers (10.4% compared to 
8.0%) firms (SIC codes 357 and 737 respectively), slightly lower percentage of 
telecommunication (6.3% compared to 8.4%) and instrumentation (10.4% compared to 
16.3%) firms (SIC codes 366 and 382 respectively), and an almost equal percentage of 
electronics (9.3%) firms (SIC code 366).  
Thus, it appears that the primary difference between the two samples is in size as 
measured by the number of employees. The respondent firms have more employees on 
average than the firms in the total sample. More specifically, the 100 firms that provided 
data for this study are similar to the total sample on age, sales, ownership, and primary 
SIC code but differ on number of employees. The firms that provided data had more 
employees (mean = 84.7) than the 2142 firms in the total sample (mean = 64.05). 
5.2  Preliminary Analyses 
Strategic Orientation items were subjected to a limited simulation factor analysis to 
establish discriminant validity of the strategic orientation scales. A limited simulation, 
instead of a full factor analysis, was chosen because the sample size did not allow 
including all 30 items simultaneously in the factor analysis. Thus, ten factor analyses 
(with varimax rotation) were run with 5 items each from alliance orientation, leadership 
orientation, and learning orientation. When unconstrained, six factor analyses had a four 
factor solution (four factors with eigen values greater than 1.0) while the other four factor 
analyses had a three factor solution (three factors with eigen values greater than 1.0). For 
the six factor analyses that had a four factor solution, a 3-factor solution was constrained. 
                                                 
23 There appears to be a large number of software firms in the CorpTech sample and consequently in the 
sample used in this study. It is possible that the high proportion of software firms in the CorpTech high-
technology database may reflect a bias towards sampling software firms, but it is also possible that it is due 
to the high proportion of software firms in the 21st century economy in general. In either case, the findings 
of this study may be more generalizable to software firms than other types of high technology firms.  
  131
The resultant 450 factor loadings were analyzed for adequate loading (Table 5.3). The 
criteria were a loading of at least 0.55 on the primary factor and maximum 0.40 on a 
secondary factor. It was found that only 16 factor loadings (3.5% of the total 450 
loadings) did not meet the criteria. The factor analyses involved in these aberrant factor 
loadings are highlighted in Table 5.3. These loadings were analyzed individually. It was 
observed the aberrant loadings were limited to 4 of the total 18 items. Two of these items 
only had one or two aberrant loadings restricted to a single factor analysis and were not 
considered to be problematic in general. Two items (one leadership orientation item and 
one alliance orientation item) were identified for further consideration. It was observed 
that only the one alliance orientation item had inconsistent loadings across all factor 
analyses. This item also appeared to be primarily responsible for the fourth factor in four 
of the six factor analysis that had four factors with eigen values greater than 1.0. 
Correlation analysis confirmed that this alliance orientation item did not correlate 
consistently with other alliance orientation items whereas no such problem was observed 
for the leadership orientation item. Therefore, the aberrant alliance orientation item was 
dropped but the leadership orientation item was retained. Eliminating this one alliance 
orientation item decreased the number of aberrant loadings by 50%. The remaining items 
for each construct were averaged to form the final scale value. The Cronbach alpha for 
the 11-item alliance orientation scale, the 10-item leadership orientation scale, and the 8-
item learning orientation scale were found to be .84, .90, and .89 respectively24.   
                                                 
24 All three constructs are bipolar in nature. Due to this high values on alliance orientation correspond to 
cooperative alliance orientation while low values correspond to competitive alliance orientation. Similarly, 
high values on leadership orientation correspond to entrepreneurial leadership while low values correspond 
to managerial leadership. High values on learning orientation correspond to generative learning while low 
values correspond to adaptive learning.   
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Thus the factor analyses demonstrated good discriminant validity between the three 
dimensions (Table 5.4) even though the correlations between the three strategic 
orientation scales were found to be weak to moderately positive ranging from .10 to .43 
(as shown later in table 5.4). 
Insert Table 5.4 about here 
As noted in chapter 4, the expectation that a forced-choice bipolar measure would be 
supported for knowledge management ranging from emphasis on knowledge acquisition 
on end and emphasis on knowledge creation on the other end was disconfirmed in both 
the pre-test phases. Hence, knowledge creation and knowledge acquisition were 
measured as distinct, unipolar scales. Knowledge creation and knowledge acquisition 
items were factor analyzed separately for key supplier and customer alliance. Varimax 
rotation was used to rotate the factor solution. Surprisingly, instead of the hypothesized 
two factors the items loaded on three factors (eigen values greater than 1.0). It was found 
that the last six items, intended to include three knowledge creation items and three 
knowledge acquisition items, loaded on one factor that appeared distinct from knowledge 
creation and knowledge acquisition. The last six items which were developed for the first 
time for this study as noted in the previous chapter were, therefore, combined into a 
separate variable called General Knowledge Management and were not analyzed further 
for purposes of directly testing hypothesized relationships25. The first six items were 
classified as knowledge creation and knowledge acquisition, with items 1, 3, and 5 as 
knowledge creation and 2, 4, and 6 as knowledge acquisition. Thus, the knowledge 
creation and knowledge acquisition scales used for data analysis were nearly identical 
                                                 
25 Analyses using the new variable, General Knowledge Management, will be discussed later in the post-
hoc analyses.  
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(except for minor word changes that can be noted in Table 4.1) to the scales previously 
used by Lyles and Salk (1996) and He and Wong (2004) as noted in the previous chapter. 
Cronbach alpha revealed good scale reliability for the two measures, 0.79 and 0.71 for 
knowledge creation and knowledge acquisition respectively on the supplier side, and 0.77 
and 0.84 for knowledge creation and knowledge acquisition respectively on the customer 
side. The reliability of the knowledge creation and knowledge acquisition scales found 
here compares well with the reliability of .88 and .81 respectively found by other 
researchers as reported in the previous chapter. The variability in the reliability of the 
knowledge acquisition measure across the two supply chain alliance contexts is worth 
noting although it reached acceptable levels of reliability in both contexts.  
Factor analysis of inter-firm diversity items with varimax rotation revealed that only 
two items for resource diversity (product and manufacturing technologies and R & D 
expertise) and three items for cultural diversity (values and social norms, organizational 
culture, and personnel management practices) loaded together well. Thus, three items for 
resource diversity and two items for cultural diversity had to be dropped for poor loading. 
The resultant two item resource diversity scale had an inter-item correlation of 0.62 and 
0.76 for suppliers and customers respectively. The resultant three-item cultural diversity 
scale had a Cronbach alpha of 0.88 and 0.87 for the supplier and customer respectively. 
The greater variability in the reliability of resource diversity across the two supply chain 
alliance contexts is worth noting.  
The two item industry growth and environmental uncertainty scales were analyzed 
next. It was observed that the two scales held together well. Inter-item correlation for the 
two item measure for industry growth was 0.84 and for environmental uncertainty was 
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0.73. The four item knowledge complexity scale was found to have a Cronbach alpha of 
0.82. The inter-item correlation for alliance status was 0.77 for the key supplier alliance 
and 0.81 for the key customer alliance. 
5.3  Results 
Table 5.5 provides the descriptive statistics and correlations for all the variables of 
interest included in the study.  
Insert Table 5.5 about here 
Examination of the correlations reveals that learning orientation is significantly 
positively related to leadership orientation and to alliance orientation although leadership 
and alliance orientation are not significantly related to each other. Though alliance 
orientation, leadership orientation, and learning orientation are conceptualized as three 
distinct dimensions of strategic orientation, it is reasonable to believe that, in practice, 
they will be somewhat positively related to each other as found in the correlation table.  
It was also found that the correlations between resource diversity and cultural 
diversity are not significant for both the key supplier (r2=.04) and the key customer (r2=-
.10), confirming that these two are distinct moderators. Further, there was a stronger 
relationship between key supplier and customer alliance for cultural diversity (r2=.41) 
than for resource diversity (r2=.22) though both relationships are significant.  
It was also found that the correlation for knowledge creation and knowledge 
acquisition is positive and significant for both the key supplier alliance (r2=.29) and the 
key customer alliance (r2=.50). Further, it was observed that there is a significant 
correlation between knowledge creation across the key supplier and customer alliance 
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(r2=.33) as well as knowledge acquisition across the key supplier and customer alliance 
(r2=.53).  
As expected, there was a high correlation between achieved firm performance in the 
last 3 years and expected performance over the next 5 years. The Pearson correlation 
between perceived achieved and expected performance was .78.  
Analysis of means revealed that the strategic alliances reported by firms were not 
uniformly ‘core’ to them. The mean value for the supplier side on alliance status, ‘how 
core the reported relationship is to the firm’, was 2.77 while that for the customer side 
was 3.29. Thus, on average the key supplier alliance reported by firms tends to be less 
‘core’ to them than the key customer alliance (t (1, 83) = -2.10, p < .05). Moreover, 
alliance status had a significant positive relationship with knowledge creation on the 
supplier side and with knowledge acquisition on the customer side26.  
Industry growth is found to be significantly negatively correlated with the age of the 
firm and the tenure of the present CEO. This suggests that perceived growth of the firm’s 
principal industry decreases as the firm gets older and the CEO’s tenure increases. 
Industry growth is also found to be significantly positively correlated to environmental 
uncertainty and with number of employees. This suggests that industries perceived to 
grow at a high rate are also perceived to have high environmental uncertainty. It also 
appears to suggest that as the firm’s industry grows, the firm grows with it increasing its 
employment.  
                                                 
26 To confirm that supplier and customer alliance did not difference on knowledge creation or knowledge 
acquisition, two paired sample T tests were conducted. No significant difference was found for knowledge 
creation in key supplier alliance and key customer alliance (t (1, 83) = -1.16, ns) as well as for knowledge 
acquisition in key supplier and key customer alliance (t (1, 83) = -1.57, ns). These findings provide 
confidence that key supplier and customer alliance do not statistically differ in knowledge creation as well 
as knowledge acquisition.   
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Before examining whether the data supports the hypotheses described in Chapter 3, it 
is important to ensure that the data is clean and ready to analyze. As some companies did 
not provide data on control variables like age (four missing), number of employees (five 
missing), and CEO tenure (seven missing), mean values were substituted for missing 
values on these variables. Also, because of the large range on the age and employee 
variable, a log transformation was used to transform the two variables toward greater 
normality. To detect interaction effects, the main variables were centered and their 
product term calculated to reduce multicollinearity as suggested by Cronbach (1987), 
Jaccard, Turrisi, and Wan (1990) and Tabachinik and Fidell (2001). 
It was also considered important to check for possible multicollinearity problems.  
Variance inflation factors were found to range from 1.1 to 1.3 across all reported 
regressions. Chatterjee, Hadi, and Price (2000) suggested that multicollinearity is not a 
problem when the VIF are below 10 and all the VIFs are close to 1. Thus, 
multicollinearity does not appear to be a problem for the three strategic orientation 
measures as well as the knowledge management measures in any of the regression 
analyses. 
All control variables (firm age (log), number of employees (log), CEO tenure, 
industry growth, environmental uncertainty) were included in all the analyses described 
below although most were not found to be significantly related to knowledge creation or 
knowledge acquisition for either the supplier or customer alliance. Main effects of 
leadership orientation, alliance orientation, and learning orientation on knowledge 
creation and knowledge acquisition on both key supplier and the key customer alliance 
were examined first, followed by moderated effects (Table 5.6 a & b). The influence of 
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knowledge creation and knowledge acquisition from both alliances on firm performance 
and the moderating effect of industry knowledge were examined last (Table 5.7). 
To examine the main effects of alliance orientation, leadership orientation, and 
learning orientation on knowledge creation and knowledge acquisition in key supplier or 
customer alliance, four hierarchical multiple regression tests were conducted. In all the 
four tests, the control variables were entered first as a block, followed by the three main 
variables of alliance orientation, leadership orientation, and learning orientation as well 
as the main effect of resource diversity and cultural diversity (Table 5.6 a & b).  
Insert Table 5.6 (a) & (b) about here 
5.3.1 Main Effects Analysis on Knowledge Creation and Knowledge Acquisition 
For the main effect of alliance orientation (H1), it was found that alliance orientation 
did not have a significant influence on knowledge creation (β = -.02, t = -.19, ns) and 
knowledge acquisition (β = .06, t = .52, ns) in the key supplier alliance as well as 
knowledge creation (β = .14, t = 1.25, ns) or knowledge acquisition (β = .16, t = 1.47, ns) 
in the key customer alliance. Thus, H1 was not supported by the data in any of the four 
tests. 
For the main effect of leadership orientation (H2), it was found that leadership 
orientation did not have a significant impact on knowledge creation (β = .05, t = .43, ns) 
or knowledge acquisition (β = .11, t = .90, ns) in the key supplier alliance but had a 
significant impact on knowledge creation (β = .32, t = 2.959, p < .01) and knowledge 
acquisition (β = .27, t = 2.55, p < .05) in the key customer alliance. The impact of 
leadership orientation on knowledge creation in the key customer alliance is positive 
which is in the direction hypothesized, i.e. as leadership orientation becomes more 
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entrepreneurial, knowledge creation increases. However, the positive relationship 
between leadership orientation and knowledge acquisition in the key customer alliance is 
opposite to that hypothesized, i.e. as leadership orientation becomes more 
entrepreneurial, knowledge acquisition increases. Thus, H2 was only supported in one of 
the four tests. 
For the main effect of learning orientation (H3), it was found that learning orientation 
did not have a significant impact on knowledge creation (β = .02, t = .21, ns) or 
knowledge acquisition (β = -.08, t = -.65, ns) in the key supplier alliance as well as on 
knowledge acquisition (β = -.18, t = 1.58, ns) in the key customer alliance. It did have a 
marginally significant impact on knowledge creation (β = -.22, t = -1.89, p < .1) in the 
key customer alliance. However, the marginally significant impact of learning orientation 
on knowledge creation in the key customer alliance is negative, which is opposite to that 
hypothesized. In other words, it was found that as learning orientation becomes more 
generative, knowledge creation decreases. Thus, H3 was not supported in any of the four 
tests.  
Thus, of the main effects hypothesized between the strategic orientation dimensions 
and knowledge creation and knowledge acquisition, only the relationship between 
leadership orientation and knowledge creation was partially supported by the data27. 
Moreover, this main effect was only supported for the key customer alliance and not the 
key supplier alliance.  
5.3.2 Moderator Analyses on Knowledge Creation and Knowledge Acquisition 
                                                 
27 It was also observed that the main effect of resource diversity was significant in all the four tests, while 
the main effect of cultural diversity was significant only for supplier knowledge creation and marginally 
significant for customer knowledge acquisition. The effect was found to be negative in all the tests. 
However, because no main effect of the two diversity variables was hypothesized they are not discussed 
here.  
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To examine if inter-firm diversity moderates the relationship between the three 
strategic orientation dimensions (leadership, alliance, and learning) and knowledge 
creation and knowledge acquisition, interaction terms were created and entered 
individually in separate moderated hierarchical regressions (Table 5.6 a & b). 
For the moderating influence of resource diversity on the relationship between 
alliance orientation and knowledge creation (H4a), it was found that resource diversity 
did not moderate the relationship between alliance orientation and knowledge creation in 
the key supplier alliance (β = .13, t = 1.29, ns) or between alliance orientation and 
knowledge creation in the key customer alliance (β = .12, t = 1.22, ns). Thus, H4(a) was 
not supported by the data in either test.   
For the moderating influence of resource diversity on the relationship between 
alliance orientation and knowledge acquisition (H4b), it was found that resource diversity 
did not moderate the relationship between alliance orientation and knowledge acquisition 
in the key supplier alliance (β = -.07, t = -.65, ns) or the relationship between alliance 
orientation and knowledge acquisition in the key customer alliance (β = -.05, t = -.55, ns). 
Thus, H4(b) was not supported by the data in either test.  
For the moderating influence of resource diversity on the relationship between 
leadership orientation and knowledge creation (H5a), it was found that resource diversity 
had a significant influence on the relationship between leadership orientation and 
knowledge creation in key supplier alliance (β = .28, t = 2.88, p < .01), but did not 
moderate the relationship between leadership orientation and knowledge creation in key 
customer alliance (β = -.52, t = -.51, ns). Fig 5.1 (a) and (b) compare the interaction found 
in the data for the effect of resource diversity on the relationship between leadership 
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orientation and knowledge creation in the key supplier alliance with the pattern of 
interaction hypothesized. It is observed that the relationship between knowledge creation 
and leadership orientation is inconsistent with that hypothesized in Hypothesis 5(a). 
Leadership orientation is found to have a stronger relationship with knowledge creation at 
low resource diversity compared to high resource diversity which is opposite to the 
hypothesized relationship. Moreover, even though the direction of relationship between 
entrepreneurial leadership orientation and knowledge creation is in the hypothesized 
direction at high resource diversity, it is in the opposite direction at low resource 
diversity.  
Insert Fig 5.1 (a) & (b) about here 
For the moderating influence of resource diversity on the relationship between 
leadership orientation and knowledge acquisition (H5b), it was found that resource 
diversity did not moderate the relationship between leadership orientation and knowledge 
acquisition in the key supplier alliance (β = .09, t = .80, ns) or the relationship between 
leadership orientation and knowledge acquisition in the key customer alliance (β = .02, t 
= .18, ns) in the key customer alliance. Thus, H5(b) was not supported by the data in 
either test.  
For the moderating influence of resource diversity on the relationship between 
learning orientation and knowledge creation (H6a), it was found that resource diversity 
did not moderate the relationship between learning orientation and knowledge creation in 
the key supplier alliance (β = .15, t = 1.56, ns) but has a marginally significant influence 
on the relationship between learning orientation and knowledge creation in the key 
customer alliance (β = .19, t = 1.81, p < .1). Fig 5.2 (a) and (b) compare the interaction 
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found in the data for the influence of resource diversity on the relationship between 
learning orientation and knowledge creation in the key supplier alliance with the pattern 
of interaction hypothesized. It is observed that the relationship between learning 
orientation and knowledge creation found in the data is inconsistent with that 
hypothesized in Hypothesis 6(a). Learning orientation has a stronger relationship with 
knowledge creation at low resource diversity than at high resource diversity. Moreover, 
the direction of relationship between learning orientation and knowledge creation at both 
low and high resource diversity is in the direction opposite to that hypothesized. Thus, 
H6(a) was not supported by the data in either test.  
Insert Fig 5.2 (a) & (b) about here 
For the moderating influence of resource diversity on the relationship between 
learning orientation and knowledge acquisition (H6b), it was found that resource 
diversity did not moderate the relationship between learning orientation and knowledge 
acquisition in the key supplier alliance (β = -.09, t = -.82, ns) or between learning 
orientation and knowledge acquisition in the key customer alliance (β = .07, t = .69, ns). 
Thus, H6(b) was not supported by the data in either test.  
For the moderating influence of cultural diversity on the relationship between alliance 
orientation and knowledge creation (H7a), it was found that cultural diversity did not 
moderate the relationship between alliance orientation and knowledge creation in the key 
supplier alliance (β = .05, t = .48, ns) or between alliance orientation and knowledge 
creation in the key customer alliance (β = -.07, t = -.70, ns). Thus, H7(a) was not 
supported by the data in either test.  
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For the moderating influence of cultural diversity on the relationship between alliance 
orientation and knowledge acquisition (H7b), it was found that cultural diversity did not 
moderate the relationship between alliance orientation and knowledge acquisition in the 
key supplier alliance (β = -.02, t = -.15, ns) or between alliance orientation and 
knowledge acquisition in the key customer alliance (β = -.09, t = -.91, ns). Thus, H7(b) 
was not supported by the data in either test.  
For the moderating influence of cultural diversity on the relationship between 
leadership orientation and knowledge creation (H8a), it was found that cultural diversity 
did not moderate the relationship between leadership orientation and knowledge creation 
in the key supplier alliance (β = -.04, t = -.35, ns) or between leadership orientation and 
knowledge creation in the key customer alliance (β = -.04, t = -.37, ns). Thus, H8(a) was 
not supported by the data in either test.  
For the moderating influence of cultural diversity on the relationship between 
leadership orientation and knowledge acquisition (H8b), it was found that cultural 
diversity did not moderate the relationship between leadership orientation and knowledge 
acquisition in the key supplier alliance (β = .16, t = 1.29, ns) or between leadership 
orientation and knowledge acquisition in the key customer alliance (β = -.09, t = -.91, ns). 
Thus, H8(b) was not supported by the data in either test.  
For the moderating influence of cultural diversity on the relationship between 
learning orientation and knowledge creation (H9a), it was found that cultural diversity 
did not moderate the relationship between learning orientation and knowledge creation in 
the key supplier alliance (β = -.05, t = -.47, ns) or between learning orientation and 
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knowledge creation in the key customer alliance (β = .05, t = .44, ns). Thus, H9(a) was 
not supported by the data in either test.  
For the moderating influence of cultural diversity on the relationship between 
learning orientation and knowledge acquisition (H9b), it was found that cultural diversity 
did moderate the relationship between learning orientation and knowledge acquisition in 
the key supplier alliance at a moderate level of significance (β = .20, t = 1.70, p < .1) but 
did not moderate the relationship between learning orientation and knowledge acquisition 
in the key customer alliance (β = .14, t = 1.46, ns). Fig 5.3 (a) and (b) compare the 
interaction found in the data for the influence of cultural diversity on the relationship 
between learning orientation and knowledge acquisition in the key supplier alliance with 
the pattern of interaction hypothesized. It is observed that the relationship between 
learning orientation and knowledge acquisition is partially consistent with that 
hypothesized. Learning orientation has a stronger relationship with knowledge 
acquisition at low cultural diversity than at high cultural diversity which is consistent 
with that hypothesized. However, the direction of the relationship between learning 
orientation and knowledge acquisition is in the hypothesized direction at low cultural 
diversity (where differences in learning orientation had a more substantive effect on 
knowledge acquisition) but in the opposite direction at high cultural diversity (where 
smaller differences between learning orientation had been expected). Thus, H9(b) was 
only partially supported by the tests.   
Insert Fig 5.3 (a) & (b) about here 
5.3.3 Main Effects of Knowledge Creation and Knowledge Acquisition on 
Performance 
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To examine the impact of knowledge creation and knowledge acquisition in key 
supplier and customer strategic alliance on firm performance, hierarchical multiple 
regression analysis was conducted. The control variables were entered together, followed 
by the main variables supplier knowledge creation, supplier knowledge acquisition, 
customer knowledge creation, and customer knowledge acquisition with either achieved 
or expected firm performance as the dependent variable in each separate analysis (Table 
5.7).  
Insert Table 5.7 about here 
The first analysis was to examine the impact of knowledge creation and knowledge 
acquisition on firm performance (H10). It was found that neither knowledge creation (β = 
-.08, t = -.67, ns) nor knowledge acquisition (β = -.22, t = -1.69, ns) in key supplier 
alliance had a main effect on achieved firm performance. Similarly, neither knowledge 
creation (β = .17, t = 1.32, ns) nor knowledge acquisition (β = .00, t = .03, ns) in customer 
alliance had a main effect on achieved firm performance. Similar results were found for 
expected firm performance. Specifically, neither knowledge creation (β = -.16, t = -1.32, 
ns) nor knowledge acquisition (β = -.20, t = -1.54, ns) in key supplier alliance had a main 
effect on expected firm performance. In the key customer alliance, neither knowledge 
creation (β = .19, t = 1.50, ns) nor knowledge acquisition (β = -.10, t = -.67, ns) had a 
main effect on expected firm performance. In other words, neither knowledge creation 
nor knowledge acquisition had an impact on firm performance in either the key supplier 
or key customer alliance. Thus, H10 was not supported by the data.  
5.3.4 Moderator Analysis on Firm Performance 
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To examine whether the complexity of the knowledge base of the industry influences 
the relationship between knowledge creation and firm performance or between 
knowledge acquisition and firm performance (H11), interaction effects were included in 
the analyses.  
On the supplier side, it was found that knowledge complexity did not influence the 
relationship between knowledge creation and achieved firm performance (β = .07, t = .65, 
ns) or the relationship between knowledge acquisition and achieved firm performance (β 
= .08, t = .66, ns). Similar results were found for expected firm performance. Knowledge 
complexity did not influence the relationship between knowledge creation and expected 
firm performance (β = -.04, t = -.35, ns) or between knowledge acquisition and expected 
firm performance (β = .08, t = .70, ns) on the supplier side. 
On the customer side, it was found that knowledge complexity significantly 
influenced the relationship between knowledge creation and achieved firm performance 
(β = .33, t = 2.85, p < .01). Fig 5.4 (a) and (b) compare the interaction found in the data 
with the pattern of interaction hypothesized. It is observed that the relationship between 
knowledge creation and firm performance is in the hypothesized direction at high 
industry knowledge complexity but in the opposite direction at low industry knowledge 
complexity.  
Insert Figure 5.4 (a) & (b) about here 
However, knowledge complexity did not influence the relationship between 
knowledge acquisition and achieved firm performance (β = .02, t = .14, ns). Further, 
although moderating effect of knowledge complexity was found for the relationship 
between knowledge creation and achieved firm performance in key customer alliance as 
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noted above, knowledge complexity did not moderate the relationship between 
knowledge creation and expected firm performance (β = .13, t = 1.09, ns). Similarly, 
knowledge complexity did not moderate the relationship between knowledge acquisition 
and expected firm performance (β = .05, t = .44, ns). Thus, H11 was only partially 
supported.  
5.4  Post-hoc Analyses 
In informal discussions with some software firms that had been contacted for this 
study, the respondents mentioned that their company did not have any supplier alliances 
and so the survey was not relevant to them. For this reason it was decided to examine if 
software firms differed from other firms in the sample on the importance of the key 
supplier and customer alliance. It was found that for software firms the key supplier 
alliance was significantly less important to their business compared to non-software firms 
(t = 2.52, p < .05). The mean importance of key supplier alliance was 2.52 for software 
firms and 3.37 for non-software firms. No such difference was found between software 
firms and non-software firms on their key customer alliance (t = .033, ns).  
Because software and non-software firms were found to be statistically different on 
the importance of their key supplier alliance, further post-hoc analyses was conducted to 
determine if the type of firm has any influence on knowledge creation and knowledge 
acquisition in key supplier alliance. Type of firm (software versus non-software) was 
added as a main effect after all the other main effects had been examined for knowledge 
creation and knowledge acquisition. It was found that the type of firm (software versus 
non-software) had no significant effect on knowledge creation or knowledge acquisition 
in key supplier alliances. 
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This was followed by examining if the interaction of type of firm and interfirm 
diversity between partners influences knowledge creation or knowledge acquisition in the 
alliance. In other words, moderated hierarchical regression analysis was conducted to 
check for an interaction effect of type of firm (software versus non-software) and 
resource diversity or cultural diversity on knowledge creation and knowledge acquisition 
in key supplier alliance. An interaction effect was found only for type of firm (software 
versus non-software) with cultural diversity on knowledge creation in key supplier 
alliance (β = .89, t = 2.18, p < .05). Plotting this relationship (Figure 5.5) revealed that 
non-software firms have higher knowledge creation in key supplier alliance compared to 
software firms. It was found that at low cultural diversity non-software firms had high 
knowledge creation in their key supplier alliance. As cultural diversity increases, 
knowledge creation decreases for non-software firms though non-software firms have 
higher knowledge creation than software firms even at high cultural diversity. Thus, for 
non-software firms increase in cultural diversity between firms is not conducive to 
knowledge creation in the key supplier alliance.  
Insert Fig 5.5 about here 
This finding was limited to cultural diversity in key supplier alliance and did not 
generalize to resource diversity in the same alliance. Moreover, it was limited to 
knowledge creation in the key supplier alliance and was not found for knowledge 
acquisition in the same alliance.  
Additional analysis was conducted to examine if the addition of an interaction 
between the type of firm (software versus non software) and cultural diversity would 
affect any of the hypothesized relationships involving cultural diversity in key supplier 
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alliance. It was found that the type of firm did not show any systematic influence on the 
results reported earlier in the main analyses.  
Further, moderated hierarchical regression analyses was conducted to examine if 
alliance status interacted with the main effect of knowledge creation and knowledge 
acquisition in key supplier and customer alliance on firm performance. It was found that 
alliance status did not influence the impact of knowledge creation and knowledge 
acquisition in both supplier and customer alliance on firm performance. Thus, it is 
possible to compare both knowledge creation and knowledge acquisition in a wide 
variety (degree of importance) of supplier and customer alliance and its impact on firm 
performance.  
As mentioned earlier, a general knowledge management measure was created by 
combining items 7 through 12 of knowledge management items on both supplier and 
customer alliances. These items were originally expected to constitute three knowledge 
creation items and three knowledge acquisition items but the factor analysis indicated that 
they belonged in a separate single factor as reported earlier. The Cronbach alpha for the 
general knowledge management scale for the supplier and customer side was .86 and .82 
respectively. The correlation between this new general knowledge management scale and 
knowledge creation and knowledge acquisition scales used for the main analyses were 
.50 and .39 for the key supplier alliance and .57 and .61 for the key customer alliance. 
The variability of the correlation between the general knowledge management scale and 
knowledge acquisition across the supply chain alliance context should be noted.  
All tests as reported in the main section were repeated with the general knowledge 
management measure for key supplier alliance and key customer alliance. Accordingly, 
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the first test was to examine main effects of the three strategic orientation dimensions. 
Alliance orientation was not found to have a main effect on knowledge management in 
strategic alliance with either the key supplier (β = -.02, t = -.19, ns) or the key customer 
(β = -.11, t = -1.05, ns). Leadership orientation was not found to influence knowledge 
management in strategic alliance with the key supplier (β = .18, t = 1.66, ns) but had a 
significant influence on knowledge management with a key customer (β = .36, t = 3.50, p 
< .01). Learning orientation was not found to have a significant influence on knowledge 
management in strategic alliance with a key supplier (β = .10, t = .89, ns) and a key 
customer (β = -.13, t = -1.21, ns). Thus, according to the post-hoc analyses only 
leadership orientation has a direct influence on knowledge management and only in the 
key customer alliance. This relationship is positive which is consistent with that found in 
the main analyses for both knowledge creation and knowledge acquisition.  
To examine the possible moderator effect of inter-firm diversity in the post-hoc 
analyses, interaction effects of resource diversity and cultural diversity with leadership 
orientation were entered. It was found that neither resource diversity (β = .13, t = 1.22, 
ns) nor cultural diversity (β = .06, t = .53, ns) influenced knowledge management in the 
key supplier alliance. Similarly, neither resource diversity (β = -.02, t = -.21, ns) nor 
cultural diversity (β = .15, t = 1.59, ns) do not influence the relationship between 
leadership orientation and knowledge management in the strategic alliance with a key 
customer.  
Similar analyses were conducted for alliance orientation and learning orientation. For 
the former, it was found that neither resource diversity (β = -.02, t = -.19, ns) nor cultural 
diversity (β = .07, t = .61, ns) had no influence on the relationship between alliance 
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orientation and knowledge management in strategic alliances with a key supplier. Also, 
neither resource diversity (β = .07, t = .71, ns) nor cultural diversity (β = .08, t = .79, ns) 
had no influence on the relationship between alliance orientation and knowledge 
management in strategic alliances with a key customer. For the latter, it was found that 
resource diversity did not influence the relationship between learning orientation and 
knowledge management in strategic alliances with a key supplier (β = .01, t = .12, ns), 
but cultural diversity had a significant influence (β = .21, t = 2.05, p < 0.05) on the 
relationship between learning orientation and knowledge management with a key 
supplier. The relationship is plotted in Figure 5.6. The graph reveals that the moderating 
influence of cultural diversity on the relationship between learning orientation and 
knowledge acquisition in the key supplier alliance found in the main analyses is generally 
replicated here for knowledge management in the key supplier alliance. (It should be 
noted that the slope of the relationship at low cultural diversity is less while that at high 
cultural diversity is more compared to that in the main analysis).  
Insert Figure 5.6 about here 
In the customer alliance, resource diversity had a marginally significant influence on 
the relationship between learning orientation and knowledge management in strategic 
alliances with a key customer (β = .17, t = 1.73, p < .1). The relationship is plotted in Fig 
5.7. The graph reveals that the moderating influence of resource diversity on the 
relationship between learning orientation and knowledge creation in the key customer 
alliance in the main analysis is replicated here for the relationship between learning 
orientation and knowledge management in the key customer alliance.  
Insert Figure 5.7 here 
  151
Further, cultural diversity had a significant moderating influence on the relationship 
between learning orientation and knowledge management in the key customer alliance (β 
= .20, t = 2.22, p < .05). The relationship is plotted in Fig 5.8. The graph reveals that the 
moderating influence of cultural diversity in this customer alliance was not found earlier 
for knowledge creation and knowledge acquisition but does reinforce the moderation 
effect found for general knowledge management in key supplier alliance as noted earlier 
in this section.  
Insert Figure 5.8 here 
Further, post-hoc analyses revealed that knowledge management (as reflected in this 
new measure) in the strategic alliances with a key supplier (β = -.37, t = -2.83, p < .01) 
and customer (β = .32, t = 2.63, p <.01) is significantly related to achieved firm 
performance. Similarly, knowledge management in the strategic alliance with the key 
supplier (β = -.44, t = -3.37, p < .01), and customer (β = .34, t = 2.76, p < .01) is 
significantly related to expected firm performance. Thus, general knowledge 
management in key supplier alliance has a negative impact on firm performance while 
general knowledge management in key customer alliance has a positive impact on both 
actual and expected firm performance.   
To reexamine the moderation effect of complexity of the knowledge base of the 
industry with general knowledge management, interaction effects were added. Results 
revealed that industry knowledge does not moderate the relationship between knowledge 
management in supplier alliances with either achieved (β = .07, t = .68, ns) or expected (β 
= .02, t = .19, ns) firm performance. Similarly, industry knowledge did not moderate the 
relationship between general knowledge management in customer alliances with either 
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achieved (β = .01, t = .09, ns) or expected (β = .00, t = .01, ns) firm performance. Thus, 
the complexity of the knowledge base of the industry did not appear to moderate the 
relationships between general knowledge management and firm performance.  
To summarize, the findings reported here are based on self-report data collected from 
top executives in 100 high-technology firms. It suggests that strategic orientation is a 
three dimensional construct having weak to moderate correlations between the 
dimensions of alliance, leadership, and learning orientation. The significant, positive 
correlation between knowledge creation and knowledge acquisition suggests that key 
strategic supply chain alliances (with the key customer and supplier) tend to involve both 
creation and acquisition of knowledge, suggesting that alliances that focus primarily on 
knowledge creation or knowledge acquisition are not typical among high-tech firms.  
Hierarchical multiple regression analyses suggests that for the key customer alliance, 
leadership orientation has a significant, positive relationship with knowledge creation and 
knowledge acquisition while learning orientation has a marginally significant, negative 
relationship with knowledge creation. Further, resource diversity marginally influences 
the relationship between learning orientation and knowledge creation in this alliance.  
Moderated hierarchical multiple regression analyses reveal that for key supplier 
alliance resource diversity moderates the relationship between leadership orientation and 
knowledge creation in the supplier alliance. Further, cultural diversity marginally 
influences the relationship between learning orientation and knowledge acquisition in this 
alliance. 
Lastly, analyses also reveal that although knowledge creation and knowledge 
acquisition in key supplier and customer alliance have no direct impact on firm 
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performance, the complexity of the knowledge base of the industry moderates the 
relationship between knowledge creation in the customer alliance and achieved firm 
performance. However, similar results were not found for expected firm performance.  
Post-hoc analyses reveal the similarities and differences in effects involving a third 
knowledge management variable, labeled as general knowledge management, in both 
supplier and customer analyses. All hypothesized relationships were investigated with 
this new variable. The post-hoc analyses confirmed the positive relationship between 
leadership orientation and knowledge management in a key customer alliance. It also 
revealed a positive relationship between knowledge management in a key customer 
relationship and firm performance and a negative relationship between knowledge 
management in a key supplier alliance and firm performance. Thus, the post-hoc analyses 
with the new general knowledge management variable replicated many of the findings 
with the original analyses but also revealed some new distinct findings that might be 
further explored in the future.  
The next chapter will discuss the implications of these findings as well as suggest 
directions for future research based on these findings.    
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION 
 
Despite the growing body of literature in the area of knowledge management, 
empirical research examining the relationship between firm strategic orientation and 
knowledge management in strategic alliances or the impact of interorganizational 
knowledge management on firm performance has been scarce. This research study was 
designed to understand the influence of firm strategic orientation on knowledge creation 
and knowledge acquisition in non-equity strategic alliances of high-tech firms and the 
impact of these two modes of interorganizational knowledge management in these 
alliances on firm performance.  
It is important to note that this study only looked at non-equity alliances. Following 
Mitchell and Singh (1996) and Wathne and Heide (2004), among others, non-equity 
alliances refer to close interorganizational relationships between independent firms. 
These alliance are different from equity alliances as they provide firms with potentially 
non-trivial benefits of partnering (such as sharing resources and capabilities, legitimacy 
and prestige, access to new knowledge) while still retaining their separate identities 
(Singh, 1997).  
This research study focused on the business level of the firm. As such, the discussion 
of strategic orientation, knowledge-based view, and firm performance throughout this 
study is best understood at the business level. The sample of this study was also 
practically limited to single-business firms28. No attempt is made in this study to 
                                                 
28 This was achieved through several ways. Firms that appeared to be multi-business from their websites 
were not included. A cap of 500 employees was imposed to exclude large multi-business corporations. 
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generalize theoretical arguments or empirical findings to the corporate level for multi-
business firms (e.g. GE). However, as the different divisions of a multi-business firm 
such as GE tend to behave like single-business firms in many ways, some of the theory 
and data presented here may generalize to the division-level of multi-business 
corporations.       
A number of relationships were hypothesized based on the knowledge-based view of 
the firm. These were investigated using data collected from top executives of 100 high-
tech firms. Some hypotheses were supported by the data while many failed to be 
confirmed. Accordingly, there are a number of important findings of this study. The lack 
of support for many hypotheses demonstrates the need for more detailed theoretical work 
connecting firm strategy to knowledge creation and acquisition as well as the 
relationships of knowledge creation and acquisition with firm performance. The results of 
this study provide some helpful guidance for future research on this topic by narrowing 
the range of strategic orientations that may be most productive to explore. The findings 
also highlight the need for more theoretical and empirical work on mediation and 
moderation effects in knowledge management. This chapter discusses the important 
findings and limitations of this study and provides recommendations for future research 
in this area.  
6.1 Discussion  
6.1.1  Strategic Orientation 
This study adopted a comparative approach to firm strategic orientation. The 
marketing literature has a tradition of using a comparative approach to understand the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Firms that were subsidiaries of multi-business firms were also excluded by selecting them out using the 
CorpTech search engine.  
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marketing strategy of the firm (e.g. Gatignon & Xuereb, 1997; Narver & Slater, 1990; 
Noble, Sinha, & Kumar, 2002). As discussed in chapter 2, a comparative approach can be 
more useful than other approaches to strategic orientation for comparing firms as it 
allows scholars to compare firms in the same strategic group with each other. For 
example, the Miles and Snow (1978) typology classifies firms into four strategic groups 
(prospector, defender, analyzer, and reactor) allowing inter-group comparison (e.g. 
between prospectors and reactors) but not intra-group comparison (e.g. between two 
prospector firms or two analyzer firms). Comparative approaches, however, enable intra-
group comparison of firms along key dimensions of strategy. For example, analyzer firms 
can be compared with each other on their customer orientation and competitor 
orientation, two important dimensions of marketing strategy (Lukas & Ferrell, 2000). 
Though comparative approaches tend to be less parsimonious, they are better able to 
detect nuances associated with various aspects of competitive strategy that other 
approaches miss (Morgan & Strong, 1998). Thus, it would be helpful for the management 
literature to have a comparative approach to firm strategic orientation. This study took a 
first step in this direction.  
In this study, there was at least moderate variation among high-tech firms on each of 
the three dimensions of strategic orientation as shown in Table 5.4. It was also found that 
the correlations between the three dimensions were weak to moderate which confirmed 
that the three dimensions are relatively independent of each other. Another unique 
characteristic about the three dimensions is their bipolar orientation. In other words, 
alliance orientation can range from cooperative to competitive, leadership orientation 
from entrepreneurial to managerial, and learning orientation from generative to adaptive. 
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Forced choice scales were developed in this study to measure the three dimensions and 
were found to have good reliability (Cronbach alpha for the 11-item alliance orientation 
scale, the 10-item leadership orientation scale, and the 8-item learning orientation scale 
were found to be .84, .90, and .89 respectively). Though the items in the scales were 
taken from existing scales that commonly use single pole measures, the complete scales 
developed here for the three dimensions have not been used before. Although the 
reliability estimates for the scales found in this study are encouraging, more research 
needs to be done to establish the reliability and validity of the scales. Research linking the 
three dimensions of strategic orientation to the antecedents and consequences of firm 
strategy needs to be done before these scales can gain wider acceptance in the literature.  
Though relating firm strategy to its antecedent variables was not an objective of this 
study, several probable antecedents were measured and included as controls. Selected 
environmental factors including industry growth and environmental uncertainty were 
measured and controlled. One measure of top management experience (CEO tenure) and 
two measures of firm characteristics (age and size) were also measured and controlled. 
Finally, complexity of the knowledge base of the industry was measured and used as a 
moderator variable for some of the hypotheses. Table 5.4 reveals weak to moderate 
correlations between the three strategic orientation dimensions and these variables. As 
may be expected, leadership orientation had a significant positive correlation with 
environmental uncertainty and industry growth such that in industries with high growth 
rate and higher uncertainty, firms were higher on entrepreneurial leadership orientation. 
Further, learning orientation had a significant positive correlation with industry growth 
such that when growth rate of the industry was high, firms were higher on generative 
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learning orientation. Lastly, firm age was found to have a negative significant correlation 
with leadership orientation and learning orientation such that older firms had a 
managerial leadership orientation and an adaptive learning orientation. All other 
correlations were weak but in the expected direction. It would be useful for future 
research to examine the influence of these variables on firm strategy in studies 
appropriately designed to measure their antecedent effects.  
It is important for any strategic orientation variable to show direct or indirect impact 
(through strategic actions that are believed to help the firm gain competitive advantage) 
on firm performance (Gatignon & Xuereb, 1997; Venkataraman, 1989). In this study, no 
direct performance effects were hypothesized for the three strategic orientation 
dimensions. It would be useful for future research to look at how the three dimensions of 
strategic orientation proposed in this study influence firm performance. Also, this study 
used a multidimensional approach to measure firm performance. Future research should 
look at the impact of the three dimensions of strategic orientation on different aspects of 
firm performance (such as new product development, market share, profitability) 
separately.  
6.1.2 Knowledge Creation and Knowledge Acquisition in Supply Chain Alliances 
Another important, though surprising, contribution of this research is the finding that 
knowledge creation and knowledge acquisition have a moderate positive correlation with 
each other. Several prior studies have recognized two types of knowledge-based strategic 
alliances. Mowery et al (1996) suggested that over time in some alliances firms are able 
to imitate and internalize the knowledge skills of their partners, while in other alliances 
firms are able to specialize and develop new knowledge skills by building on their 
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existing knowledge. Many other scholars (Powell & Brantley, 1992 and Grant & Baden-
Fuller, 2004) argue that some alliances are vehicles for acquiring and absorbing partners’ 
knowledge, while other alliances provide partners access to each others knowledge to 
generate new knowledge. Koza and Lewin (1998) classified alliances into ‘learning 
alliances’ in which firms acquire knowledge from their partner for self benefit and 
‘business alliances’ in which partners combine their complementary knowledge for 
mutual benefit. Though these scholars use different labels for the types of alliances, the 
common idea is of alliances as either for new knowledge creation or for acquiring 
partner’s knowledge. Thus, it was expected that strategic alliances will either be 
knowledge creation alliances or knowledge acquisition alliances. In fact, the possibility 
of using forced choice measures for knowledge creation and knowledge acquisition was 
explored in the pre-test phase but was rejected because of positive correlations between 
items of the two scales. This led to the use of single-pole scale for both knowledge 
creation and knowledge acquisition.  
The self-report data collected in this study fails to find evidence that the two types of 
knowledge-based strategic alliances are completely independent of each other. The mean 
level of knowledge acquisition and knowledge creation (on a scale of 1-low to 5-high) is 
2.10 and 2.75 respectively in key supplier alliances and 2.30 and 2.94 respectively in key 
customer alliances. This suggests that strategic alliances involve moderate levels of both 
knowledge creation and acquisition. Thus, strategic management scholars need to devote 
more attention to understanding the complex nature of how firms act to both create and 
acquire knowledge through these alliances. Moreover, in both key supplier and customer 
alliances the mean level of knowledge creation is higher than knowledge acquisition. 
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Though it is possible that these key alliances have been in place for quite some time 
enabling firms to engage in more knowledge creation compared to knowledge 
acquisition, the higher mean of the relatively more difficult knowledge creation compared 
to the relatively easier knowledge acquisition is still surprising and demands more 
research attention. 
If business executives do not see alliances as exclusively for either knowledge 
creation or knowledge acquisition but for both knowledge creation and acquisition, 
strategic management researchers need to be aware of the dual nature of such alliances 
and explore complementarities and conflicts between the two modes of knowledge 
management in alliances. For example, the dialectic view of strategic alliances suggests 
that both knowledge acquisition and creation happen simultaneously in these alliances 
(de Rond & Bouchikhi, 2004). It becomes important to understand what happens in such 
alliances when the approach used to acquire knowledge conflicts with the approach used 
to create knowledge.  On the other hand, the life-cycle view of strategic alliances claims 
that organizations start with acquiring knowledge from their partners for their own 
purposes and gradually move to creating knowledge together with their partners for 
common purposes through the alliance (de Rond & Bouchikhi, 2004). If alliances do pass 
through these phases, it becomes important to understand how firms move from 
perceiving knowledge management approaches as contradicting to perceiving them as 
complementary. The findings of this study suggest that informants of most of the sampled 
firms did see knowledge creation and knowledge acquisition as complementary. Extant 
research does not offer us much help in determining which of these two theories explain 
the dynamic processes of strategic alliances in the high-tech sector.  
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This study tested the antecedents and consequences of interorganizational knowledge 
management in both supplier alliances and customer alliances. The focus on both supplier 
and customer alliances as opposed to either supplier alliances or customer alliances is a 
significant and important departure from most extant research. An overwhelming 
majority of empirical research on non-equity supply chain alliances examines only 
supplier alliances (e.g. Jap, 1999; Kumar, Scheer, & Steenkamp, 1995) or customer 
alliances (e.g. Joshi & Sharma, 2004; Yli-Renko et al., 2001). Though there are some 
studies that do not exclusively focus on supplier alliances or customer alliances (e.g. 
Lambe et al., 2002; Sivadas & Dwyer, 2000), they tend to pool both types of alliances 
ignoring possible differences between supplier and customer alliances. One of the 
objectives of this study was to validate the expected similarity of the hypothesized 
relationships in the key customer alliance to those in the key supplier alliance. It was 
believed that if identical relationships were found on both sides, it would increase 
confidence in the generalizability of the findings to all non-equity supply chain 
relationships in high-tech firms. If, however, relationships were found to be different 
across key supplier and customer alliances, it would suggest as-yet unrecognized 
differences between the two types of supply chain alliances.  
Data collected from firms on their key supplier and customer alliances revealed that 
relationships with significant empirical support were unique in every case to either the 
key supplier alliance or the key customer alliance. This was a very surprising finding and 
suggests the need for more studies comparing firm’s upstream (supplier) and downstream 
(customer) alliances. This was the first study known to make this contrast. Perhaps, lack 
of research studies comparing upstream supplier alliances with downstream customer 
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alliances is because of data collection issues (such as respondent time and fatigue) 
involved in collecting data on both upstream and downstream alliances from the same 
firm. Though collecting data on both upstream supplier alliances and downstream 
customer alliances from the same firm is certainly more difficult than collecting data on 
just either downstream or upstream alliance, the benefits of comparing the two types of 
alliances probably outweigh the cost of data collection. Such an effort will allow for the 
integration of two related, though disconnected, literatures- the literature on upstream and 
downstream alliances.     
Asymmetry in supply chain relationships is an important reason for expecting 
differences between a firm’s supplier and customer alliances (Kumar et al., 1995). In 
traditional supply chains relative power of partners tends to decrease from upstream to 
downstream29 (Griffith et al., 2006). Thus, firms may have supplier alliances with more 
partners that have more power and customer alliances with partners that have less power. 
This difference in power can have an important impact on a firm’s supply chain 
relationship.   
The findings of this study also seem to suggest that the primary industry in which the 
firm competes may also influence its alliances with suppliers and customers. For 
example, in this study it was found that firms in the software industry differed from other 
high technology firms in the importance of their key supplier alliance but were 
comparable to other high tech firms in the importance of their key customer alliance. As 
mentioned in Chapter 5, the mean importance of key supplier alliance was 2.52 for 
software firms and 3.37 for other firms while no such difference was found between 
                                                 
29 Obvious exceptions exist as in discount retailing for dominant discount retailers (e.g. Walmart and 
Target) and their suppliers.  
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software firms and other firms on their key customer alliance. Thus, future studies 
looking at alliances in different industries need to be cognizant of the fact that importance 
of supplier versus customer alliances may also vary across industries.  
Next, the key customer alliances that firms report are moderately ‘core’ to the firm, 
i.e the mean importance of the key alliance on the firm’s business is moderate. On a scale 
of 1 to 5 (1-low and 5-high), the mean status rating of the key customer alliance that 
firms reported on was 3.29 (standard deviation 1.70). Frequency analysis of customer 
alliance status revealed that 7 firms reported it as 2 or less, 26 firms reported between 2 
and 4, and 49 firms reported 4 or higher. This suggests that when firms are asked to 
report about their strategic alliance with a key customer they do not necessarily report 
their largest or most important customer. This finding is consistent with the recent 
discussion in the marketing and management literature that firms gain new knowledge 
through alliances with customers of varying importance to the firm. For example, Slater 
and Narver (1999) argue that alliances with both small and large customers can be a 
source of new knowledge for firms. New knowledge from downstream partners can come 
from either large or small customers provided they are interested in pushing the existing 
frontier and developing new innovations for the future (von Hippel, 1988).  
The above noted finding that firms can gain knowledge from alliances with customers 
that vary in their importance for the firm is also replicated for alliances with suppliers. 
The mean status rating (on a scale of 1-low to 5-high) of the key supplier alliance that 
firms reported on was 2.7730 (standard deviation 1.53). Frequency analysis of supplier 
alliance status revealed that 21 firms reported it as 2 or less, 35 firms reported between 2 
                                                 
30 It should be noted here that, as mentioned earlier, the large number of software firms in the data was 
responsible for decreasing the mean rating of the key supplier alliance. The mean status rating of the key 
supplier alliance was 2.52 for software firms and 3.37 for non-software firms.  
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and 4, and 30 firms reported 4 or higher. This suggests that just as organizations do not 
necessarily gain new knowledge from their largest and most important customer, they 
also do not necessarily gain new knowledge exclusively from their largest, most 
important supplier. When asked to report about knowledge gained from their key 
supplier, firms often appeared to report on an alliance other than with their largest 
supplier.  
The above discussion of key customer and supplier alliances underscores an 
important contribution of this study. The few empirical studies that have looked at 
knowledge management in strategic alliances have been about customer alliances (e.g. 
Yli-Renko et al., 2001), ignoring the important issue of supplier alliances. Given that 
high-tech firms in this study report gaining equivalent level of knowledge from both key 
customers and key suppliers as mentioned earlier in this chapter, future research should 
examine knowledge management between firms and their key suppliers in more depth. 
Empirical studies using the knowledge-based view can help understand knowledge 
management issues in upstream supplier alliances. For example, extant research has 
shown that in many industries (such as automobiles) close relationships with suppliers 
can be a source of competitive advantage (Dyer & Noboeka, 2000). Firms in such 
industries characterized by high activity of upstream (supplier) alliances (e.g. Toyota’s 
extensive network of alliances with its suppliers) can be asked to report on their key 
supplier alliances. Such research will help understand knowledge management in 
upstream alliances as well as the impact of knowledge management in these alliances on 
the firm’s ability to introduce new products, adopt new technologies, and reduce 
production costs.  
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6.1.1 Three dimensions of strategic orientation and two modes of interorganizational 
knowledge management 
This study empirically examined the direct relationships between each of the three 
dimensions of firm strategic orientation and both knowledge creation and knowledge 
acquisition in strategic supply chain alliances. Some basic ideas in the knowledge-based 
view are that firm strategy should influence knowledge management, some types of 
strategic actions have much greater implications for knowledge management than others, 
and the factors that encourage knowledge acquisition may differ from those that influence 
knowledge creation (Grant & Baden-Fuller, 2004; Zeng & Hennart, 2002). This study 
developed measures to empirically test the basic ideas by testing the relationship between 
firm strategic orientation and interorganizational knowledge management.   
Of the three strategic orientation dimensions proposed, leadership orientation appears 
to have the greatest influence on interorganizational knowledge management. It was 
found that leadership orientation had a significant positive relationship with knowledge 
creation and knowledge acquisition in the key customer alliance. This finding is 
replicated in the post-hoc analyses for general knowledge management in the key 
customer alliance. It should be mentioned here that the positive relationship between 
leadership orientation and knowledge creation found in the data is consistent with the 
hypothesized relationship, while the positive relationship between leadership orientation 
and knowledge acquisition found in the data is opposite to that hypothesized. In other 
words, this study finds that as the firm’s leadership orientation becomes more 
entrepreneurial, knowledge creation and acquisition through key customer alliance 
increases.  
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This finding is consistent with that of Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996) who used 
the resource-based view to study alliances in the semiconductor industry and found that 
the leadership of the firm had an important influence in its ability to use strategic 
alliances to exchange technical knowledge with their partners to develop new products. 
The results of the present study confirm their findings and demonstrate that it is firms 
with an entrepreneurial leadership orientation that engage in more knowledge 
management in their alliances. Scholars have argued that an entrepreneurial leadership 
provides a future-oriented vision that involves envisioning and creating a scenario of 
possible opportunities that the firm can seize to compete effectively (Gupta et al., 2004) 
in the kind of rapidly changing situations in which firms in the high-tech industry 
frequently find themselves (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997). Such leaders are better able to 
manage knowledge that might be used later without knowing precisely what future 
demands will be. They do this by simultaneously pursuing multiple options (Miller, 
2002). This study suggests that firms with an entrepreneurial leadership orientation are 
better at managing knowledge through alliances as compared to firms with a managerial 
leadership orientation. This finding appears to justify the greater expense which would be 
required for process-based research to better understand the process by which an 
entrepreneurial leadership team creates and acquires knowledge in strategic alliances with 
customers. The practical and logistical problems associated with getting access to 
alliances at initiation and following them over time has been major deterrent to process 
research on strategic alliances.  
Further, it was found that leadership orientation did not have a significant impact on 
knowledge creation or knowledge acquisition in the key supplier alliance. It is surprising 
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that though leadership orientation had a significant positive impact on knowledge 
creation and acquisition in key customer alliances, there was no support for a direct 
impact in key supplier alliances. This is a very surprising finding because there is no 
evidence in extant research to suggest that a firm’s leadership orientation will have a 
positive impact on knowledge management in downstream alliances but not in upstream 
alliances. Future researchers are urged to examine in-depth the effect of leadership 
orientation on knowledge management in supplier alliances. Perhaps, qualitative research 
involving open-ended interviews with top management may be needed to better 
understand how entrepreneurial and managerial leadership orientation differently 
influences knowledge management in supplier alliances.  
The lack of support for the hypotheses involving the direct impact of alliance 
orientation on knowledge creation and knowledge acquisition in the key alliances was 
surprising. This study failed to find any evidence that a cooperative or competitive 
alliance orientation towards supply chain partners has an influence on knowledge 
management (creation or acquisition) in strategic alliances. It is possible that the lack of 
support for this hypothesis was because alliance orientation was measured as common to 
all the alliances of the firm, rather than specific to particular alliances. Though the 
measurement of alliance orientation as common to all alliance of the firm is consistent 
with Kandemir et al. (2002), the dominant approach in the alliance literature has been to 
ask firms about one alliance and provide perceptual information on relationship-specific 
variables (e.g. bilateral communication, trust, commitment) with respect to that alliance. 
It is possible that alliance orientation is not common to all alliances of the firm and varies 
across alliances. For example, firms may be highly cooperative with one partner and 
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highly competitive with another. Thus, when asking for details about two alliances 
(supplier and customer) future researchers may find it useful to measure alliance 
orientation for each specific alliance.   
Another surprising finding was the lack of support for the hypothesized relationship 
involving the direct impact of learning orientation on knowledge creation and knowledge 
acquisition in the key alliances. This study fails to find any evidence that learning 
orientation has a direct positive impact on knowledge creation or a direct negative impact 
on knowledge acquisition strategic alliances31. It is possible, as Kandemir et al. (2002), 
suggest that the impact of learning orientation on alliance outcomes is not direct, but 
rather is through other relation-specific variables like relationship quality. This study did 
not measure relational characteristics like relationship quality, satisfaction or level of 
social interaction (Griffith et al., 2006; Yli-Renko et al., 2001) as it focused on the direct 
relationship between learning orientation and knowledge creation and acquisition in 
alliances. Future researchers are encouraged to measure relationship-specific 
characteristics and link them to learning orientation as well as knowledge creation and 
acquisition in these relationships. It may also be useful to adopt a comparative modeling 
approach and contrast models of direct relationship between learning orientation and 
knowledge outcomes in alliances with those where this relationship is mediated by 
relationship-specific variables.  
6.1.2 Moderator Analyses on Knowledge Creation and Knowledge Acquisition 
                                                 
31 Learning Orientation was found to have a marginally significant impact on knowledge creation in the key 
customer alliance. The negative direction of this relationship, i.e. as learning orientation becomes more 
generative knowledge creation in the alliance decreases, was opposite to that hypothesized. However, this 
relationship was not replicated in either the key supplier alliance or the post-hoc analysis using general 
knowledge management. Thus, it is not interpreted further.   
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A number of moderator hypotheses had been proposed regarding the influence of 
resource diversity and cultural diversity on the relationship between strategic orientation 
and knowledge management in alliances. Though limited evidence was found for the 
moderating influence of resource diversity and cultural diversity, a surprising finding was 
the pervasive main effect of resource diversity on knowledge creation and knowledge 
acquisition in both key supplier and customer alliances. Resource diversity was found to 
have a negative, statistically significant relationship with both knowledge creation and 
knowledge acquisition in key strategic alliances. In other words, it was found that as 
resource diversity between partnering firms’ increases, knowledge creation and 
acquisition in key strategic alliances decreases. The negative impact of resource diversity 
on knowledge creation appears to support Phan and Peridis (2000)’s theoretical 
proposition that as resource similarity between firms increase, knowledge creation in the 
alliance will increase. This is counter to the large body of literature rooted in the 
resource-based view that suggests resource diversity in alliances provides firms with 
access to new and different resources that encourages innovation (Das & Teng, 2002; 
Eisenhardt & Santos, 2002). It was also found that cultural diversity had a negative, 
significant relationship with knowledge creation in the key supplier alliance. In other 
words, it was found that as cultural diversity between partnering firms increases, 
knowledge creation in key supplier alliance decreases. Phan & Peridis (2000) suggest that 
high cultural diversity discourages effective communication between partners, thereby 
decreasing knowledge creation. Together, the main effects of resource and cultural 
diversity found here suggest that firms will generally have higher knowledge 
management in alliances with partners that have low resource and cultural diversity. 
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Thus, if firms choose to form alliances with partners with high resource and cultural 
diversity, they may be doing so for reasons other than interorganizational knowledge 
management. In other words, the knowledge-based view appears to suggest that firms 
will generally have higher knowledge creation and acquisition when they form alliances 
with partners that have similar resources and capabilities and similar culture. This is an 
important suggestion as it helps to distinguish the knowledge-based view from the 
general resource-based view which suggests that resource diversity and culture diversity 
in alliances encourages innovation and forms the basis for gaining competitive advantage.  
None of the relationships hypothesized with resource diversity as the moderator 
variable between strategic orientation dimensions and the two modes of knowledge 
management was entirely supported by the data in the predicted direction. Resource 
diversity did appear to have a significant moderating influence on the relationship 
between leadership orientation and knowledge creation in the key supplier alliance. It 
was found that firms with a managerial leadership orientation are less effective in 
creating knowledge through their key supplier alliance when there is high resource 
diversity between partners. Further, resource diversity does not have much influence on 
knowledge creation through key supplier alliances for firms with entrepreneurial 
leadership orientation. Thus, it appears that firms with a managerial leadership 
orientation need to form strategic alliances with suppliers that have similar resources and 
capabilities to create knowledge, while for firms with entrepreneurial leadership 
orientation resource diversity may not have much influence on the level of knowledge 
created.  
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Resource diversity also seemed to have marginally significant influence on the 
relationship between learning orientation and knowledge creation in the key customer 
alliance. It was found that firms with an adaptive learning orientation are more effective 
in creating knowledge through their alliance when there is low resource diversity between 
partners. Thus, it appears that firms with adaptive learning orientation need to form 
strategic alliances with customers that have similar resources and capabilities to create 
knowledge, while for firms with generative learning orientation, resource diversity does 
not appear to influence the level of knowledge creation much.    
For cultural diversity, partial support was found for the moderating influence of 
cultural diversity on the relationship between learning orientation and knowledge 
acquisition in key supplier alliance. As hypothesized, firms with an adaptive learning 
orientation were found to be more effective in acquiring knowledge through their alliance 
when there is low cultural diversity between partnering firms. However, for firms with a 
generative learning orientation cultural diversity with key supplier did not make any 
difference to knowledge acquisition in these alliances. Thus, firms with an adaptive 
learning orientation need to form strategic alliances with suppliers that have a similar 
culture to acquire knowledge from them.   
Together the moderating influence of resource diversity and cultural diversity found 
in the data suggests that, from a knowledge-based view, firms may be more effective in 
interorganizational knowledge management if they form strategic alliances with partners 
that have similar resources and culture.  
6.1.3 Knowledge creation, knowledge acquisition, and firm performance 
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Another objective of this study was to examine the direct impact of knowledge 
creation and knowledge acquisition on firm performance. It was found that neither 
knowledge creation nor knowledge acquisition in key supplier or customer alliance had a 
statistically significant relationship with perceived firm performance. The lack of support 
for the relationship between the two modes of knowledge management and firm 
performance is important to note in view of Eisenhardt and Santos (2002)’s critique that 
there is as-yet no compelling evidence of the positive impact of knowledge management 
on firm performance. Though knowledge management has been empirically linked to 
alliance performance (Inkpen, 2002), its relationship with firm performance has been 
taken as a matter of faith in extant literature and not empirically demonstrated. It is 
possible that the impact of knowledge creation and knowledge acquisition on firm 
performance is through other variables like number of patents and new product 
introductions that contribute to improved firm performance32. Scholars have already 
begun to examine the impact of knowledge management on innovation. For example, 
Yli-Renko et al. (2001) look at two measures of innovation, technological distinctiveness 
and new product development, as part of the dependent variable knowledge exploitation 
of knowledge acquired from key customer alliances. It would be useful to extend such a 
model to include actual firm performance as measured by market share, profitability, or 
stock price.  
This should not be interpreted to mean that knowledge management in supply chain 
alliances will not have a direct influence on firm performance. The post-hoc finding that 
general knowledge management in key supplier and customer alliances had a significant 
                                                 
32 Even in the data collected for this study, the average correlation of knowledge creation with performance 
increased by about .15 and that of knowledge acquisition with performance increased by about .10 when 
only the new product dimension of performance was considered.  
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influence on achieved and expected firm performance provides hope that evidence can be 
found for the direct impact of knowledge management on firm performance. However, it 
is important to mention here that the impact of general knowledge management on 
performance was negative for the key supplier alliance and positive for the key customer 
alliance. This suggests that knowledge management with a key supplier may have a 
negative impact on firm performance, while knowledge management with a key customer 
may have a positive impact on firm performance. There is a significant body of literature 
that suggests that traditionally supply chain relationships tend to be asymmetric with the 
more upstream partner being more powerful (Kumar et al., 1995; Griffith et al., 2006). 
The more powerful partner in supply chain relationships tends to control the decisions or 
behavior of the less powerful partners and direct the relationship in its own favor so as to 
capture most value for itself (Anderson & Weitz, 1989; Gaski, 1984)  If this is indeed the 
case, then it is possible that an alliance with a key supplier has a negative impact on 
performance for the downstream partner, while an alliance with a key customer has a 
positive impact on performance for the upstream partner as found in this study.  
Results also reveal that complexity of the knowledge base of the industry influences 
the relationship between knowledge creation in key customer alliance and achieved firm 
performance. It was found that higher knowledge creation in key customer alliance is 
positively related to firm performance only when the knowledge base of the industry is 
highly complex. This finding is evidence that in industries where the knowledge base is 
more complex, knowledge creation in customer alliances helps firms improve their 
performance. It was also found that in industries where the knowledge base of the 
industry is not as complex, knowledge creation in key customer alliance has a negative 
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influence on firm performance. Thus, firms need to be aware of the complexity of 
knowledge required to compete in their industry and engage in strategic alliances with 
key customers accordingly. These findings are consistent with a life-cycle view of 
industries that in the early stages of the industry when the knowledge base of the industry 
is more complex, new knowledge creation is more important for firm performance. As 
industries become more mature and the knowledge base of the industry becomes less 
complex new knowledge creation is not as important for competing effectively and may 
even be detrimental for performance. Creating new knowledge, by definition, is 
expensive. Thus, firms need to carefully weigh the costs and benefits of engaging in 
knowledge creation with their key customers depending on the complexity of the 
knowledge base of the industry.    
It was also seen that knowledge complexity of the industry did not impact the 
relationship between knowledge acquisition and firm performance. The data failed to 
support the hypothesized relationship that at low level of complexity, knowledge 
acquisition will have a higher influence on performance. Thus, the impact of knowledge 
acquisition on firm performance does not appear to vary by knowledge complexity of the 
industry. This suggests that the firms’ acquisition of knowledge through its key supply 
chain alliances need not be contingent on the knowledge complexity of the industry (and 
by implication, the life stage of the industry). In the absence of other empirical studies 
looking at the impact of industry knowledge on knowledge acquisition through strategic 
alliances, there does not appear to be much to be gained from further examining the 
moderating influence of industry knowledge on the relationship of knowledge acquisition 
with firm performance. Future researchers may want to investigate if the relationship 
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between knowledge acquisition and firm performance is moderated by other factors like 
age of the alliance and the ability of firm to exploit the acquired knowledge.  
6.2 Limitations 
This section discusses six key limitations of this study.  
The form of the knowledge creation and knowledge acquisition scales differed 
somewhat from expectations. Three items each in the measures of knowledge creation 
and knowledge acquisition had to be dropped from the main scale because they loaded on 
an unexpected factor which was labeled general knowledge management. Despite the 
increasing attention to interorganizational knowledge creation and knowledge acquisition 
in extant literature, no reliable scale exists to measure these constructs. The knowledge 
creation scale used in this study was adapted from He and Wong’s (2000) explorative 
innovation scale and the knowledge acquisition scale was adapted from Lyles and Salk’s 
(1996) knowledge acquisition from a foreign parent scale. An attempt was made in this 
study to adapt these scales to develop multi-item knowledge creation and knowledge 
acquisition measures that would include various knowledge domains (e.g. product, 
market, technological, managerial, work processes). However, only product, market, and 
technological knowledge on each of the two scales loaded well together. Other 
knowledge domains tended to load together whether the partner already possessed such 
knowledge (as in knowledge acquisition) or neither firm possessed such knowledge (as in 
knowledge creation). Thus, there is an urgent need to consider in-depth examination of 
interorganizational knowledge creation and acquisition and to develop suitable scales for 
measuring these constructs. Much work needs to be done in this area including 
developing more reliable and valid scales for interorganizational knowledge creation and 
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knowledge acquisition and establishing their correlations not only with alliance 
performance measures (as has been done in the past) but also with important firm-level 
variables including performance and innovation.    
Another limitation arises from the methodology used to test the hypotheses. Survey 
research does not allow observation of knowledge management in real time. Though this 
study assumes causal linkages between firm strategic orientation and interorganizational 
knowledge management and knowledge management and firm performance, cross-
sectional studies can not establish causality unambiguously. Certainly, longitudinal 
studies that capture alliance interactions and knowledge management dynamics would be 
a good way to examine and confirm the hypotheses made in this study and to uncover 
detailed mechanisms and patterns related to knowledge creation and acquisition 
processes. The present research used self-response measures to assess the creation or 
acquisition of new knowledge through the alliance. Thus, future studies should look at 
studying alliances and interorganizational knowledge management in real time. This 
limitation, however, needs to be balanced against the recent recognition of potential 
reliability shortcomings of longitudinal research. Reliable longitudinal data, argued 
Anderson (1995), may be an illusion: 
First, consider the mechanics of such an undertaking. An enormous amount of sustained 
cooperation is required by managers acting as key informants over time. The “right sizing” 
movement, which appears to be continuing despite warnings about its potential shortcomings 
(Hamel & Prahalad, 1994) produces tremendous upheaval in firms and increasing demands on 
the remaining managers. The first consequence leads to sample attrition over time as whole 
units disappear, whereas the second leads to greater unwillingness to participate in academic 
research, particularly repeatedly (p. 439).  
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Also, the study used data from only the focal firm for both key customer and supplier 
alliances. Though this is in line with other alliance researchers (e.g. Lambe et al, 2002 in 
marketing and Sarkar et al., 2001 in management), obtaining data from both parties in a 
dyadic relationship may be better than data from one side of the dyad. Partners’ 
perceptions of the state of affairs of a relationship routinely vary and it is possible that 
where one partner sees cooperation, the other sees competition and where one sees joint 
creation of knowledge, the other sees acquisition of knowledge. Collecting data from 
both sides of the key customer and supplier alliance was beyond the scope and resources 
of this study. Future research should try to collect data from both parties in the 
relationship to examine the convergence in perception of relational activities. One 
potential difficulty in collecting information from both dyad partners may be the high 
level of trust that the key informants need to have in the researcher/s to disclose the 
detailed identity of their partners. It is important that informants feel comfortable 
disclosing the full identity of their alliance partners to the researcher/s. When informants 
of this study were asked about their partners, less than 20% provided meaningful identity 
information for their partners.  
Another limitation of the study involves the possible presence of a retrospective bias. 
Survey research that requires respondents to report about events that have happened in 
the past, especially the distant past, is likely to suffer from such bias. Informants in this 
study were asked to focus on ongoing supplier and customer alliances. Performance data 
was collected for achieved performance over the past three years as well as expected 
performance over the next five years. Thus, informants were asked to report recent facts 
or events, rather than recall those from the distant past (Huber & Power, 1985; Miller, 
  178
Cardinal, & Glick, 1997). Further, because this study compared knowledge creation and 
knowledge acquisition, retrospective bias does not appear to be a plausible explanation 
for the results. It is possible that measuring firm performance after measuring knowledge 
outcomes (creation and acquisition) may have tainted the influence of knowledge 
creation and acquisition on firm performance. However, the lack of significant finding for 
the relationship between knowledge outcomes and performance suggests that 
retrospective bias did not influence the results of this study. Thus, even as retrospective 
bias does not seem to be a possible explanation for the results of this study, this limitation 
needs to be kept in mind when interpreting the results (Golden, 1992). 
This study has a limited sample size of 100 firms. Though 2142 of the original 2500 
firms qualified for the study, only 193 agreed to participate and only 100 provided usable 
responses. It is possible that a larger sample could be more representative of the high-tech 
firms in general. Though there was no significant difference in means between 
respondents and non-respondents (except for a relatively small practical difference in 
number of employees), the small sample size of this study should be kept in mind when 
generalizing the results of this study to the larger set of high-tech firms.  
Finally, while a sample drawn from the US does not seem to pose any systematic 
problems with the study, future efforts could utilize a broad-based international sample 
and explore any differences that may exist across countries that have a large high-tech 
sector. Strategic alliances are shaped by societal, economic, cultural, and institutional 
contexts in which firms and its actions are embedded and these forces determine strategic 
orientation towards alliance partners as well as outcomes in alliances. The role of national 
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culture in determining knowledge creation and knowledge acquisition would be an 
interesting research avenue.  
6.3 Conclusion 
This study started with the objective of increasing current understanding of the 
relationship between firm strategy and knowledge management in strategic supply chain 
alliances as well as of the influence of knowledge management on firm performance. 
Survey data was collected from top executives of 100 high-tech firms in five industries 
(based on 3-digit SIC codes). Firms in the high-tech sector were selected as it was 
believed that it would be a relatively homogeneous sample. However, it appears that 
firms belonging to SIC code 737 (software) are at least somewhat different in their 
perceptions of alliances from other high-tech firms in the sample. Though the difference 
between the two types of firms did not threaten the validity of the findings of this study, it 
underscores the need for careful sampling in future research involving high-tech firms.  
This study also found some evidence for the relationship between firm strategy and 
interorganizational knowledge management in key supply chain relationships. Leadership 
orientation, an important component of firms’ strategic orientation, had a positive 
significant direct impact on knowledge creation and knowledge acquisition in key 
customer alliances such that firms with an entrepreneurial leadership orientation were 
more effective in creating and acquiring knowledge through the alliance. It was also 
found that generally firms are more effective at interorganizational knowledge 
management when they partner with suppliers and customers that have similar resources 
and culture. Though evidence was not found for the direct impact of knowledge creation 
and knowledge acquisition on firm performance, post-hoc analysis of the relationship 
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between general knowledge management and firm performance provided hope that it is 
possible to find direct performance effects for interorganizational knowledge 
management.  
In an influential critique of the knowledge-based view, Eisenhardt and Santos (2002) 
argued that the “implications [of knowledge-based view] for strategy remain distant” (p. 
161) because extant research has been unable to link knowledge management to firm 
strategy and firm performance. The findings of this study make a positive and non-trivial 
contribution to the knowledge-based view as a theory of strategic management. It is 
hoped that future researchers will build on the findings of this study and advance current 
understanding of knowledge management in strategic supply chain alliances.    
  181
REFERENCES 
 
Almeida, P., Phene, A., & Grant, R. M. 2003. Innovation and knowledge management: 
Scanning, sourcing, and integration. In M. Easterby-Smith, & M. A. Lyles (Eds.), 
Handbook of Organizational Learning and Knowledge Management. Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
 
Alzira, S., & Easterby-Smith, M. 1994. Cultural Change and Managerial Careers. 
Personnel Review, 23(3): 33-50. 
 
Anand, B. N., & Khanna, T. 2000. Do firms learn to create value? The case of alliances. 
Strategic Management Journal, 21(Special Issue): 295-316. 
 
Anderson, E., & Weitz, B. A. 1989. Determinants of continuity in conventional industrial 
channels. Marketing Science, 8(Fall): 310-323. 
 
Anderson, J. C. 1995. Relationships in business markets: exchange episodes, value 
creation, and their empirical assessment. Journal of the Academy of Marketing 
Science, 23(4): 446-450. 
 
Andrews, K. R. 1971. The Concept of Corporate Strategy. New York: Dow Jones-Irwin. 
Ansoff, H. I. 1994. Comment on Henry Mintzberg’s rethinking strategic planning. 
Long Range Planning. 
 
Appleyard, M. M. 2002. Cooperative knowledge creation: The case of buyer-supplier co-
development in the semiconductor industry. In F. J. Contractor, & P. Lorange (Eds.), 
Cooperative Strategies: 381-418. Amsterdam: Pergamon. 
 
Argote, L., & Ingram, P. 2000. Knowledge transfer: A basis for competitive advantage in 
firms. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 82(1): 150-169. 
 
Argote, L., McEvily, B., & Reagans, R. 2003. Managing knowledge in organizations. an 
integrative framework and a review of emerging themes. Management Science, 
49(4): 571-582. 
 
Argyris, C. 1977. Douple loop learning in organizations. Harvard Business Review, 
55(Sept-Oct): 115-125. 
 
Argyris, C. 1993. On Organizational Learning. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers. 
 
Argyris, C., & Schon, D. A. 1978. Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action 
Perspective: Addison-Wesley. 
 
Atkins, S., & Murphy, K. 1993. Reflection: A review of the literature. Journal of 
Advanced Nursing, 18(8): 1188-1192. 
 
  182
Aulakh, P. S., & Madhok, A. 2002. Cooperation and performance in international 
alliances: The critical role of flexibility. In F. J. Contractor, & P. Lorange (Eds.), 
Cooperative Strategies and Alliances: 25-48. Amsterdam: Pergamon. 
 
Autio, E. 2000. Growth of technology-based new firms. In D. L. Sexton, & H. Landstrom 
(Eds.), Handbook of Entrepreneurship: 329-347. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
 
Baker, W. E., & Sinkula, J. M. 1999. The synergistic effect of market orientation and 
learning orientation on organizational performance. Journal of the Academy of 
Marketing Science, 27: 411-427. 
 
Baker, W. E., & Sinkula, J. M. 2002. Market orientation, learning orientation and product 
innovation: Delving into the organization's black box. Journal of Market-Focused 
Management, 5: 5-23. 
 
Balmer, J. M. T., & van Riel, C. B. M. 1997. Corporate identity. European Journal of 
Marketing, 31(5/6): 338-422. 
 
Barnett, W. P., & Burgelman, R. A. 1996. Evolutionary perspectives on strategy. 
Strategic Management Journal, 17: 5-19. 
 
Barney, J. B. 1991. Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of 
Management, 17: 99-120. 
 
Barney, J. B. 2001. Resource-based theories of competitive advantage: A ten-year 
retrospective on the resource-based view. Journal of Management, 27: 643-650. 
 
Barney, J. B., Busenitz, L. W., Fiet, J. O., & Moesel, D. D. 1996. New venture teams’ 
assessment of learning assistance from venture capital firms. Journal of Business 
Venturing, 11: 257-272. 
 
Baron, R. A. 2004. The cognitive perspective: A valuable tool for answering 
entrepreneurship's basic "why" questions. Journal of Business Venturing, 19: 221-
239. 
 
Barringer, B. R., & Bluedorn, A. C. 1999. The relationship between corporate 
entrepreneurship and strategic management. Strategic Management Journal, 20(5): 
421-444. 
 
Barringer, B. R., & Harrison, J. S. 2000. Walking a tightrope: Creating value through 
interorganizational relationships. Journal of Management, 26: 367-403. 
 
Baum, J. A. C., Locke, E. A., & Smith, K. G. 2001. A multidimensional model of venture 
growth. Academy of Management Journal, 44(2): 292-303. 
 
Baumard, P. 1999. Tacit knowledge in organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
  183
 
Bayus, B. L., Jain, S., & Rao, A. G. 1997. Too little, too early: Introduction timing and 
new product performance in the personal digital assistant industry. Journal of 
Marketing Research, 34: 50-63. 
 
Beamish, P. W., & Delios, A. 1997. Incidence and propensity of alliance formation. In P. 
W. Beamish, & J. P. Killing (Eds.), Cooperative Strategies: Asian Pacific 
Perspectives: 91-114. San Francisco: The New Lexington Press. 
 
Becker, M. C. 2003. The concept of routines twenty years after Nelson and Winter (1982) 
– A review of the literature, DRUID Working Paper, No 03-06. 
 
Beech, N., MacIntosh, R., MacLean, D., Shephard, J., & Stokes, J. 2002. Exploring 
constraints on developing knowledge - On the need for conflict. Management 
Learning, 33(4): 459-475. 
 
Bettis, R. A., & Wong, S.-S. 2003. Dominant logic, knowledge creation, and managerial 
choice. In M. Easterby-Smith, & M. A. Lyles (Eds.), Handbook of Organizational 
Learning and Knowledge Management: 343-355. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
 
Boland, R., Singh, J., Salipante, P., Aram, J. D., Fay, S. Y., & Kanawattanachai, P. 2001. 
Knowledge representations and knowledge transfer. Academy of Management 
Review, 44(2): 393-418. 
 
Borys, B., & Jemison, D. B. 1989. Hybrid arrangements as strategic alliances: 
Theoretical issues in organizational combinations. Academy of Management Review, 
14: 234-249. 
 
Brews, P. J., & Hunt, M. R. 1999. Learning to plan and planning to learn: Resolving the 
planning school/learning school debate. Strategic Management Journal, 20: 889-
913. 
 
Bromley, D. 2001. Relationship between personal and corporate reputation. European 
Journal of Marketing, 35(3/4): 259-267. 
 
Brown, J. S., & Duguid, P. 2001. Knowledge and organization: A social-practice 
perspective. Organization Science, 12(2): 198-213. 
 
Brown, R. B. 2000. Contemplating the emotional component of learning: The emotions 
and feelings involved when undertaking an MBA. Management Learning, 31(3): 
275-293. 
 
Brown, S. L., & Eisenhardt, K. L. 1997. The art of continuous change: linking 
complexity theory and time-paced evolution in relentlessly shifting organizations. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 42(1): 1-27. 
 
  184
Brown, T. E., Davidsson, P., & Wiklund, J. 2001. An operationalization of Stevenson’s 
conceptualization of entrepreneurship as opportunity-based firm behavior. Strategic 
Management Journal, 22(10): 953-968. 
 
Burns, T., & Stalker, G. 1966. The Management of Innovation. London: Tavistock 
Publications. 
 
Burt, R. S. 1992. Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Busenitz, L. W., & Barney, J. B. 1997. Differences between entrepreneurs and managers 
in large organizations: Biases and heuristics in strategic decision-making. Journal of 
Business Venturing, 12(1): 9-30. 
 
Calantone, R., Cavusgil, S. T., & Zhao, Y. 2002. Learning orientation, firm innovation 
capability, and firm performance. Industrial Marketing Management, 31(6): 515-
524. 
 
Campbell, D. 1960. Blind variation and selective retention in creative thought as in other 
knowledge processes. The Psychological Review 67, 380-400. 
 
Chaston, I., Badger, B., & Sadler-Smith, E. 2000. Organizational learning style and 
competences: A comparitive investigation of relationship and transactionally oriented 
small UK manufacturing firms. European Journal of Marketing, 34(5/6): 625-640. 
 
Chaston, I., Badger, B., & Sadler-Smith, E. 2001. Organizational learning: An empirical 
assessment of process in small UK manufacturing firms. Journal of Small Business 
Management, 39(2): 139-151. 
 
Chatterjee, S., Hadi, A. S., & Price, B. 2000. Regression analysis by example: Third 
Edition. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
 
Chatzkel, J. 2004. Establishing a global KM initiative: The Wipro story. Journal of 
Knowledge Management, 8(2): 6-18. 
 
Child, J. 2001. Learning through strategic alliances. In M. Dierkes, A. B. Antal, J. Child, 
& I. Nonaka (Eds.), Handbook of Organizational learning and knowledge: 657-680. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Chiles, T. H., Bluedorn, A. C., & Gupta, V. K. 2006. Beyond creative destruction and 
entrepreneurial discovery: A radical Austrian approach to entrepreneurship. 
Organization Studies, Forthcoming. 
 
Choi, C. J., & Lee, S. H. 1997. A knowledge-based view of co-operative 
interorganizational relationships. In P. W. Beamish, & J. P. Killing (Eds.), Co-
  185
operative strategies: European perspectives.: 33-58. San Francisco: The New 
Lexington Press. 
 
Christensen, C., & Bower, J. 1996. Customer power, strategic investment, and the failure 
of leading firms. Strategic Management Journal, 17: 197-218. 
 
Chun, R. 2001. European Journal of Marketing, Special edition: 'Corporate identity and 
corporate marketing'. Corporate Reputation Review, 4(3): 276-283. 
 
Coakes, E., Bradburn, A., & Sugden, G. 2004. Managing and leveraging knowledge for 
organizational advantage. Knowledge Management Research & Practice, 2(2): 118-
128. 
 
Coase, R. H. 1937. The nature of the firm. Economica, IV: 386-405. 
 
Coff, R. W. 1999. When competitive advantage doesn't lead to performance: The 
resource based view and stakeholder bargaining power. Organization Science, 10(2): 
119-133. 
 
Cohen, W. M., & Levinthal, D. A. 1990. Absorptive capacity: A new perspective on 
learning and innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35: 128-152. 
 
Contractor, F. J., Kim, C.-S., & Beldona, S. 2002. Interfirm learning in alliance and 
technology networks: An empirical study in the global pharmaceutical and chemical 
industries. In F. J. Contractor, & P. Lorange (Eds.), Cooperative Strategies: 493-516. 
Amsterdam: Pergamon. 
 
Contractor, F. J., & Lorange, P. 2002. The growth of alliances in the knowledge-based 
economy. In F. J. Contractor, & P. Lorange (Eds.), Cooperative strategies and 
alliances: 3-24. Oxford: Pergamon. 
 
Cooper, L. G. 2000. Strategic marketing planning for radically new products. Journal of 
Marketing, 64(1): 1-16. 
 
Cope, J. 2003. Entrepreneurial learning and critical reflection. Management Learning, 
34(4): 429-450. 
 
Covin, J. G. 1991. Entrepreneurial versus conservative firms: A comparison of strategies 
and performance. Journal of Management Studies, 28(5): 439-462. 
 
Covin, J. G., & Miles, M. P. 1999. Corporate entrepreneurship and the pursuit of 
competitive advantage. Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice, 23(3): 47-63. 
 
Covin, J. G., & Slevin, D. P. 1989. Strategic management of small firms in hostile and 
benign environments. Strategic Management Journal, 10: 75-87. 
 
  186
Covin, J. G., & Slevin, D. P. 1991. A conceptual model of entrepreneurship as firm 
behavior. Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice(Fall): 7-25. 
 
Crampton, C. D. 2001. The mutual knowledge problem and its consequences for 
dispersed collaboration. Organization Science, 12(3): 346-371. 
 
Crant, J. M. 2000. Proactive behavior in organizations. Journal of Management, 26(3): 
435-462. 
 
Cronbach, L. 1987. Statistical tests for moderator variables: Flaws in analysis recently 
proposed. Psychological Bulletin, 102: 414-417. 
 
Crossan, M., Lane, H. W., & White, R. E. 1999. An organizational learning framework: 
From intuition to institution. Academy of Management Review, 24(3): 522-537. 
 
Csikszentmihalyi, M. 1990. Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience. New York: 
Harper Perennial. 
 
Cummings, J. 2003. Knowledge sharing: A review of the literature: 1-57. Washington, 
D.C.: The World Bank. 
 
Das, T. K., & Rahman, N. 2002. Opportunism dynamics in strategic alliances. In F. J. 
Contractor, & P. Lorange (Eds.), Cooperative Strategies and Alliances: 89-118. 
Boston, MA: Pergamon. 
 
Das, T. K., & Teng, B.-S. 2000. A resource-based theory of strategic alliances. Journal 
of Management, 26(1): 31-60. 
 
Das, T. K., & Teng, B.-S. 2002. The dynamics of alliance conditions in the alliance 
development process. Journal of Management Studies, 39: 725-746. 
 
Davenport, T. H., & Prusack, L. 2000. Working knowledge: How organizations manage 
what they know. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. 
 
Davis, G. F., & Useem, M. 2002. Top management, company directors, and corporate 
control. In A. Pettigrew, H. Thomas, & R. Whittington (Eds.), Handbook of Strategy 
and Management. London: Sage. 
 
Day, G. S. 1994. Capabilities of market-driven organizationa. Journal of Marketing: 37-
51. 
 
Day, G. S. 2000. Managing market relationships. Journal of the Academy of Marketing 
Science, 28: 24-30. 
 
De Long, D. W., & Fahey, L. 2000. Diagnosing cultural barriers to knowledge 
management. Academy of Management Executive, 14(4): 113-127. 
  187
 
De Rond, M., & Bouchikhi, H. 2004. On the dialectics of strategic alliances. 
Organization Science, 15(1): 56-69. 
 
Deeds, D. L., & Hill, C. W. L. 1996. Strategic alliances and the rate of new product 
development: An empirical study of entrepreneurial biotechnology firms. Journal of 
Business Venturing, 11(1): 41-55. 
 
Desouza, K. C., Chattaraj, A., & Kraft, G. 2003. Supply chain perspectives to knowledge 
management. Journal of Knowledge Management, 7(3): 129-138. 
 
Dess, G. G., & Beard, D. W. 1984. Dimensions of organizational task environments. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 29: 52-73. 
 
Dess, G. G., Ireland, R. D., & Hitt, M. A. 1990. Industry effects and strategic 
management research. Journal of Management, 16: 7-27. 
 
Dess, G. G., Ireland, R. D., Zahra, S., Floyd, S. W., Janney, J. J., & Lane, P. J. 2003. 
Emerging issues on corporate entrepreneurship. Journal of Management, 29: 351-
378. 
 
Dess, G. G., & Lumpkin, G. T. 2001. Emerging issues in strategy process research. In M. 
A. Hitt, R. E. Freeman, & J. S. Harrison (Eds.), The Blackwell Handbook of 
Strategic Management. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers. 
 
Dess, G. G., Lumpkin, G. T., & Covin, J. G. 1997. Entrepreneurial strategy making and 
firm performance: Tests of contingency and configurational models. Strategic 
Management Journal, 18(9): 677-695. 
 
Dess, G. G., & Origer, N. K. 1987. Environment, structure, and consensus in strategy 
formulation: A conceptual Integration. Academy of Management Review, 12(2): 313-
330. 
 
Dess, G. G., & Robinson, R. 1984. Measuring organizational performance in the absence 
of objective measures: The case of the privately-held firm and conglomerate business 
unit. Strategic Management Journal, 5: 265-273. 
 
Dickson, P. R., & Giglierano, J. J. 1986. Missing the boat and sinking the boat: A 
conceptual model of entrepreneurial risk. Journal of Marketing, 50(3): 58-71. 
 
Digman, J. M. 1990. Personality structure: Emergence of the 5 factor model. Annual 
Review of Psychology, 41: 417-440. 
 
Ding, H.-B., & Peters, L. S. 2000. Inter-firm knowledge management practices for 
technology and new product development in discontinuous innovation. International 
Journal of Technology Management, 20(5/6/7/8): 588-600. 
  188
 
Donaldson, L. 1990. The ethereal hand: Organizational economics and management 
theory. Academy of Management Review, 15(3): 369-381. 
 
Donaldson, L. 2003. Damned by our own theories: Contradictions between theories and 
management education. Academy of Management Learning & Education, 1(1): 96-
106. 
 
Dougherty, D. 1992. Interpretive barriers to succesful product innovation in large firms. 
Organization Science, 3(2): 179-202. 
 
Doz, Y. L. 1996. The evolution of cooperation in strategic alliances: Initial conditions or 
learning processes? Strategic Management Journal, 17(Summer Special Issue): 55-
83. 
 
Doz, Y. L., & Baburoglu, O. 2000. From competition to collaboration: The emergence 
and evolution of R&D cooperatives. In D. O. Faulkner, & M. De Rond (Eds.), 
Cooperative Strategy: 173-192. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Doz, Y. L., & Hamel, G. 1998. Alliance Advantage. Boston, MA: Harvard Business 
School Press. 
 
Drath, W. H., & Palus, C. J. 1994. Making common sense: Leadership as meaning-
making in a community of practice. Greensboro, NC: Center for Creative 
Leadership. 
 
Dyer, J. H., & Noboeka, K. 2000. Creating and managing a high performance 
knowledge-sharing network: The Toyota case. Strategic Management Journal, 21: 
345-368. 
 
Dyer, J. H., & Singh, H. 1998. The relational view: Cooperative strategy and sources of 
interorganizational competitive advantage. Academy of Management Review, 23: 
660-679. 
 
Eisenhardt, K. M., & Martin, J. A. 2000. Dynamic capabilities: What are they? Strategic 
Management Journal, 21: 1105-1121. 
 
Eisenhardt, K. M., & Santos, F. M. 2002. Knowledge-based view: A new theory of 
strategy? In A. Pettigrew, H. Thomas, & R. Whittington (Eds.), Handbook of 
Strategy and Management. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
 
Eisenhardt, K. M., & Schoonhoven, C. B. 1996. Resource-based view of strategic 
alliance formation: strategic and social effects in entrepreneurial firms. Organization 
Science, 7(2): 136-150. 
 
  189
Eisenhardt, K. M., & Tabrizi, B. N. 1995. Accelerating adaptive processes: Product 
innovation in the global computer industry. Administrative Science Quarterly, 40(1): 
84-110. 
 
Farrell, M. A., & Oczkowski, E. 2002. Are market orientation and learning orientation 
necessary for superior organizational performance? Journal of Market-Focused 
Management, 5: 197-217. 
 
Faulkner, D. O. 1995. International Strategic Alliances: Cooperating to Compete. 
Maidenhead: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Faulkner, D. O., & De Rond, M. 2000. Perspectives on cooperative strategy. In D. O. 
Faulkner, & M. De Rond (Eds.), Cooperative Strategy: 3-39. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Fiol, C. M. 2001. Revisiting an identity-based view of sustainable competitive advantage. 
Journal of Management, 27: 691-699. 
 
Fiol, C. M., & Huff, A. S. 1992. Maps for managers: Where are we? Where do we go 
from here? Journal of Management Studies, 29(3): 267-285. 
 
Fiol, C. M., & Lyles, M. A. 1985. Organizational Learning. Academy of Management 
Review, 10(4): 803-813. 
 
Ford, C. M. 2002. The futurity of decisions as a facilitator of organizational creativity and 
change. Journal of Organizational Change Management, 15(6): 635-646. 
 
Foss, N. J., & Mahkne, V. 2003. Knowledge management: What can organizational 
economics contribute? In M. Easterby-Smith, & M. A. Lyles (Eds.), The Blackwell 
Handbook of Organizational Learning and Knowledge Management: 78-103. 
Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. 
 
Friedman, V. J., Lipshitz, R., & Overmeer, W. 2001. Creating conditions for 
organizational learning. In M. Dierkes, A. B. Antal, J. Child, & I. Nonaka (Eds.), 
Handbook of Organizational Learning and Knowledge: 757-774. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Galbraith, C. S. 1990. Transferring core manufacturing technologies in high tech firms. 
California Management Review, 32(4): 56-70. 
 
Galton, F. 1890. Remarks. Mind, 15: 380-381. 
 
Garud, R., & Karnoe, P. 2001. Path creation as a process of mindful deviation. In R. 
Garud, & P. Karnoe (Eds.), Path Dependence and Creation: 1-38. London: 
Lawrence Earlbaum Associates. 
 
  190
Garud, R., & Nayyar, P. 1994. Transformative capacity: continual structuring by 
intemporal technology transfer. Strategic Management Journal, 15: 365-385. 
 
Gaski, J. F. 1984. The theory of power and conflict in channels of distribution. Journal 
of Marketing, 48(3): 9-29. 
 
Gatingnon, H., & Xuereb, J. 1997. Strategic orientation of the firm and new product 
performance. Journal of Marketing Research, XXXIV: 77-90. 
 
Gavetti, G., & Levinthal, D. A. 2000. Looking forward and looking backward: Cognitive 
and experiential search. Strategic Management Journal, 45(1): 113-137. 
 
Geringer, J. M. 1991. Strategic determinants of partner selection criteria in international 
joint ventures. Journal of International Business Studies,, 22(1): 41-62. 
 
Gersick, C. J., & Hackman, R. J. 1990. Habitual routines in task-performing groups. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 47: 65-97. 
 
Gersick, C. J. 1991. Revolutionary change theories: A multilevel exploration of the 
punctuated equilibrium paradigm. Academy of Management Review, 16: 10-36. 
 
Gerwin, D. 2004. Coordinating product development in strategic alliances. Academy of 
Management Review, 29(2): 241-257. 
 
Gerwin, D., & Ferris, J. S. 2004. Organizing new product development projects in 
strategic alliances. Organization Science, 15: 22-37. 
 
Gioia, D. A., Corley, K. G., & Fabbri, T. 2002. Revisng the past (while thinking in the 
future perfect tense). Journal of Organizational Change Management, 15(6): 622-
634. 
 
Glynn, M. A. 1996. Innovative genius: A framework for relating individual and 
organizational intelligencies to innovation. Academy of Management Review, 21(4): 
1081-1111. 
 
Gold, A. H., Malhotra, A., & Segars, A. H. 2001. Knowledge management: An 
organizational capabilities perspective. Journal of Management Systems, 18(1): 185-
214. 
 
Golden, B. R. 1992. The past is the past—Or is it? The use of retrospective account as 
indicators of past strategy. Academy of Management Journal, 35(4): 848-860. 
 
Grant, R. M. 1996. Toward a knowledge-based theory of the firm. Strategic 
Management Journal, 17(Winter Special Issue): 109-122. 
 
  191
Grant, R. M., & Baden-Fuller, C. 1995. A knowledge-based theory of inter-firm 
collaboration. Academy of Management Best Paper Proceedings, 7: 17-21. 
 
Grant, R. M., & Baden-Fuller, C. 2000. Knowledge and economic organization: An 
application to the analysis of interfirm collaboration. In G. von Krogh, I. Nonaka, & 
T. Nishiguchi (Eds.), Knowledge Creation: A New Source of Value: 113-150. 
London: Macmillan. 
 
Grant, R. M., & Baden-Fuller, C. 2004. A knowledge accessing theory of strategic 
alliances. Journal of Management Studies, 41(1): 619-652. 
 
Gray, B. 2000. Assessing inter-organizational collaboration: Multiple conceptions and 
multiple methods. In D. O. Faulkner, & M. De Rond (Eds.), Cooperative Strategy: 
243-260. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Gray, B., & Wood, D. J. 1991. Collaborative alliances: Moving from practice to theory. 
Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 27: 3-22. 
 
Greenwood, J. 1993. Reflective practice: A critique of the work of Argyris and Schon. 
Journal of Advanced Nursing, 18: 1183-1187. 
 
Greenwood, J. 1998. The role of reflection in single and double loop learning. Journal of 
Advanced Nursing, 27: 1048-1053. 
 
Grewal, R., & Tansuhaj, P. 2001. Building organizational capabilities for managing 
economic crisis: The role of market orientation and strategic flexibility. Journal of 
Marketing, 65: 67-80. 
 
Griffith, D. A., Harvey, M. G., & Lusch, R. F. 2006. Social exchange in supply chain 
relationships: The resulting benefits of procedural and distributive justice. Journal of 
Operations Management, 24: 85-98. 
 
Grunow, D. 1995. The research design in organization studies: Problems & Prospects. 
Organization Science, 6(1): 93-103. 
 
Gulati, R., Khanna, T., & Nohria, N. 1994. Unilateral commitments and the importance 
of process in alliances. Sloan Management Review, 35(3): 61-69. 
 
Gulati, R., Nohria, N., & Zaheer, A. 2000. Strategic networks. Strategic Management 
Journal, 21(3): 203-215. 
 
Gulati, R., & Wong, L. O. 2003. Size of the pie and share of the pie: Implications of 
network embeddedness and business relatedness for value creation and value 
appropriation in joint ventures. In V. Buskens, W. Raub, & C. Snijders (Eds.), The 
Governance of Relations in Markets and Organizations. Amsterdam: JAI PRess. 
 
  192
Gulati, R., & Zajac, E. J. 2000. Reflections on the study of strategic alliances. In D. O. 
Faulkner, & M. De Rond (Eds.), Cooperative Strategy: 365-374. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Gupta, A. K., & Govindarajan, V. 1984. Business unit strategy, managerial 
characteristics, and business unit effectiveness at strategy implementation. Academy 
of Management Journal, 9: 25-41. 
 
Gupta, A. K., & Govindarajan, V. 2000. Knowledge flows within multinational 
corporations. Strategic Management Journal, 21: 473-496. 
 
Hagedoorn, J. 1993. Understanding the rationale of strategic technology partnering: inter-
organizational modes of cooperation and sectoral differences. Strategic Management 
Journal, 14: 371-385. 
 
Hagedoorn, J., & Osborn, R. N. 2002. Interfirm R&D partnerships: Major theories and 
trends since 1960. In F. J. Contractor, & P. Lorange (Eds.), Cooperative strategies 
and alliances: 518-541. Amsterdam: Pergamon. 
 
Hall, R., & Andriani, P. 2003. Managing knowledge associated with innovation. Journal 
of Business Research, 56(2): 145-152. 
 
Hambrick, D. C., & Fukutomi, G. D. 1991. The seasons of a CEO’s tenure. Academy of 
Management Review, 16(4): 719-742. 
 
Hambrick, D. C., Geletkanycz, M. A., & Fredrickson, J. W. 1993. Top executive 
commitment to the status quo: Some tests of its determinants. Strategic Management 
Journal, 14: 401-418. 
 
Hambrick, D. C., & Mason, P. A. 1984. Upper echelons: The organization as a reflection 
of its top managers. Academy of Management Review, 9(2): 193-206. 
 
Hambrick, D. C., & Pettigrew, A. 2001. Upper echelons: Donald Hambrick on executives 
and strategy. Academy of Management Executive, 15(3): 36-44. 
 
Hamel, G. 1991. Competition for competence and inter-partner learning within 
international strategic alliances. Strategic Management Journal, 12: 83-103. 
 
Hamel, G., Doz, Y. L., & Prahalad, C. K. 1989. Collaborating with your competitors- 
And win. Harvard Business Review, 67: 133-139. 
 
Hamel, G., & Prahalad, C. K. 1994. Competing for the Future. Boston, MA: Harvard 
Business School Press. 
 
Hargadon, A. B., & Sutton, R. I. 1997. Technology brokering and innovation in a product 
development firm. Administrative Science Quarterly, 42(2): 716-749. 
  193
 
Harrison, J. S., Hitt, M. A., Hoskisson, R. E., & Ireland, R. D. 2001. Resource 
complementarity in business combinations: Extending the logic to organizational 
alliances. Journal of Management, 27(6): 679-690. 
 
Hayek, F. A. 1945. The use of knowledge in society. American Economic Review, 35(4): 
519-530. 
 
Hayek, F. A. 1988. The fatal conceit. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
He, Z.-L., & Wong, P.-K. 2004. Exploration vs. exploitation: An empirical test of the 
ambidexterity hypothesis. Organization science, 15(4): 481-494. 
 
Heide, J. B., & John, G. 1990. Alliances in industrial purchasing: The determinants of 
joint action in buyer-supplier relationships. Journal of Marketing Research, XXVII: 
24-36. 
 
Heiens, R. A. 2000. Market orientation: Toward an integrated framework. Academy of 
Marketing Science Review(1): 1-5. 
 
Hennart, J.-F. 1988. A transaction costs theory of joint ventures. Strategic Management 
Journal, 9: 361-374. 
 
Hennart, J.-F., Roehl, T., & Zietlow, D. S. 1999. 'Trojan Horse' or 'WorkHorse'? The 
evolution of U.S.-Japanese joint ventures in the United States. Strategic Management 
Journal, 20(1): 15-29. 
 
Hitt, M. A., Dacin, M. T., Levitas, E., Arregle, J. L., & Borza, A. 2000. Partner selection 
in emerging and developed market context: Resource-based and organizational 
learning perspective. Academy of Management Journal, 43(3): 449-467. 
 
Hitt, M. A., Dacin, M. T., Tyler, A. L., & Park, D. 1997. Understanding the differences in 
Korean and U.S. executives’ strategic orientations. Strategic Management Journal, 
18: 159-167. 
 
Hitt, M. A., Ireland, R. D., Camp, S. M., & Sexton, D. L. 2001. Guest editors’ 
introduction to the special issue strategic entrepreneurship: Entrepreneurial strategies 
for wealth creation. Strategic Management Journal, 22: 479-491. 
 
Holmqvist, M. 2004. Experiential learning processes of exploitation and exploration 
within and between organizations: An empirical study of product development. 
Organization Science, 15(1): 70-81. 
 
Hoopes, D. G., & Postrel, S. 1999. Shared knowledge, "glitches" and product 
development performance. Strategic Managment Journal, 20: 837-865. 
 
  194
Huber, G. P. 1991. Organizational learning: The contributing processes and the 
literatures. Organization science, 2(1): 88-115. 
 
Huber, G. P., & Power, G. D. 1985. Retrospective reports of strategic level 
managers:Guidelines for increasing their accuracy. Strategic Management Journal, 
6: 171-180. 
 
Hult, G. T. M. 2003. A research agenda for the nexus of product development and supply 
chain management processes. Journal of Product Innovation Management, 20(6): 
427-428. 
 
Hult, G. T. M., Ketchen, D. J. J., & Slater, S. F. 2004. Information processing, knowledge 
development, and strategic supply chain performance. Academy of Management 
Journal, 47(2): 241-253. 
 
Hult, G. T. M., Ketchen Jr., D. J., & Nichols Jr., E. L. 2002. An examination of cultural 
competitiveness and order fulfillment cycle time within supply chains. Academy of 
Management Journal, 45(3): 577-587. 
 
Hunt, S. D., & Lambe, C. J. 2000. Marketing's contribution to business strategy: Market 
orientation, relationship marketing and resource-advantage theory. International 
Journal of Management Reviews, 2(1): 17-43. 
 
Huntsman, S. 1994. Using strategic planning to drive organizational change. Long Range 
Planning, 27(1): 50-55. 
 
Hussi, T. 2004. Reconfiguring knowledge management - combining intellectual capital, 
intangible assets and knowledge creation. Journal of Knowledge Management, 8(2): 
36-52. 
 
Ichijo, K., von Krogh, G., & Nonaka, I. 1998. Knowledge enablers. In G. von Krogh, J. 
Roos, & D. Klein (Eds.), Knowing In Firms: Understanding, Managing and 
Measuring Knowledge: 173-203. London, UK: Sage. 
 
Imai, K., Nonaka, I., & Takeuchi, H. 1985. Managing the new product development 
process:how Japanese companies learn and unlearn. In K. Clark, R. Hayes, & C. 
Lorenz (Eds.), he Uneasy Alliance. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. 
 
Inkpen, A. C. 1996. Creating knowledge through collaboration. California Management 
Review, 39: 123-140. 
 
Inkpen, A. C. 2002. Learning, knowledge management, and strategic alliances: So many 
studies, so many unanswered questions. In F. J. Contractor, & P. Lorange (Eds.), 
Cooperative Strategies and Alliances: 267-290. Amsterdam: Pergamon. 
 
  195
Inkpen, A. C., & Beamish, P. W. 1997. Knowledge, bargaining power and the instability 
of international joint ventures. Academy of Management Review, 22(1): 177-202. 
 
Ireland, R. D., Hitt, M., A., Camp, S. M., & Sexton, D. L. 2001. Integrating 
entrepreneurship and strategic management actions to create firm wealth. Academy of 
Management Execu-tive, 15(1): 49-63. 
 
Jaccard, J., Turrisi, R., & Wan, C. K. (Eds.). 1990. Interaction Effects in Multiple 
Regression. Newbury Park: Sage Publications. 
 
Jacoba, T. O., & Jaques, E. 1990. Military Executive. In K. Clark, & M. Clark (Eds.), 
Measures of Leadership. New Jersey: Leadership Library of America Inc. 
 
Jago, A. 1982. Leadership: Perspectives in theory and research. Management Science, 
28(3): 315-336. 
 
Jap, S. 1999. Pie-expansion efforts: Collaboration processes in buyer-supplier 
relationships. Journal of Marketing Research, XXXVI: 461-475. 
 
Jap, S. 2001. "Pie-sharing" in complex collaboration contexts. Journal of Marketing 
Research, XXXVIII: 86-99. 
 
Jaworski, B., Kohli, A. K., & Sahay, A. 2000. Market-driven versus market driving. 
Journal of the Academy of Market Science, 28(1): 45-54. 
 
Jensen, R. J., & Szulanski, G. 2004. Stickiness and the adaptation of organizational 
practices in cross-border knowledge transfers. Journal of International Business 
Studies, 35: 508-523. 
 
Johnson, J. L. 1999. Strategic integration in industrial distribution channels: managing 
the interfirm relationships as a strategic asset. Journal of the Academy of Marketing 
Science, 27: 4-18. 
 
Johnson, J. L., Cullen, J. B., Sakano, T., & Takenouchi, H. 1996. Setting the stage for 
trust and strategic integration in Japanese-US cooperative alliances. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 27(981-1004). 
 
Johnson, W. H. A. 2002. Assessing organizational knowledge creation theory in 
collaborative R&D projects. International Journal of Innovation Management, 
6(4): 387-418. 
 
Joshi, A. W., & Sharma, S. 2004. Customer knowledge development: Antecedents and 
impact on new product performance. Jouranl of Marketing, 68(4): 47-59. 
 
  196
Judge, W. Q., Fryxell, G. E., & Dooley, R. S. 1997. The new task of R&D management: 
creating goal-directed communities for innovation. California Management Review, 
39(3): 72-85. 
 
Kaldor, A. G. 1971. Imbricative Marketing. Journal of Marketing, 35(2): 19-25. 
 
Kale, P., Dyer, J. H., & Singh, H. 2002. Alliance capability, stock market response, and 
long-term alliance success: The role of alliance function. Strategic Management 
Journal, 23: 747-767. 
 
Kale, P., Singh, H., & Perlmutter, H. 2000. Learning and protection of proprietary assets 
in strategic alliances: Building relational capital. Strategic Management Journal, 
21(3): 217-237. 
 
Kandemir, D., Ghauri, P., & Cavusgil, S. T. 2002. The strategic role of organizational 
learning in relationship quality in strategic alliances. In F. J. Contractor, & P. Lorange 
(Eds.), Cooperative strategies and alliances, Vol. 799-828. Oxford: Pergamon. 
 
Kara, A., Spillan, J. E., & DeShields, O. W. 2005. The effect of a narket orientation on 
business performance: A study of small-sized service retailers using MARKOR scale. 
Journal of Small Business Management, 43(2): 105-118. 
 
Katila, R., & Ahuja, G. 2002. Something old, Something new: A longitudinal study of 
search behavior and new product introduction. Academy of Management Journal, 
45(8): 1183-1194. 
 
Keh, H. T., Foo, M. D., & Lim, B. C. 2002. Opportunity evaluation under risky 
conditions: The cognitive processes of entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurship Theory & 
Practice, 27(2): 125-149. 
 
Kelley, K. L., & Staelin, R. 1987. Effects of quality and quantity of information on 
decision effectiveness. Journal of Consumer Research, 14: 200-213. 
 
Kerssens-van Drongelen, I. C., & de Weerd-Nederhof, P. C. 1999. The use of 
performance measurement tools for balancing short- and long-term NPD 
performance. International Journal of Innovation Management, 3(4): 397-426. 
 
Ketchen Jr, D. J., & Giunipero, L. C. 2004. The intersection of strategic management and 
supply chain management. Industrial Marketing Management, 33: 51-56. 
 
Khanna, T., Gulati, R., & Nohria, N. 1998. The dynamics of learning alliances: 
Competition, cooperation and relative scope. Strategic Management Journal, 19: 
193-210. 
 
Kidd, J. B. 1998. Knowledge creation in japanese manufacturing companies in Italy. 
Management Learning, 29(2): 131-146. 
  197
 
Kikoski, C. K., & Kikoski, J. 2004. The Inquiring Organization. Westport, CT:  Praeger 
 
Kim, L. 1998. Crisis construction and organizational learning: Capability building in 
catching-up at Hyundai Motor. Organization Science, 9(4): July-August. 
 
Kirzner, I. M. 1973. Competition and Entrepreneurship. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
 
Klimoski, R. J., & Mohammed, S. 1994. Team mental model: Construct or metaphor. 
Journal of Management, 20: 403-437. 
 
Kogut, B. 1988. Joint Ventures: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives. Strategic 
Management Journal, 9: 319-332. 
 
Kogut, B. 1989. The stability of joint ventures, reciprocity and competitive rivalry. 
Journal of Industrial Economics, 38: 183-198. 
 
Kogut, B. 2000. The network as knowledge: Generative rules and the emergence of 
structure. Strategic Management Journal, 21(3): 405-425. 
 
Kogut, B., & Kulatilaka, N. 1994. Operating flexibility, global manufacturing, and the 
option value of a multinational network. Management Science, 40: 123-139. 
 
Kogut, B., & Zander, U. 1992. Knowledge of the firm, combinative capabilities, and the 
replication of technology. Organization Science, 3: 383-397. 
 
Kohli, A. K., & Jaworski, B. J. 1990. Market Orientation: The construct, reserach 
propositions, and managerial implications. Journal of Marketing, 54: 1-18. 
 
Koza, M., P. , & Lewin, A. 1998. The co-evolution of strategic alliances. Organization 
Science, 9: 255–264. 
 
Kristensson, P., Gustafsson, A., & Archer, T. 2004. Harnessing the creative potential 
among users. The Journal of Product Innovation Management, 21: 4-14. 
 
Kumar, N., & Scheer, L. 1998. Radical and incremental product innovation among 
market driven and market driving firms. Paper presented at the Marketing Science 
Institute/Journal of Marketing Conference. 
 
Kumar, N., Scheer, L., & Kotler, P. 2000. From market driven to market driving. 
European Management Journal, 18(2): 129-142. 
 
Kumar, N., Scheer, L. K., & Steenkamp, J.-B. E. M. 1995. The effects of supplier 
fairness on vulnerable resellers. Jouranl of Marketing Research, 32: 54-65. 
 
  198
Kyriakopoulos, K., & Moorman, C. 2004. Tradeoffs in marketing exploitation and 
exploration strategies: The overlooked role of market orientation. International 
Journal of Research in Marketing, 21: 219-240. 
 
Lachmann, L. M. 1986. The Market as an Economic Process. New York: Basil 
Blackwell. 
 
Lado, A. A., Boyd, N., & Hanlon, S. C. 1997. Competition, cooperation, and the search 
for economic rents: A syncretic model. Academy of Management Review, 22(1): 
110-141. 
 
Lahteenmaki, S., Toivonen, J., & Mattila, M. 2001. Critical aspects of organizational 
learning research and proposals for its measurement. British Journal of 
Management, 12(2): 113-129. 
 
Lambe, C. J., Spekman, R., & Hunt, S. D. 2000. Interimistic relational exchange: 
conceptualization and propositional development. Journal of the Academy of Market 
Science, 28(2): 212-225. 
 
Lane, P. J., & Lubatkin, M. H. 1998. Relative absorptive capacity and interorganizational 
learning. Strategic Management Journal, 19: 461-477. 
 
Lane, P. J., Salk, J. E., & Lyles, M. A. 2001. Absorptive capacity, learning and 
performance in international joint ventures. Strategic Management Journal, 22: 
1139-1161. 
 
Lardner, J. 1987. Fast forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the VCR wars. New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company. 
 
Larson, A. 1992. Network dyads in entrepreneurial settings: A study of the governance of 
exchange relationships. Administrative Science Quarterly, 37: 76-104. 
 
Lei, D. 1997. Competence-building, technology fusion and competitive advantage. 
International Journal of Technology Management, 14(4): 208-237. 
 
Lente, H. V. 1993. Promising Technologies: The Dynamics of Expectations in 
Technological Development. Enschende: Twente University Press. 
 
Leonard-Barton, D. 1992. Core capabilities and core rigidities: A paradox in managing 
new product development. Strategic Management Journal, 13: 111-125. 
 
Levin, R., Klevorick, A., Nelson, R. R., & Winter, S. 1987. Appropriating the returns 
from industrial research and development. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 
3: 783-820. 
 
  199
Levinthal, D. A., & March, J. G. 1993. The myopia of learning. Strategic Management 
Journal, 14(Winter Special Issue): 93-107. 
 
Levitt, B., & March, J. G. 1988. Organizational learning. Annual Review of Sociology, 
14: 319-340. 
 
Lewin, A. Y., Long, C. P., & Carroll, T. N. 1999. The coevolution of new organizational 
forms. Organization science, 10: 519-534. 
 
Lewin, P., & Phelan, S. E. 2000. An Austrian theory of the firm. Review of Austrian 
Economics, 13: 59-79. 
 
Li, M., & Gao, F. 2003. Why Nonaka highlights tacit knowledge: a critical review. 
Journal of Knowledge Management, 7(4): 6-14. 
 
Li, M., & Simerly, R. L. 1998. The moderating effect of environmental dynamism on the 
ownership and performance relationship. Strategic Management Journal, 19: 169-
179. 
 
Liebeskind, J. P. 1996. Knowledge, strategy, and the theory of the firm. Strategic 
Management Journal, 17(Winter Special Issue): 93-107. 
 
Lincoln, J. R., Ahmadjian, C. L., & Mason, E. 1998. Organizational learning and 
purchase-supply relations in Japan: Hitachi, Matsushita, & Toyota compared. 
California Management Review, 40(3): 241-264. 
 
Lowe, K. B., Kroeck, K. G., & Sivasubramaniam, N. 1996. Effectiveness correlates of 
transformational and transactional leadership: A meta-analytic review of the MLQ 
literature. Leadership Quarterly, 7(3): 385-425. 
 
Lubinski, D. 2000. Scientific and social significance of assessing individual differences: 
"Sinking shafts at a few critical points". Annual Review of Psychology, 51: 405-444. 
 
Lukas, B. A., & Ferrell, O. C. 2000. The effect of market orientation on product 
innovation. Journal of the Academy of Market Science, 28: 239-247. 
 
Lumpkin, G. T., & Dess, G. G. 1995. Simplicity as a strategy-making process: The 
effects of stage of organizational development and environment on performance. 
Academy of Management Journal, 38: 1386-1407. 
 
Lumpkin, G. T., & Dess, G. G. 1996. Clarifying the entrepreneurial orientation construct 
and linking it to performance. Academy of Management Review, 21: 135-171. 
 
Lumpkin, G. T., & Lichtenstein, B. B. 2005. The Role of organizational learning in the 
opportunity-recognition process. Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice, 29(4): 451-
460. 
  200
 
Lyles, M. A., & Salk, J. E. 1996. Knowledge acquisition from foreign parents in 
international joint ventures: An empirical examination in the Hungarian context. 
Journal of International Business Studies, 27(5): 877-903. 
 
Lyles, M. A., & Schwenk, C. R. 1992. Top management, strategy, and organizational 
knwoledge structures. Journal of Management Studies, 29: 155-174. 
 
Lyon, D. W., Lumpkin, G. T., & Dess, G. G. 2000. Enhancing entrepreneurial research: 
Operationalizing and measuring a key strategic decision making process. Journal of 
Management, 26: 1055-1085. 
 
Madhavan, R., & Grover, R. 1998. From embedded knowledge to embodied knowledge: 
New product development as knowledge management. Journal of Marketing, 62(4): 
1-12. 
 
Madhavan, R., Gynawali, D. R., & He, J. 2004. Two's company, three's a crowd? Triads 
in cooperative-competitive networks. Academy of Management Journal, 47(6): 918-
927. 
 
Madhok, A. 2000. Transaction (in)efficiency, value (in)efficiency, and inter-firm 
collaboration. In D. O. Faulkner, & M. De Rond (Eds.), Cooperative Strategy: 74-95. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Madhok, A., & Tallman, S. B. 1998. Resources, transactions and rents: Managing value 
through interfirm collaborative relationships. Organization Science, 9: 326-339. 
 
Mahoney, J. T., & Williams, C. 2003. Sticky knowledge: Barriers to knowing in the firm. 
Academy of Management Review, 28(4): 679-681. 
 
Manu, F. A., & Sriram, V. 1996. Innovation, marketing strategy, environment and 
performance. Journal of Business Research, 35: 79-91. 
 
March, J. G. 1991. Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning. Organization 
Science, 2(1): 71-87. 
 
Martins, E. C., & Terblanche, F. 2003. Building organizational culture that stimulates 
creativity and innovation. European Journal of Innovation Management, 6(1): 64-
74. 
 
McAdam, R. 2000. Knowledge management as a catalyst for innovation within 
organizations: A qualitative study. Knowledge and Process Management, 7(4): 233-
241. 
 
  201
McFadyen, M. A., & Cannella Jr., A. A. 2004. Social capital and knowledge creation: 
Diminishing returns of the number and strength of exchange relationships. Academy 
of Management Journal, 45: 735-747. 
 
McFarlin, D. B., & Chelle, R. F. 2005. Quality reserach and practical relevance: Can we 
find the "sweet spot"? Academy of Management Executive, 19(1): 158-161. 
 
McGrath, R. G. 1999. Falling forward: Real options reasoning and entrepreneurial 
failure. Academy of Management Review, 24(1): 13-30. 
 
McGrath, R. G. 2001. Exploratory learning, innovative capacity, and managerial 
oversight. Academy of Management Journal, 44(1): 118-131. 
 
McGrath, R. G., Ferrier, W. J., & Mendelow, A. L. 2004. Real options as engines of 
choices and heterogeneity. Academy of Management Review, 29(1): 86-101. 
 
McGrath, R. G., & Macmillan, I. 2000. The Entrepreneurial Mindset. Boston, MA: 
Harvard Business School Press. 
 
McGrath, R. G., & Nerkar, A. 2004. Real Options reasoning and a new look at the R&D 
investment strategies of pharmaceutical firms. Strategic Management Journal, 
25(1): 1-21. 
 
McKelvey, B. 1975. Guidelines for the empirical classification of organizations. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 20: 509-525. 
 
Menon, A., Bharadwaj, S. G., Adidam, P. T., & Edison, S. W. 1999. Antecedents and 
consequences of marketing strategy making: A model and a test. Journal of 
Marketing, 63(2): 18-40. 
 
Meyer, M. W., & Gupta, V. 1994. The performance paradox. Research in 
Organizational Behavior, 16: 309-369. 
 
Meyers, P. W., & Athaide, G. A. 1991. Strategic mutual learning between producing and 
buying firms during product innovation. Journal of Product Innovation 
Management, 8: 155-169. 
 
Michael, S., Storey, D., & Thomas, H. 2002. Discovery and coordination in strategic 
management and entrepreneurship. In M. A. Hitt, R. D. Ireland, S. M. Camp, & D. L. 
Sexton (Eds.), Strategic Entrepreneurship: Creating a New Mindset. Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 
 
Michel, J. G., & Hambrick, D. C. 1992. Diversification posture and top management 
team characteristics. Academy of Management Journal, 35: 9-37. 
 
  202
Miles, R. E., & Snow, C. C. 1978. Organizational Strategy, Structure and Process. NY: 
Mc-Graw Hill. 
 
Miller, C., Cardinal, L., & Glick, W. 1997. Retrospective reports in organizational 
research: Areexamination of recent evidence. Academy of Management Journal, 
40(1): 189-204. 
 
Miller, D., & Droge, C. 1986. Psychological and traditional determinants of structure. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 31(4): 539-560. 
 
Miller, D., & Friesen, P. H. 1978. Archetypes of strategy formulation. Management 
Science, 24: 921-933. 
 
Miller, D., & Friesen, P. H. 1982. Innovation in conservative and entrepreneurial firms: 
Two models of strategic momentum. Strategic Management Journal, 3(1): 1-25. 
 
Miller, K. D. 2002. Knowledge inventories and managerial myopia. Strategic 
Management Journal, 23(8): 689-706. 
 
Miller, K. D., & Arikan, A. T. 2004. Technology search investments: Evolutionary, 
option reasoning, and option pricing approaches. Strategic Management Journal, 
25(5): 473-485. 
 
Millins, J. W., & Forlani, D. 2005. Missing the boat or sinking the boat: A study of new 
venture decision making. Journal of Business Venturing, 20: 47-69. 
 
Miner, A. S., & Mezias, S. J. 1996. Ugly duckling no more: Pasts and futures of 
organizational learning research. Organization Science, 7(1): 88-99. 
 
Mintzberg, H. 1973. The Nature of Managerial Work. New York: Harper & Row. 
 
Mintzberg, H., Lampel, J., & Ahlstrand, B. 1998. Strategy Safari: A Guided Tour 
Through The Wilds of Strategic Management. New York: The Free Press. 
 
Mintzberg, H., & Waters, J. A. 1985. Of strategies, deliberate and emergent. Strategic 
Management Journal, 6: 257-272. 
 
Mintzberg, H., & Westley, F. 1992. Cycles of organizational change. Strategic 
Management Journal, 13(Winter Special Issue): 39-59. 
 
Mitchell, R., Friga, P. N., & Mitchell, R. 2004. Untangling the intuition mess: Intuition as 
a construct in entrepreneurial research. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice. 
 
Mitchell, W., & Singh, K. 1996. Survival of business using collaborative relationships to 
commercialize complex goods. Strategic Management Journal, 17: 169-195. 
 
  203
Mohr, A. T., & Puck, J. F. 2005. Managing functional diversity to improve the 
performance of international joint ventures. Long Range Planning, 38(2): 163-182. 
 
Moorman, C., & Miner, A. S. 1997. The impact of organizational memory on new 
product performance and creativity. Journal of Marketing Research, 34(1): 91-106. 
 
Moran, P., & Ghoshal, S. 1996. Theories of economic organization: The case for realism 
and balance. Academy of Management Review, 21(1): 58-73. 
 
Morgan, G. 1997. Images of Organization. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
 
Morgan, R. E., & Strong, C. A. 1998. Market orientation and dimensions of strategic 
orientation. European Journal of Marketing, 32: 1051-1065. 
 
Morgan, R. M., & Hunt, S. D. 1994. The commitment trust theory of relationship 
marketing. Journal of Marketing, 58: 20-38. 
 
Mowery, D. C., Oxley, J. E., & Silverman, B. S. 1996. Strategic alliances and interfirm 
transfer. Strategic Management Journal, 17(Winter special issue): 77-93. 
 
Mowery, D. C., Oxley, J. E., & Silverman, B. S. 2002. The two faces of partner-specific 
absorptive capacity: Learning and cospecialization in strategic alliances. In F. J. 
Contractor, & P. Lorange (Eds.), Cooperative Strategies and Alliances: 291-320. 
Amsterdam: Pergamon. 
 
Mudambi, R., & Helper, S. 1998. The ‘close but adversarial’ model of supplier relations 
in the U.S. auto industry. Strategic Management Journal, 19(8): 775-792. 
 
Mulligan, P. 2002. Specification of a capability-based IT classification framework. 
Information & Management, 39(8): 647-658. 
 
Mullins, J. W., & Forlani, D. 2005. Missing the boat or sinking the boat: A study of new 
venture decision making. Journal of Business Venturing, 20: 47-69. 
 
Muthusamy, S. K., & White, M. A. 2005. Learning and knowledge transfer in strategic 
alliances: A social exchange view. Organization Studies, 26(3): 413-441. 
 
Nahapiet, J., & Ghoshal, S. 1998. Social capital, intellectual capital, and the 
organizational advantage. Academy of Management Review, 23(2): 242-266. 
 
Naman, J., & Slevin, D. 1993. Entrepreneurship and the concept of fit: A model and 
empirical tests. Strategic Management Journal, 14: 137-153. 
 
Narver, J., Slater, S. F., & MacLachlan, D. 2004. Market orientation, innovativeness, and 
new product success. Journal of Product Innovation Management, 21(5): 334-347. 
 
  204
Narver, J. C., & Slater, S. F. 1990. The effect of a market orientation on business 
profitability. Journal of Marketing, 54(4): 20-35. 
 
Nelson, R., & Winter, S. 1982. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. 
Cambridge, MA: Belknap. 
 
Nelson, R. R. 1991. Why firms differ? Strategic Management Journal, 12: 61-74. 
 
Nerkar, A. 2003. Old is gold? The value of temporal exploration in the creation of new 
knowledge. Management Science, 49(2): 211-229. 
 
Nickerson, J. A., & Zenger, T. R. 2004. A knowledge-based theory of the firm: The 
problem-solving perspective. Organization Science, 15(6): 617-632. 
 
Niederkofler, M. 1991. The evolution of strategic alliances: Opportunities for managerial 
influence. Journal of Business Venturing, 6(4): 237-257. 
 
Noble, C. H., Sinha, R. K., & Kumar, A. 2002. Market orientation and alternative 
strategic orientations: A longitudinal assessment of performance implications. 
Journal of Marketing, 66(4): 25-39. 
 
Nonaka, I. 1991. The Knowledge creating company. Harvard Business Review, 6: 96-
104. 
Nonaka, I. 1994. A dynamic theory of organizational knowledge creation. 
Organization Science, 5: 15-37. 
 
Nonaka, I., & Konno, N. 1998. The concept of “ba”: Building a foundation for 
knowledge creation. California Management Review, 40(3): 40-54. 
 
Nonaka, I., Reinmoller, P., & Toyama, R. 2001. Integrated information technology 
systems for knowledge creation. In M. Dierkes, A. B. Antal, J. Child, & I. Nonaka 
(Eds.), Handbook of Organizational Learning and Knowledge: 827-848. Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press. 
 
Nonaka, I., & Takeuchi, H. 1995. The Knowledge-Creating Company: How Japanese 
Companies Create the Dynamics of Innovation. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Nonaka, I., Takeuchi, H., & Umemoto, K. 1996. A theory of organizational knowledge 
creation. International Journal of Technology Management, 11: 833-845. 
 
Nonaka, I., & Toyama, R. 2003. The knowledge-creating theory revisited: Knowledge 
creation as a synthesizing process. Knowledge Management Research & Practice, 1: 
2-10. 
 
  205
Nonaka, I., Toyama, R., & Nagata, A. 2000. A firm as a knowledge-creating entity: A 
new perspective on the theory of the firm. Industrial and Corporate Change, 9(1): 1-
20. 
 
Nooteboom, B. 2000. Learning by interaction: Absorptive capacity, cognitive distance 
and governance. Journal of Management and Governance, 4: 69-92. 
 
Obstfield, D. 2005. Social networks, the tertius Iungens orientation, and involvement in 
innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 50: 100-130. 
 
Ordonez de Pablos, P. 2005. Knowledge management projects: state of the art in the 
Spanish manufacturing industry. International Journal of Manufacturing 
Technology and Management, 7(4): 297-310. 
 
Osborn, R. N., & Baughn, C. C. 1990. Forms of interorganizational governance for 
multinational alliances. Academy of Management Journal, 33(3): 503-519. 
 
Overby, M. L., & Ozcan, S. 2006. Partner diversity and shareholder value: A study of 
high-tech multi-firm alliances. From 
www.cbs.dk/content/download/36129/546394/file/Overby%20 Ozcan.pdf 
 
Overholt, A. 2005. 25 top women business builders., Fast Company: 65-77. 
 
Pangarkar, N., & Klein, S. 2001. The impacts of alliance purpose and partner similarity 
on alliance governance. British Journal of Management, 12: 341-353. 
 
Park, N. K., Mezias, J. M., & Song, J. 2004. A resource-based view of strategic alliances 
and firm value in the electronic marketplace. Journal of Management, 30(1): 7-27. 
 
Parkhe, A. 1991. Interfirm diversity, organizational learning, and longevity in global 
strategic alliances. Journal of International Business Studies, 22(4): 579-601. 
 
Parkhe, A. 1993. Strategic alliance structuring: A game theoretic and transaction cost 
examination of interfirm cooperation. Academy of Management Journal, 36: 794-
829. 
 
Patriotta, G. 2004. On studying organizational knowledge. Knowledge Management 
Research & Practice, 2: 3-12. 
 
Penrose, E. T. 1959. The Theory of the Growth of the Firm (3rd ed.). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Peters, T. 1992. Liberation Management. New York: Pan Books. 
 
Peters, T., & Waterman, J. 1982. In Search of Excellence. New York: Warner Books. 
 
  206
Peterson, K. J., Handfield, R. B., & Ragatz, G. L. 2003. A model of supplier integration 
into new product development. Journal of Product Innovation Management, 20: 
284-299. 
 
Pettigrew, A., Thomas, H., & Whittington, R. 2002. Strategic Management: The strengths 
and limitations of the field. In A. Pettigrew, H. Thomas, & R. Whittington (Eds.), 
Strategy and Management. London: Sage. 
 
Pfeffer, J. 1998. The human equation. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. 
 
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. 1978. The External Control of Organizations: A Resource 
Dependence Perspective. New York: Harper & Row. 
 
Phan, P. H., & Peridis, T. 2000. Knowledge creation in strategic alliances: Another look 
at organizational learning. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 17: 201-222. 
 
Podolny, J. M., & Page, K. L. 1998. Network forms of organization. Annual Review of 
Sociology, 24: 57-76. 
 
Poh-Kam, W. 2000. Knowledge creation management: Issues and challenges. 
Introduction to special issue. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 17: 193-200. 
 
Polanyi, M. 1966. The Tacit Dimension. Garden City, NY: DoubleDay. 
 
Polonsky, M. J., Schuppisser, D. S. W., & Beldona, S. 2002. A stakeholder perspective 
for analyzing marketing relationships. Journal of Market-Focused Management, 5: 
109-126. 
 
Porac, J., Thomas, H., & Baden-Fuller, C. 1989. Competitive groups as cognitive 
communities: The case of the Scottish knitwear industry. Journal of Management 
Studies, 26: 397-416. 
 
Porter, M. E. 1985. Competitive Advantage: Creating and sustaining superior 
performance. Boston, MA: Harvard Business Press. 
 
Pothukuchi, V., Damapour, F., Choi, J., Chen, C. C., & Park, S. H. 2002. National and 
organizational culture differences and international joint venture performance. 
Journal of International Business Studies, 33(2): 243-265. 
 
Powell, W. W., & Brantley, P. 1992. Competitive cooperation in biotechnology: Learning 
through networks. In N. Nohria, & R. G. Eccles (Eds.), Networks and Organizations. 
Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. 
 
Powell, W. W., Koput, K. W., & Smith-Doerr, L. 1996. Interorganizational collaboration 
and the locus of innovation: Networks of learning in biotechnology. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 41(1): 116-145. 
  207
 
Prahalad, C. K., & Bettis, R. 1986. The dominant logic: The new linkage between firm 
diversity and performance. Strategic Managment Journal, 7: 485-501. 
 
Prahalad, C. K., & Hamel, G. 1994. Strategy as a field of study: why search for a new 
paradigm? Strategic Management Journal, 15(Special Issue): 5-16. 
 
Priem, R., Rasheed, A., & Kotulic, A. 1995. Rationality in strategic decision processes, 
environmental dynamism, and firm performance. Journal of Management, 21: 913-
929. 
 
Rajagopalan, N. 1996. Strategic orientations, incentive plan adoptions, and firm 
performance: Evidence from electric utility firms. Strategic Management Journal, 
18: 761-785. 
 
Rindfleisch, A., & Moorman, C. 2001. The acquisition and utilization of information in 
new product alliances: A strength-of-ties perspective. Journal of Marketing, 65(2): 
1-19. 
 
Ring, P. S., & Van de Ven, A. H. 1994. Developmental processes of cooperative 
interorganizational relationships. Academy of Management Review, 19: 90-118. 
 
Robertson, P. L., & Yu, T., F. 2001. Firm strategy, innovation and consumer demand: A 
market process approach. Managerial and Decision Economics, 22: 183-199. 
Robinson, W. T., & Min, S. 2002. Is the first to market the first to fail? Empirical 
evidence for industrial goods businesses. Journal of marketing Research, 39(1): 
120-128. 
 
Roehl, T. W., & Truitt, J. F. 1987. Stormy open marriages are better: Evidence from US, 
Japanese, and French cooperative ventures in commercial aircraft. Columbia Journal 
of World Business, 22(2): 87-95. 
 
Rollier, B., & Turner, J. A. 1994. Planning forward by looking backward: Retrospective 
thinking in strategic decision-making. Decision Sciences, 25(2): 169-188. 
 
Rothaermel, F. T., & Deeds, D. L. 2004. Exploration and exploitation alliances in 
biotechnology: A system of new product development. Strategic Management 
Journal, 25: 201-221. 
 
Rothaermel, F. T., & Deeds, D. L. In Press. Alliance type, alliance experience and 
alliance management capability in high-technology ventures. Journal of Business 
Venturing. 
 
Rotheli, T. F. 1998. Pattern recognition and procedurally rational expectations. Journal 
of Economic Behavior & Organization, 37(1): 71-90. 
 
  208
Rowe, W. G. 2001. Creating wealth in organizations: The role of strategic leadership. 
Academy of Management Executive, 15(1): 81-94. 
 
Russ, M., & Camp, S. M. 1997. Strategic alliances and technology transfer: An extended 
paradigm. International Journal of Technology Management, 14(5): 513-527. 
 
Rynes, S. L., Bartunek, J. M., & daft, R. L. 2001. Across the great divide: Knowledge 
creation and transfer between practitioners and academics. Academy of Management 
Journal, 44(2): 340-355. 
 
Sadler-Smith, E., & Badger, B. 1998. Cognitive style, learning and innovation. 
Technology Analysis & Strategic Management, 10: 247-265. 
 
Salk, J. E., & Simonin, B. L. 2003. Beyond alliances: Towards a meta-theory of 
collaborative learning. In M. Easterby-Smith, & M. A. Lyles (Eds.), Handbook of 
Organizational Learning and Knowledge Management. Oxford, UK: Blackwell 
Publishing Ltd. 
 
Sanchez, R. 2001. Managing knowledge into competence: The five learning cycles of 
competent organizations. In R. Sanchez (Ed.), Knowledge management and 
Organizational Competence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Sapienza, H. J., Smith, K. G., & Gannon, M. J. 1988. Using subjective evaluations of 
organizational performance in small business research. American Journal of Small 
Business, 12(Winter special issue): 45-53. 
 
Sarasvathy, S. D. 2001a. Causation and Effectuation: Towards a theoretical shift from 
economic inevitability to entrepreneurial contingency. Academy of Management 
Review, 26(2): 243-254. 
 
Sarasvathy, S. D. 2001b. Entrepreneurship as economics with imagination. Business 
Ethics Quarterly, The Ruffin Series(3): 95-112. 
 
Sarasvathy, S. D., Dew, N., Velamuri, R., & Venkataraman, S. 2003. Three Views of 
entrepreneurial opportunity. In Z. J. Acs, & D. B. Audretsch (Eds.), Handbook of 
Entrepreneurship Research: An Interdisciplinary Survey and Introduction: 141-
160. Norwell, MA: Kluwer. 
 
Sarasvathy, S. D., Simon, H., & Lave, L. B. 1998. Perceiving and managing business 
risks: Differences between entrepreneurs and bankers. Economic Behavior and 
Organization, 33(2): 207-226. 
 
Sarkar, M. B., Cavusgil, S. T., & Evirgen, C. 1997. A commitment-trust mediated 
framework of international collaborative venture performance. In P. W. Beamish, & 
J. P. Killing (Eds.), Cooperative Strategies: North American Perspectives.: 255-285. 
San Francisco: The New Lexington Press. 
  209
 
Sarkar, M. B., Echambadi, R., Cavusgil, S. T., & Aulakh, P. S. 2001. The influence of 
complementarity, compatibility, and relationship capital on alliance performance. 
Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 29: 358-373. 
 
Sarkar, M. B., Echambadi, R., & Harrison, J. S. 2001. Alliance entrepreneurship and firm 
market performance. Strategic Management Journal, 22(6/7): 201-220. 
 
Saxton, T. 1997. The effects of partner and relationship characteristics on alliance 
outcomes. Academy of Management Journal, 40: 443-461. 
 
Schumpeter, J. A. 1942. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York: Harper & 
Brothers. 
Scott, W. R. 2003. Organizations: Rational, Natural, and Open Systems. Upper 
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
 
Senge, P. 1990. The Fifth Discipline. NY: Doubleday Currency. 
 
Seshadri, S., & Shapira, Z. 2003. The flow of ideas and timing of evaluation as 
determinants of knowledge creation. Industrial and Corporate Change, 12(5): 1099-
1124. 
 
Sethi, R. 2000. New product quality and product development teams. Journal of 
Marketing, 64(2): 1-14. 
 
Shackle, G. L. S. 1972. Epistemics and Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Shan, W., Walker, G., & Kogut, B. 1994. Inter-firm cooperation and startup innovation in 
the biotechnology industry. Strategic Management Journal, 15: 387-394. 
 
Sharkie, R. 2003. Knowledge creation and its place in the development of sustainable 
competitive advantage. Journal of Knowledge Management, 7(1): 20-31. 
 
Shenkar, O. 2001. Cultural distance revisited: Towards a more rigorous conceptualization 
and measurement of cultural differences. Journal of International Business Studies, 
32(3): 519-535. 
 
Simonin, B. 2004. An empirical investigation of the process of knowledge transfer in 
international strategic alliances. Journal of International Business Studies, 35: 407-
427. 
 
Simonin, B. L. 1997. The importance of collaborative know-how: An empirical test of 
the learning organization. Academy of Management Journal, 40(5): 1150-1174. 
 
  210
Simonin, B. L. 1999. Ambiguity and the process of knowledge transfer. Strategic 
Management Journal, 20(7): 595-623. 
 
Singh, K. 1997. The impact of technological complexity and interfirm cooperation on 
business survival. Academy of Management Journal, 40(2): 339-358. 
 
Sinkula, J. M., Baker, W., & Noordewier, T. G. 1997. A framework for market-based 
organizational learning: Linking values, knowledge and behavior. Journal of the 
Academy of Marketing Science, 25: 305-318. 
 
Sivadas, E., & Dwyer, F. B. 2000. An Examination of Organizational Factors Influencing 
New Product Success in Internal and Alliance-Based Processes. Journal of 
Marketing, 64(1): 31-49. 
 
Skarmeas, D., Katsikeas, C. S., & Schlegelmilch, B. B. 2002. Drivers of commitment and 
its impact on performance in cross-cultural buyer-seller relationships: The importer's 
perspective. Journal of International Business Studies, 33(4): 757-783. 
 
Slater, S. F., & Narver, J. C. 1995. Market orientation and the learning organisation. 
Journal of Marketing, 59(3): 63-74. 
 
Slater, S. F., & Narver, J. C. 1998. Customer-led and market-oriented: Let’s not confuse 
the two. Strategic Management Journal, 19(10): 1001-1006. 
 
Slater, S. F., & Narver, J. C. 1999. Market-oriented is more than being customer-led. 
Strategic Management Journal, 20(12): 1165-1168. 
 
Slater, S. F., & Narver, J. C. 2000. The positive effect of a market orienation on business 
profitability: A balanced replication. Journal of Business Research, 48(1): 69-73. 
 
Song, J., Almeida, P., & Wu, G. 2003. Learning-by-hiring: When is mobility more likely 
to facilitate interfirm knowledge transfer? Management Science, 49(4): 351-375. 
 
Song, M., & Xie, J. 1995. Managing cross-functional new product development teams: 
A comparative study of japanese and american firms. Paper presented at the 
Organizational Innovation for Effective New Product Development, Boston, MA. 
 
Spekman, R., Forbes, T., Isabella, L., & MacAvoy, T. 1998. Alliance management: A 
view from the past and a look to the future. Journal of Management Studies, 35(6): 
747-771. 
 
Spencer, J. W. 2001. How relevant is university-based reserach to private high-
technology firms? A United States-Japan comparison. Academy of Management 
Journal, 44(2): 432-441. 
 
  211
Spender, J.-C. 1996. Making knowledge the basis of a dynamic theory of the firm. 
Strategic Management Journal, 17(Winter special issue): 45-62. 
 
Stafford, E. R. 1994. Using co-operative strategies to make alliances work. Long Range 
Planning, 27(3): 69-75. 
 
Stearns, T. M., Hoffman, A. N., & Heide, J. B. 1987. Performance of commercial 
television stations as an outcome of interorganizational linkages and environmental 
conditions. Academy of Management Journal, 30: 71-90. 
 
Stevenson, H. H. 1985. The heart of entrepreneurship. Harvard Business Review, March-
April: 85-84. 
 
Stevenson, H. H., & Jarillo, J. C. 1990. A paradigm of entrepreneurship: Entrepreneurial 
management. Strategic Management Journal, 11(Special Issue): 17-27. 
 
Stump, R. L., & Heide, J. B. 1996. Controlling supplier opportunism in industrial 
relations. Journal of Marketing Research, 33: 431-441. 
 
Szulanski, G. 1996. Exploring internal stickiness: impediments to the transfer of best 
practice within the firm. Strategic Management Journal, 17: 27-43. 
 
Szulanski, G. 2000. The process of knowledge transfer: A diachronic analysis of 
stickiness. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 82: 9-27. 
 
Szulanski, G. 2003. Sticky knowledge: barriers to knowing in the firm. Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage. 
 
Tabachinick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. 2001. Using Multivariate Statistics (Fourth ed.). 
Boston: Allyn & Bacon. 
 
Tallman, S. 2000. Forming and managing shared organization ventures: Resources and 
transaction costs. In D. O. Faulkner, & M. De Rond (Eds.), Cooperative Strategy: 96-
118. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Tan, J. J., & Litschert, R. J. 1994. Environment-strategy relationship and its performance 
implications: An empirical study of the chinese electronics industry. Strategic 
Management Journal, 15: 1-20. 
 
Tanriverdi, H. 2005. Information technology relatedness, knowledge management 
capability, and performance of multibusiness firms. MIS Quarterly, 29(2): 311-334. 
 
Tanriverdi, H., & Venkatraman, N. 2005. Knowledge relatedness and performance of 
multibusiness firms. Strategic Management Journal, 26: 97-119. 
 
  212
Tatikonda, M. V., & Stock, G. N. 2003. Product technology transfer in the upstream 
supply chain. Journal of Product Innovation Management, 20: 444-467. 
 
Teece, D. J. 1998. Research directions for knowledge management. California 
Management Review, 40(3): 289-292. 
 
Templeton, G. F., & Snyder, C. A. 2000. Precursors, contexts and consequences of 
organizational learning. International Journal of Technology Management, 
20(5/6/7/8): 765-781. 
 
Thomke, S., & von Hippel, E. 2002. Customers as innovators: A new way to create value. 
Harvard Business Review, 80(4): 74-81. 
 
Tippins, M. J., & Sohi, R. S. 2003. IT Competency and Firm Performance: Is 
Organizational Learning a Missing Link? Strategic Management Journal, 24: 745-
761. 
 
Tsang, E. W. K. 1999. A preliminary typology of learning in international strategic 
alliances. Journal of World Business, 34(3): 211-230. 
 
Tsoukas, H. 1996. The firm as a distributed knowledge system: A constructionist 
approach. Strategic Management Journal, 17(Winter special issue): 11-25. 
 
Tushman, M. L., & Anderson, P. 1986. Technological discontinuities and organizational 
environments. Administrative Science Quarterly, 31: 439-465. 
 
Uzzi, B. 1997. Social Structure and Competitionin Interfirm Networks: The Paradox of 
Embeddedness. Administrative Science Quarterly, 42: 35-67. 
 
van de Ven, A. H. 2002. Strategic directions for the Academy: This Academy is for you! 
Academy of Management Review, 27(2): 171-185. 
 
van den Bosch, F. A. J., van Wijk, R., & Volberda, H. W. 2003. Absorptive capacity: 
Antecedents, models, and outcomes. In M. Easterby-Smith, & M. A. Lyles (Eds.), 
Handbook of Organizational Learning and Knowledge Management: 278-302. 
Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
 
Venkataraman, N., & Ramanujam, V. 1987. Measurement of business economic 
performance: An examination of method convergence. Journal of Management, 13: 
109-122. 
 
Venkatraman, N. 1989. Strategic orientation of business enterprises: the construct, 
dimensionality, and measurement. Management Science, 35: 942-962. 
 
Venkatraman, N., & Subramaniam, M. 2002. Theorizing the future of strategy: Questions 
for shaping strategy research in the knowledge economy. In A. Pettigrew, H. Thomas, 
  213
& R. Whittington (Eds.), Handbook of Strategy Management: 122-142. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
 
Visser, M. 2003. Gregory Bateson on deutro-learning and double bind: A brief 
conceptual history. Journal of History of the Behavioral Sciences, 39(3): 269-278. 
 
von Hippel, E. 1988. The Sources of Innovation. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
von Hippel, E. 1994. Sticky information and the locus of problem-solving: implications 
for innovations. Management Science, 40(4): 429-439. 
 
von Hippel, E. 1999. Toolkits for User Innovation, MIT Sloan School of Management 
Working Paper. 
 
von Krogh, G. 1998. Care in knowledge creation. California Management Review, 
40(3): 133-154. 
 
von Krogh, G., & Grand, S. 2000. Justification in knowledge creation: Dominant logic in 
management discourses. In G. von Krogh, I. Nonaka, & T. Nishiguchi (Eds.), 
Knowledge Creation: A Source of Value. New York: St. Martin's Press Inc. 
 
von Krogh, G., & Roos, J. 1996. Managing knowledge: Perspectives on cooperation 
and competition. Thousand Oaks, CA.: Sage Publications. 
 
von Krogh, G., & Roos, J. 1996. Afterword: An agenda for practice and future research. 
In G. von Krogh, & J. Roos (Eds.), Managing knowledge. Perspectives on 
cooperation and competition: 226-231. London: Sage. 
 
von Krogh, G., Roos, J., & Slocum, K. 1994. An essay on corporate epistemology. 
Strategic Management Journal, 15(Summer): 55-71. 
 
Vorhies, D. W., & Harker, M. 2000. The capabilities and performance advantages of 
market-driven firms: An empirical investigation. Australian Journal of 
Management, 25(2): 145-168. 
 
Walsh, J. P., & Ungson, G. R. 1991. Organizational memory. Academy of Management 
Review, 16(1): 57-91. 
 
Wathne, K. H., & Heide, J. B. 2004. Relationship governance in a supply chain network. 
Journal of Marketing, 68(1): 73-89. 
 
Weick, K. E. 1979. The Social Psychology of Organizing. NY: Mc-Graw Hill. 
 
Weick, K. E. 1995. Sensemaking in Organizations. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage 
Publications. 
 
  214
Whittington, R., Pettigrew, A., & Thomas, H. 2002. Conclusion: Doing more in strategy 
research. In A. Pettigrew, H. Thomas, & R. Whittington (Eds.), Handbook of 
Strategy and Management: 475-488. London: Sage Publications. 
 
Wiggins, J. S., & Pincus, A. L. 1992. Personality: Structure and assessment. Annual 
Review of Psychology, 43: 473-504. 
 
Wijen, F. 2002. Stakeholder influence and organizational learning in environmental 
management. Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Tilberg University, Maastricht, The 
Netherlands. 
 
Williamson, O. 1975. Markets and Hierarchies, Analysis and Antitrust Implications. 
New York: Free Press. 
 
Williamson, O. 1979. Transaction-cost economics: The governance of contractual 
relations. Journal of Law and Economics, 22: 230-261. 
 
Williamson, O. 1999. Strategy research: governance and competence perspectives. 
Strategic Management Journal, 20(12): 1087-1108. 
 
Yan, A., & Gray, B. 1994. Bargaining power, management control, and performance in 
United States-China joint ventures: A comparative case study. Academy of 
Management Journal, 37: 1478-1517. 
 
Yang, J., Yu, L., & Lee, C. C. 2002. The hidden value of knowledge in new products. 
Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 19(4): 573-586. 
 
Yli-Renko, H., Autio, E., & Sapienza, H. J. 2001. Social capital, knowledge acquisition, 
and knowledge exploitation in young, technology-based firms. Strategic 
Management Journal, 22: 587-613. 
 
Zahra, S. 1996. Governance, ownership, and corporate entrepreneurship: The moderating 
impact of industry technological opportunities. Academy of Management Journal, 
39(6): 1713-1735. 
 
Zahra, S., & George, G. 2002. Absorptive capacity: A review, reconceptualization, and 
extension. Academy of Management Review, 27(2): 185-203. 
 
Zahra, S. A., Ireland, R. D., & Hitt, M. A. 2000. International expansion by new venture 
firms: International diversity, mode of market entry, technological learning and 
performance. Academy of Management Journal, 43: 925-950. 
 
Zander, U., & Kogut, B. 1995. Transfer and imitation of organizational capabilities. 
Organization Science, 6(1): 76-92. 
 
  215
Zeng, M., & Chen, X.-P. 2003. Achieving cooperation in multiparty alliances: A social 
dilemma approach to partnership management. Academy of Management Review, 
28(4): 587-596. 
 
Zeng, M., & Hennart, J.-F. 2002. From learning races to cooperative specialization: 
Towards a new framework for alliance management. In F. J. Contractor, & P. 
Lorange (Eds.), Cooperative Strategies and Alliances: 189-212. Amsterdam: 
Pergamon. 
 
Zollo, M., Reuer, J. J., & Singh, H. 2002. Interorganizational routines and performance in 
strategic alliances. Organization Science, 13(6): 701-713. 
  216
Table 2.1 
Comparison of Knowledge-based View to three widely used theories of strategic alliances 
 Similarities Differences 
Resource Dependence Theory Open systems view- all 
organizations must engage in 
relationships with other 
organizations in the environment. 
Environmental determinism. 
Resource Based View Combining capabilities that are 
not perfectly tradable in the 
market nor easily developed 
internally by organizations. 
Firm heterogeneity. 
Rents earned from resources that 
are scarce and in fixed supply. 
Transaction Cost Economics Problem of ‘appropriability’. 
Why firms exist? 
Discrete exchanges based on 
economic cost-minimization. 
Dark side of human nature. 
How do firms earn economic 
rents? 
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Table 4.1 
Strategic Orientation and Knowledge Management Items with source citations 
Strategic Orientation measures in final form Original Item Reference 
Alliance Orientation  
A1 Encourages us to 
have as much 
concern for our 
partners’ interests as 
our own interests. 
Encourages us to 
think about our 
organization first and 
foremost when 
dealing with our 
partners.  
Our Japanese 
partner always 
looks out for our 
interest in this 
alliance 
Johnson, Cullen, 
Sakano, & 
Takenouchi, 
1996 
A13a We believe in 
mantaining strong, 
healthy relationships 
with our partners. 
We do not believe 
that we can have 
strong, healthy 
relationships with 
our partners. 
We must maintain 
a strong, healthy 
relationship with 
this partner to be 
able to implement 
our strategic plan 
Johnson, 
Cullen, Sakano, 
& Takenouchi, 
1996 
A10 Tries to achieve a 
close alignment 
between our strategic 
plans and that of our 
partner organizations. 
Decides our strategic 
plans without any 
particular attention to 
our partner 
organizations.  
When we develop 
our strategic plans, 
our partner firm is 
a large part of the 
picture 
Johnson, Cullen, 
Sakano, & 
Takenouchi, 
1996 
A12 Encourages 
employees to care 
about what happens 
to our partners.  
Does not encourage 
employees to care 
about what happens 
to our partners 
In this relationship, 
we feel like our 
Japanese partner 
cares what happens 
to us 
Johnson, Cullen, 
Sakano, & 
Takenouchi, 
1996 
A14b Are always frank and 
truthful in our 
dealings with our 
partner organization. 
Try to be secretive 
and deceptive in our 
dealings with our 
partner organization. 
Our Japanese 
partner is always 
frank and truthful 
in its dealings with 
us 
Johnson, 
Cullen, Sakano, 
& Takenouchi, 
1996 
A15b Our organization 
encourages 
employees to go out 
of their way to make 
sure that our 
partners are not 
damaged or harmed 
in our relationship. 
Our organization 
discourages 
employees from 
trying to protect our 
partners from 
damage or harm 
from their 
relationship with us. 
Our Japanese 
partner would go 
out of its way to 
make sure our firm 
is not damaged or 
harmed in this 
relationship 
Johnson, 
Cullen, Sakano, 
& Takenouchi, 
1996 
A8 Makes important 
business decisions 
through discussions 
with our partner 
organizations.  
Makes important 
business decisions 
entirely on our own 
without consultation 
with our partners.  
Decisions 
regarding the 
project were made 
unanimously in 
joint meetings with 
managers from 
both firms 
Sarkar, 
Echambadi, 
Cavusgil, & 
Aulakh, 2001 
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A9 Is usually willing to 
dedicate whatever 
people and resources 
it takes to make our 
relationships a 
success.   
Is usually watchful 
and careful about 
dedicating more 
people and resources 
than the minimum 
necessary to keep the 
relationship going.  
Both firms were 
willing to dedicate 
whatever people 
and resources it 
took to make this 
project a success 
Sarkar, 
Echambadi, 
Cavusgil, & 
Aulakh, 2001 
A2 Encourages us to be 
‘giving’ in our 
relationships with our 
partners so that they 
can benefit from the 
relationship too.  
Encourages us to 
‘get’ as much as 
possible from our 
partner as fast as 
possible so that only 
we can benefit from 
the relationship.  
Partner shared 
proprietory 
information with 
us                         
Partner provided 
information that 
would help us 
Sivadas & 
Dwyer, 2000 
A11 Is willing to forgive 
or overlook minor 
mistakes and 
problems on the part 
of our partners.  
Tries to hold our 
partners responsible 
for any mistakes or 
problems on their 
part.  
We rely 
extensively upon 
contractual rules 
and policies in 
controlling day-to-
day operation of 
the alliance 
Sivadas & 
Dwyer, 2000 
A16b Our organization 
does not want us to 
engage in actions 
that may be harmful 
for our partner even 
if those actions are 
beneficial for our 
organization. 
Our organization 
wants us to maximize 
the benefits available 
to our organization 
even if our actions 
are detrimental to 
our partner. 
We trusted that our 
partners would act 
in our company's 
best interests 
Sivadas & 
Dwyer, 2000 
A6 Emphasizes a high 
sense of unity 
between us and our 
partner organizations. 
Does not consider it 
important to feel a 
sense of oneness 
between us and our 
partners.  
A high sense of 
unity exists 
between this 
supplier and us 
Skarmea, 
Katsikeas, & 
Schlegelmilch, 
2002 
A17b Employees in our 
organization are 
encouraged to devote 
more time to our 
partner organization 
if and when our 
partner needs help. 
Employees in our 
organization are 
discouraged from 
devoting more time to 
our partner 
organization than the 
minimum necessary 
to keep the 
relationship going. 
We devote more 
time to this 
supplier when it 
needs help 
Skarmea, 
Katsikeas, & 
Schlegelmilch, 
2002 
A18a We expect our 
alliance relationship 
to last a long time. 
We do not expect our 
alliance relationship 
to last a long time. 
We expect the 
business 
relationship with 
this supplier to last 
a long time 
Skarmea, 
Katsikeas, & 
Schlegelmilch, 
2002 
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A19a We try to develop 
close relationships 
with our partners 
We do not try to have 
close relationships 
with our partners 
There is close, 
personal 
intercation 
between partners 
at multiple levels 
Kale, Singh, & 
Perlmutter, 2000
A5 Encourages us to 
interact with 
employees of our 
partner organizations 
in informal settings 
even outside of work.  
Wants us to interact 
with employees of 
our partner 
organizations only in 
formal, official 
settings.  
The alliance is 
characterized by 
personal friendship 
between the 
partners at multiple 
levels 
Kale, Singh, & 
Perlmutter, 2000
A7 Does not try to 
monitor our 
relationship with our 
partner organizations. 
Closely monitors 
every aspect of our 
relationship with our 
partner organizations. 
We monitor every 
aspect of 
transcations with 
our major supplier 
to ensure that 
nothing appropriate 
happens 
Johnson, 1999 
A4 Encourages us to 
think that we and our 
partner organizations 
share a common 
future.  
Encourages us to 
think that our future 
is distinct from the 
future of our partner 
organizations.  
Motivational 
approaches to 
managing alliances 
Zeng & 
Hennart, 2003 
A3 Emphasizes 
balancing the future 
needs of our 
organization with the 
future needs of our 
partners.   
Emphasizes the 
future needs of our 
organization more 
compared to that of 
our partners’ future 
needs.  
Motivational 
approaches to 
managing alliances 
Zeng & 
Hennart, 2003 
Leadership Orientation  
G3 Mostly competes 
through the creation 
of new products/ 
technologies/ markets 
that do not exist yet.  
Mostly competes 
through improving 
our existing products/ 
technologies in our 
current markets 
In making strategic 
decisions, we 
constantly seek to 
introduce new 
brands or new 
products in the 
market 
Tan & Litschert, 
1994 
G6 Takes bold decisions 
and then tries to deal 
with the risk through 
their determination 
and will power. 
Makes decisions that 
are associated with 
the least risk after 
careful analysis.  
We search for big 
opportunities, and 
favor large, bold 
decisions despite 
the uncertainty of 
their outcomes 
Tan & Litschert, 
1994 
G7 Tries to act quickly 
to avoid overlooking, 
missing, or losing an 
attractive 
opportunity.  
Waits before acting 
on any opportunity to 
reduce risk even if it 
means missing some 
opportunities in the 
process of waiting.  
We seek 
opportunities that 
have shown to be 
promising 
Tan & Litschert, 
1994 
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G11b Tries to compete 
mostly by pushing out 
the very boundaries 
of existing products 
and/or technologies. 
Tries to compete 
mostly by making 
small improvements 
to existing products 
and/or technologies. 
Changes in 
product or service 
lines have mostly 
been of a minor 
nature vs Changes 
in product or 
service lines have 
usually been quite 
dramatic 
Covin & Slevin, 
1989; Naman & 
Slevin, 1993 
G2 Tries to introduce a 
new, acceptable 
product quickly to 
beat rivals to the 
market.  
Tries to introduce a 
carefully, developed 
product even if it 
leads to delays 
relative to 
competitors. 
In dealing with its 
competitors, my 
firm is very often 
the first to 
introduce new 
products/services, 
administrative 
techniques, 
operating 
technologies, etc. 
Covin & Slevin, 
1989; Naman & 
Slevin, 1993 
G10 Primarily driven by 
the chance to create 
new technologies, 
products, and/or 
markets not yet 
known to people.  
Primarily driven by 
the chance to 
introduce known & 
safe technologies, 
products and/or 
markets serving 
existing needs.  
The top managers 
of my firm favor 
tried and true 
products or 
services 
Covin & Slevin, 
1989; Naman & 
Slevin, 1993 
G4 Tries to introduce 
new products or new 
markets even when in 
the face of great 
uncertainty.  
Adopts a cautious 
‘wait and see’ policy 
to minimize the 
uncertainty around 
the product or 
market. 
Typically adopts a 
cautious, "wait and 
see " posture in 
order to minimize 
the probability of 
making costly 
decisions 
Covin & Slevin, 
1989; Naman & 
Slevin, 1993 
G5 Tries to be the first to 
introduce new, 
breakthrough 
innovations in 
products, 
technologies, 
markets, and/or 
processes.  
Tries to move into 
new products, 
technologies, 
markets, and/or 
processes only after 
other firms have 
already entered there. 
Is very often the 
first business to 
introduce new 
products/services, 
administrative 
techniques, 
operating 
technologies etc. 
Covin & Slevin, 
1989; Naman & 
Slevin, 1993 
G8 Begins to pursue 
opportunities quickly 
hoping that it will be 
able to mobilize the 
resources in stages. 
Plans & lines up 
resources before 
beginning to pursue 
an opportunity.  
Since we do not 
need resources to 
commence the 
pursuit of an 
opportunity, our 
commitment of 
resources may be 
in stages 
Brown, 
Davidsson, & 
Wiklund, 2001 
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G9 Always have many 
more promising ideas 
than our time & 
resources allow us to 
pursue.  
Finds it difficult to 
come up with a 
sufficient number of 
promising ideas to 
utilize our resources 
We have many 
more ideas than we 
have time and the 
resources to pursue 
Brown, 
Davidsson, & 
Wiklund, 2001 
G14a We never experience 
a lack of ideas that 
we can convert into 
profitable 
products/services 
We have limited 
ideas that we can 
convert into 
profitable 
products/services 
We never 
experience a lack 
of ideas that we 
can convert into 
profitable 
products/services 
Brown, 
Davidsson, & 
Wiklund, 2001 
G12b Primarily emphasizes 
effectiveness through 
introducing as many 
new 
product/technologica
l/process 
introduction as 
possible. 
Primarily emphasizes 
efficiency through 
achieving the lowest 
costs possible. 
Our firm 
emphasizes 
efficiency-related 
strategies- 
reduction of 
operating costs, 
reduction of fixed 
costs, 
improvements in 
generating plant 
efficiency, and 
improvements in 
overall 
productivity and 
efficiency 
Rajagopalan, 
1996 
G13b Have a broad vision 
based on their dream 
and imagination 
which does not 
contain a specific, 
detailed action plan 
that the firm is 
expected to 
implement. 
Have a carefully 
developed vision 
which details, on a 
step-by-step basis, a 
number of specific 
actions and 
programs the firm is 
implementing or will 
implement in order to 
achieve its objectives.
Effectuation vs 
Causation 
Sarasvathy, 
2001 
G15a We are always trying 
to create new 
technologies or 
products/services to 
introduce in the 
market 
We are cautious 
about any new 
technology or 
product/service that 
we introduce to the 
market 
Over the past three 
years, this 
company has 
introduced a large 
number of new 
products to the 
market 
Zahra, 1996 
G1 Competes mostly by 
being flexible and 
pursuing multiple 
strategic alternatives 
at the same time.  
Competes mostly by 
conducting a detailed 
analysis of available 
alternatives and 
devotedly pursuing 
one of them. 
Real Options 
Literature     
McGrath, 1999 
Learning Orientation  
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L1 Is open to making 
radical changes to its 
existing values, 
beliefs, and 
assumptions, if 
needed.  
Considers its existing 
values, beliefs, and 
assumptions as 
‘chiseled in stone’ so 
they can be changed 
only slightly.  
There is a clear and 
consistent set of 
values in this 
organization that 
governs the way 
we do business 
Dess, Lumpkin, 
& Covin, 1997 
L4 Is open to making 
changes to the way in 
which it defines 
itself.  
Is resistant to making 
changes to the way in 
which it defines 
itself.  
The way we do 
things in this 
organization is 
well suited to the 
business we are in 
Dess, Lumpkin, 
& Covin, 1997 
L5 Encourages 
employees to share 
their opinion even if 
it does not agree with 
what the top 
executives think.  
Encourages 
employees to share 
their opinion as long 
as it is broadly 
consistent with what 
the top executives 
think.  
People with 
unpopular views 
are given a fair 
hearing in this 
organization 
Dess, Lumpkin, 
& Covin, 1997 
L6 Believes that 
disagreement or 
confrontation of 
ideas between 
employees can be 
beneficial to the 
organization.  
Believes that 
disagreement or 
confrontation of 
ideas between 
employees can not be 
beneficial to the 
organization.  
Conflict in this 
organization is 
often suppressed 
rather than dealth 
with openly 
Dess, Lumpkin, 
& Covin, 1997 
L3 Values ‘open-
mindedness’ and 
encourages 
employees to think in 
new and different 
ways.  
Values compliance 
and encourages 
employees to stick to 
tried and tested ways. 
Our business unit 
places a high value 
on open-
mindedness 
Baker & 
Sinkula, 1999 
L7 Allows employees to 
question the ‘world 
view’ of top 
executives. 
Allows employees to 
ask questions about 
the ‘world view’ of 
top executives but 
not question it.  
Managers in this 
business unit do 
not want their 
"world view" to be 
questioned 
Baker & 
Sinkula, 1999 
L8 Believes that once we 
stop questioning, we 
endanger our future.  
Believes that 
questioning destroys 
the unity of our 
organization 
endangering its 
future.  
The collective 
wisdom in this 
enterprise is that 
once we quit 
learning, we 
endanger our future 
Baker & 
Sinkula, 1999 
L11a Believes in doing in-
depth critical 
reflection of the way 
we do business and 
make drastic changes 
based on the 
reflection. 
Is willing to reflect 
on the way we do 
business as long as it 
is within their current 
way of doing things 
We are not afraid 
to reflect critically 
on the shared 
assumptions we 
have about the way 
we do business 
Baker & 
Sinkula, 1999 
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L9b After every failure or 
success, conducts a 
detailed 'post-
mortem' to 
understand in depth 
the lessons that can 
be learned from 
having failed or 
suceeded. 
After every failure or 
success, our 
organization 
conducts surface 
inspection to figure 
out quick fix 
solutions to our 
problems and issues. 
Reflection Greenwood, 
1993 
L10b Allows radical 
change without too 
much concern for 
how things have been 
done till now. 
Allows only minor 
change because the 
way things have been 
done till now is 
considered really 
important. 
When problem 
arise, managers 
are likely to 
employ "what has 
worked in the 
past"; Company 
always willing to 
change working 
practices 
Baker & 
Sinkula, 2002; 
Chaston, 
Badger, & 
Sadler-Smith, 
2000 
L2 Believes that all 
employees can and 
should question the 
very way we perceive 
the business we are 
in so that we do not 
become obsolete.   
Believes that 
employees should not 
question the existing 
perception of our 
business because the 
way we see our 
business has and will 
work for us.  
Personnel in this 
enterprise realize 
that the very way 
they percieve the 
marketplace must 
be continually 
questioned 
Farrell & 
Oczkowski, 
2002 
Knowledge Management Items in final form Original Item Reference 
Knowledge Creation Items    
K1 Introduce new products, the majority of which 
were not available in the market earlier 
Introduce new 
generation of 
products 
He & Wong, 
2004 
K3 Extend our product range into new areas, 
majority of which neither of us were working in 
earlier 
Open up new 
markets 
He & Wong, 
2004 
K5 Enter into new technological fields, majority of 
which neither of us were working in earlier 
Enter into new 
technological fields 
He & Wong, 
2004 
K7 Gain knowledge of domains that both of us were not familiar with 
earlier 
K9 Gain new administrative and managerial knowledge, majority of which neither of us had 
earlier 
K11 Generate new knowledge that neither of us had earlier 
K13b Generate knowledge about new processes, the majority of which neither of us possessed 
before 
Knowledge Acquisition 
Items 
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K2 Enter into new technological fields, majority 
of which only our partner was working in 
earlier 
To what extent 
have you learned 
from your foreign 
parent, new 
technological 
expertise 
Lyles & Salk, 
1996 
K4 Gain new administrative and managerial 
knowledge, majority of which our partner had 
earlier 
To what extent 
have you learned 
from your foreign 
parent, managerial 
techniques 
Lyles & Salk, 
1996 
K6 Extend our product range into new areas, 
majority of which our partner was serving 
earlier 
To what extent 
have you learned 
from your foreign 
parent, new 
marketing 
expertise 
Lyles & Salk, 
1996 
K8 Gain knowledge of domains that only our partner was familiar with 
earlier 
K10 Introduce new products, the majority of which only our partner was working in earlier 
K12 Acquire knowledge from our partner  
K14b Acquire knowledge about new work processes, the majority of which our partner had 
earlier 
Italicized items are not included in the final 
survey 
 
a Items dropped after academic survey  
b Items dropped after practitioner survey  
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Table 5.2 
Details of Companies Deleted 
Characterestics 
Number of 
Companies Examples 
Larger Companies 112 Siemens, Raytheon, GE 
Unlocateable websites 
or email addresses 101 Liquid Seats Inc., Life Plans 
Web Hosting Services / 
Computer stores 82 
Acute Network 
Technologies, ActiveHost 
Corporation 
Online Bazaars/1-800 
services 40 1-800-Attorney, ebags.com 
Community 
Portals/Local Alliances 23 
Community of Science, 
United Space Alliance 
  358   
 
  227
Table 5.3 
Informant Detail 
Level No. of Respondents Example 
1 30 
Founder, President, CEO, 
COO, Partner 
2 54 CTO, Director, VP 
3 14 
Marketing Manager, Sales 
Manager, General Manager 
4 2 Not Reported 
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Table 5.4 
Strategic Orientation Factor Analysis 
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
G1 0.46 0.05 0.37 0.22 0.09 0.59 0.14 -0.01 0.67 0.22 -0.02 0.60
G2 0.40 -0.22 0.50 0.29 -0.33 0.56 0.22 0.58 -0.27 -0.35 0.43 0.43 0.18 -0.35 0.56 . 0.31 -0.38 0.50 0.29 -0.35 0.51
G3 -0.16 -0.12 0.65 -0.15 0.70 -0.06 -0.26 -0.06 0.74
G4 -0.04 0.16 0.88 0.30 0.22 0.71 0.10 0.26 0.69 0.11 0.76 0.30 0.13 0.28 0.77
G5 -0.04 0.16 0.88 0.11 0.01 0.83 -0.11 0.16 0.72 -0.14 0.72 0.09 -0.18 0.22 0.64 -0.05 0.07 0.66 -0.06 0.05 0.73
G6 -0.04 0.20 0.79 0.01 0.74 0.19 0.06 0.09 0.70 0.02 0.75 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.76 0.02 0.05 0.77
G7 0.47 -0.02 0.55 0.29 -0.02 0.73 0.33 0.69 -0.07 0.19 -0.05 0.76 0.25 -0.09 0.75 0.29 0.74 -0.10
G8 0.09 0.06 0.75 0.22 0.06 0.62 0.21 0.06 0.65 0.18 0.13 0.67 0.27 0.09 0.59
G9 0.12 -0.07 0.71 0.21 0.62 -0.08 0.19 -0.02 0.72 0.20 -0.04 0.67
G10 0.08 0.81 0.11 0.03 0.02 0.81 0.00 0.07 0.78
A1 0.81 -0.08 0.07 -0.02 0.83 0.03 0.06 0.75 0.11 -0.01 0.80 0.00 -0.01 0.81 0.03
A2 0.27 0.84 0.03 0.33 -0.04 0.73 0.27 0.79 -0.06
A3 0.05 0.78 -0.19 0.80 0.15 -0.20 0.19 0.82 -0.14 0.15 0.79 -0.19
A4 -0.02 0.82 0.02 0.22 -0.08 0.77 0.81 0.07 0.04 0.11 0.84 0.07 0.13 0.04 0.86 0.15 0.80 0.02 0.07 0.84 0.09
A5 0.17 0.20 0.56 0.51 0.19 0.23 0.13 0.45 0.34 0.10 0.52 0.34
A6 0.19 0.78 -0.03 0.37 0.72 -0.03 0.77 0.28 0.01 0.38 0.71 0.08 0.31 0.74 0.13 0.27 0.73 0.08
A7 -0.01 0.28 0.10 -0.03 0.08 0.43 -0.03 0.07 0.49 -0.02 0.34 0.17 -0.01 0.36 0.14
A8 0.23 0.69 0.05 0.33 0.20 0.64 0.27 0.66 0.16
A9
A10 0.03 0.79 -0.05 0.06 -0.11 0.79 -0.01 0.81 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.76 0.03 0.72 -0.01
A11 0.14 0.68 -0.03 0.28 0.61 -0.02 0.22 0.64 -0.01 0.35 0.60 -0.01
A12 0.16 0.80 -0.15 0.24 -0.17 0.75 0.22 0.79 -0.13
L1 0.71 -0.13 0.08 -0.17 0.60 0.14 0.64 -0.17 0.19 0.61 -0.22 0.21
L2 0.76 0.36 -0.03 0.79 0.19 0.15 0.80 0.21 0.14 0.81 0.11 0.12 0.81 0.22 0.11 0.86 0.22 0.09
L3 0.77 0.20 0.01 0.75 0.13 0.23 0.80 0.05 0.21 0.80 0.15 0.12 0.80 0.02 0.16 0.80 0.08 0.09 0.78 0.14 0.09
L4 0.80 0.23 0.07 0.72 0.13 0.27 0.70 0.18 0.04 0.08 0.79 0.10 0.76 0.05 0.21 0.74 0.21 0.08 0.84 0.06 0.07
L5 0.82 0.25 -0.04 0.84 -0.06 0.17 0.83 0.21 0.00 0.85 -0.05 0.24 0.83 0.25 -0.02 0.75 0.38 -0.11
L6 0.74 0.23 0.06 0.78 0.07 0.23 0.31 0.73 0.05 0.76 0.24 0.14 0.77 0.24 0.16 0.71 0.32 0.17 0.72 0.30 0.09
L7 0.84 -0.01 -0.01 0.85 0.02 -0.01 0.18 0.78 -0.07 0.78 0.11 0.03 0.84 -0.05 0.06 0.78 0.01 0.03 0.83 0.07 0.03
L8 0.60 0.37 0.08 0.76 0.13 0.21 0.35 0.66 0.08 0.75 0.22 0.26 0.71 0.26 0.27 0.72 0.27 0.13
Shaded values had aberrant factor loadings based on the rules applied.
Key:
1 2* 3* 4* 9* 10*5 6 7 8*
* When factor analyzed without constraining the number of factors, 4 factors were found to have eigen values greater than 1. So, the number of factor were constrained 
to 3.
G1-G10 are 10 leadership orientation items
A1-A12 are 12 alliance orientation items
L1-L8 are 8 learning orientation items  
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Table 5.5 
Descriptives and Correlations 
 Mean sd  Age Nemp
CEO 
Ten EU IG IK GO AO LO SRD SCD SKC SKA SS CRD CCD CKC CKA CS AP EP
Age * 
(N=96)
19.58 16.04 r2 1
108.31 118.96 r2 0.03 1
p 0.66
N 95
11.59 8.76 r2 0.44 -0.09 1
p 0.00 0.41
N 93 93
3.65 0.93 r2 -0.19 -0.08 -0.05 1
p 0.07 0.33 0.65
N 96 95 93
3.80 0.99 r2 -0.43 0.21 -0.29 0.33 1
p 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00
N 96 95 93 100
4.19 0.66 r2 -0.12 0.06 -0.12 0.19 0.19 1
p 0.31 0.56 0.27 0.06 0.06
N 95 99 92 99 99
3.46 0.69 r2 -0.25 0.07 -0.13 0.20 0.39 0.18 1
p 0.02 0.49 0.23 0.05 0.00 0.08
N 96 95 93 100 100 99
3.48 0.75 r2 -0.01 -0.13 0.01 0.02 0.16 0.08 0.10 1
p 0.89 0.18 0.94 0.87 0.10 0.44 0.34
N 96 95 93 99 99 98 99
3.89 0.76 r2 -0.20 -0.18 -0.07 0.11 0.25 0.10 0.28 0.43 1
p 0.05 0.09 0.48 0.29 0.01 0.30 0.00 0.00
N 96 95 93 100 100 99 100 99
3.56 1.27 r2 0.01 -0.08 -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.17 -0.03 0.04 0.02 1
p 0.94 0.44 0.86 0.62 0.64 0.10 0.75 0.69 0.87
N 95 94 92 99 99 98 99 98 99
3.32 1.02 r2 0.02 -0.16 -0.02 -0.02 -0.13 -0.16 -0.09 -0.14 0.17 0.04 1
p 0.87 0.12 0.86 0.85 0.23 0.15 0.41 0.19 0.11 0.71
N 84 83 81 88 88 87 88 87 88 88
2.70 1.32 r2 -0.14 0.03 -0.14 0.03 0.18 0.17 0.13 0.04 0.01 -0.44 -0.30 1
p 0.18 0.70 0.20 0.79 0.09 0.10 0.21 0.72 0.92 0.00 0.00
N 88 87 85 92 92 91 92 91 92 92 87
2.10 1.25 r2 -0.07 0.06 -0.12 0.11 0.02 0.08 0.10 0.02 -0.06 -0.31 -0.16 0.29 1
p 0.52 0.56 0.26 0.29 0.87 0.47 0.32 0.83 0.55 0.00 0.14 0.01
N 88 87 85 92 92 91 92 91 92 92 87 92
2.77 1.53 r2 0.00 0.03 0.03 -0.23 -0.05 0.20 0.05 0.05 -0.15 -0.26 -0.23 0.34 0.08 1
p 0.97 0.74 0.75 0.02 0.63 0.05 0.65 0.63 0.14 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.46
N 95 94 92 98 98 97 98 98 98 97 86 90 90
3.47 1.16 r2 -0.04 0.03 -0.06 -0.13 0.09 -0.14 0.10 -0.07 -0.24 0.22 0.17 -0.18 -0.09 -0.10 1
p 0.67 0.80 0.55 0.19 0.37 0.17 0.34 0.47 0.02 0.03 0.12 0.09 0.38 0.35
N 94 93 91 97 97 96 97 96 97 96 86 90 90 95
3.26 1.03 r2 0.13 -0.02 -0.05 -0.06 -0.14 -0.26 -0.02 0.04 -0.12 0.04 0.41 -0.09 -0.02 -0.09 0.33 1
p 0.23 0.82 0.68 0.55 0.17 0.01 0.84 0.74 0.27 0.67 0.00 0.40 0.88 0.40 0.00
N 91 90 88 93 93 92 93 93 93 92 85 86 86 92 93
2.94 1.25 r2 -0.10 0.04 -0.12 0.10 0.05 0.10 0.23 0.08 0.03 -0.16 -0.27 0.33 0.28 0.04 -0.36 -0.25 1
p 0.35 0.67 0.27 0.36 0.60 0.36 0.02 0.45 0.78 0.13 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.69 0.00 0.02
N 92 91 89 94 94 93 94 94 94 93 83 88 88 93 94 91
2.30 1.22 r2 0.03 0.09 -0.08 -0.08 -0.04 0.09 0.14 0.10 0.03 -0.28 -0.25 0.09 0.53 0.05 -0.41 -0.26 0.50
p 0.79 0.39 0.46 0.47 0.73 0.42 0.18 0.34 0.75 0.01 0.02 0.42 0.00 0.64 0.00 0.01 0.00 1
N 91 90 88 94 94 93 94 93 94 93 83 88 88 92 94 90 93
3.29 1.70 r2 0.03 -0.11 0.02 -0.04 -0.15 0.11 0.04 0.07 -0.16 -0.05 -0.01 0.01 0.06 0.21 0.03 0.01 0.25 -0.01 1
p 0.79 0.27 0.84 0.70 0.15 0.28 0.70 0.48 0.12 0.62 0.92 0.94 0.56 0.04 0.77 0.89 0.02 0.94
N 93 92 90 96 96 95 96 96 96 95 85 88 88 96 93 91 91 90
13.93 4.53 r2 0.00 0.21 0.19 0.01 0.15 0.09 -0.02 -0.16 -0.02 -0.19 -0.12 -0.06 -0.21 0.12 -0.13 -0.27 0.08 -0.03 -0.09 1
p 0.98 0.04 0.07 0.94 0.14 0.36 0.84 0.11 0.82 0.06 0.28 0.58 0.05 0.23 0.20 0.01 0.44 0.76 0.37
N 96 95 93 100 100 99 100 99 100 99 88 92 92 98 97 93 94 94 96
15.60 4.60 r2 -0.10 0.21 0.02 0.14 0.22 0.14 0.07 -0.12 -0.02 -0.17 -0.12 -0.10 -0.22 0.06 0.03 -0.19 0.07 -0.11 -0.05 0.78 1
p 0.31 0.04 0.83 0.17 0.03 0.17 0.46 0.24 0.83 0.09 0.27 0.33 0.03 0.57 0.78 0.07 0.53 0.28 0.62 0.00
N 96 95 93 100 100 99 100 99 100 99 88 92 92 98 97 93 94 94 96 100
EP 
(N=100)
* Mean and Standard Deviations are reported for absolute values. Correlations are reported for natural log transformations.
CCD 
(N=93)
CKC 
(N=94)
CKA 
(N=94)
CS 
(N=96)
SKA 
(N=92)
SS 
(N=98)
CRD 
(N=97)
AP 
(N=100)
LO 
(N=100)
SRD 
(N=99)
SCD 
(N=88)
SKC 
(N=92)
IG 
(N=100)
IK (N=99)
GO 
(N=100)
AO 
(N=99)
Nemp * 
(N=95)
CEO Ten 
(N=93)
EU 
(N=100)
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Key: 
 Age: Age of firm 
 NEmp: Number of current employees in the firm 
 CEO Tenure: Tenure of current CEO (in years) 
 EU: Environmental Uncertainty 
 IG: Industry growth 
 IK: Knowledge complexity of the industry 
 GO: Leadership Orientation (1-5 scale: 5 is entrepreneurial and 1 is managerial) 
 AO: Alliance Orientation (1-5 scale: 5 is cooperative and 1 is competitive) 
 LO: Learning Orientation (1-5 scale: 5 is generative and 1 is adaptive) 
 SRD: Supplier Resource Diversity (Resource diversity between firm and key supplier) 
 SCD: Supplier Cultural Diversity (Cultural Diversity between firm and key supplier) 
 SKC: Supplier Knowledge Creation (Knowledge creation in key supplier alliance) 
 SKA: Supplier Knowledge Acquisition (Knowledge acquired through key supplier alliance)  
 SS: Importance of key supplier alliance to firm 
 CRD: Customer Resource Diversity (Resource diversity between firm and key customer) 
 CCD:  Customer Cultural Diversity (Cultural Diversity between firm and key customer) 
 CKC: Customer Knowledge Creation (Knowledge creation in key customer alliance) 
 CKA: Customer Knowledge Acquisition (Knowledge acquired through key customer alliance)  
 CS: Importance of key customer alliance to firm 
 AP: Achieved performance (in last three years) 
 EP: Expected Performance (over next five years) 
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Figure 1.1 
 
General cause-effect model of interorganizational knowledge management that explains the nature of the 
relationships between firm strategy, knowledge management in alliances, and firm performance. 
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Figure 2.1 
 
General framework for extant research in knowledge management 
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Figure 2.2 
 
Tacit Explicit 
 
 
Socialization Externalization 
Internalization Combination 
Joint activities 
Informal activities 
Shared experiences 
Use of metaphors 
and analogies 
Model building 
Critical reflection 
Action programs 
Simulation & 
experiments 
Organizational 
communication through 
telephone, emails etc. 
Corporate management 
training programs  
T
a
c
i 
t 
E
x
p
l
i
c
i
t 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nonaka’s knowledge creation framework 
 
 
 237
Figure 3.1 
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Figure 5.1 
Leadership Orientation and Knowledge Creation moderated by Supplier Resource Diversity (SRD) 
 
(a) Relationship found in the data 
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(b) Hypothesized Relationship 
Leadership Orientation and Knowledge Creation
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Note: 
 
1. Graph 5.1 (a) is plotted for values corresponding to one standard deviation below the 
mean (low) and 1 standard deviation above the mean (high) for both leadership 
orientation and supplier resource diversity.  
 
   
Low Mean High
Leadership Orientation 2.77 3.46 4.15
Supplier Resource Diversity 2.29 3.56 4.83
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Figure 5.2 
Learning Orientation and Knowledge Creation moderated by Customer Resource Diversity (CRD) 
 
(a) Relationship found in the data 
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(b) Hypothesized relationship 
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Note: 
 
1. Graph 5.2 (a) is plotted for values corresponding to one standard deviation below the mean 
(low) and 1 standard deviation above the mean (high) for both learning orientation and 
customer resource diversity.  
 
Low Mean High
Learning Orientation 2.70 3.46 4.22
Customer Resource Diversity 2.31 3.47 4.63  
 240
Figure 5.3 
Learning Orientation and Knowledge Acquisition moderated by Supplier Cultural Diversity (SCD) 
 
(a) Relationship found in the data 
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(b) Hypothesized Relationship 
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Note: 
1. Graph 5.3 (a) is plotted for values corresponding to one standard deviation below the 
mean (low) and 1 standard deviation above the mean (high) for both learning orientation 
and supplier cultural diversity.  
 
Low Mean High
Learning Orientation 2.70 3.46 4.22
Supplier Cultural Diversity 2.30 3.32 4.34  
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Figure 5.4 
Knowledge Creation and Achieved Firm Performance moderated by knowledge complexity (IK) 
of the industry 
 
(a) Relationship found in the data 
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(b) Hypothesized relationship 
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Note: 
 
1. Graph 5.4 (a) is plotted for values corresponding to one standard deviation below the 
mean (low) and 1 standard deviation above the mean (high) for both customer knowledge 
creation and industry complexity. 
 
Low Mean High
Customer Knowledge Creation 1.69 2.94 4.19
Industry Knowledge 3.53 4.19 4.85  
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Figure 5.5 
Relationship between Supplier Cultural Diversity and Knowledge Creation for software (SW) 
versus non-software firms as found in the data 
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Note: 
 
1. Graph 5.5 is plotted for values corresponding to one standard deviation below the mean 
(low) and 1 standard deviation above the mean (high) for supplier cultural diversity. 
 
 Low Mean High 
Supplier Cultural Diversity 2.30 3.32 4.34 
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Figure 5.6 
 
Learning Orientation and Knowledge Management in Key Supplier Alliance moderated by 
Supplier Cultural Diversity (SCD) 
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Note: 
1. Graph 5.6 is plotted for values corresponding to one standard deviation below the mean 
(low) and 1 standard deviation above the mean (high) for both learning orientation and 
supplier cultural diversity.  
 
Low Mean High
Learning Orientation 2.70 3.46 4.22
Supplier Cultural Diversity 2.30 3.32 4.34  
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Figure 5.7 
 
Learning Orientation and Knowledge Management in Key Customer Alliance moderated by 
Customer Resource Diversity (CRD) 
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Note: 
 
1. Graph 5.7 is plotted for values corresponding to one standard deviation below the mean 
(low) and 1 standard deviation above the mean (high) for both learning orientation and 
customer resource diversity.  
 
Low Mean High
Learning Orientation 2.70 3.46 4.22
Customer Resource Diversity 2.31 3.47 4.63  
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Figure 5.8 
Learning Orientation and Knowledge Management in Key Customer Alliance moderated by 
Customer Cultural Diversity (CCD) 
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Note: 
 
1. Graph 5.8 is plotted for values corresponding to one standard deviation below the mean 
(low) and 1 standard deviation above the mean (high) for both learning orientation and 
customer cultural diversity.  
 
 Low Mean High 
Learning Orientation 2.70 3.46 4.22 
Customer Cultural Diversity 2.23 3.26 4.29 
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Appendix 4.1 
List of SIC Codes 
 3571 Electronic Computers  
 3572 Computer Storage Devices  
 3575 Computer Terminals  
 3577 Computer Peripheral Equipment, Not Elsewhere Classified  
 3578 Calculating and Accounting Machines, Except Electronic Computers  
 3579 Office Machines, Not Elsewhere Classified  
 3661 Telephone and Telegraph Apparatus  
 3663 Radio and Television Broadcasting and Communications Equipment  
 3669 Communications Equipment, Not Elsewhere Classified  
 3671 Electron Tubes  
 3672 Printed Circuit Boards  
 3674 Semiconductors and Related Devices  
 3675 Electronic Capacitors  
 3676 Electronic Resistors  
 3677 Electronic Coils, Transformers, and Other Inductors  
 3678 Electronic Connectors  
 3679 Electronic Components, Not Elsewhere Classified  
 3821 Laboratory Apparatus and Furniture  
 3822 Automatic Controls for Regulating Residential and Commercial Environments and 
Appliances  
 3823 Industrial Instruments for Measurement, Display, and Control of Process Variables; 
and Related Products  
 3824 Totalizing Fluid Meters and Counting Devices  
 3825 Instruments for Measuring and Testing of Electricity and Electrical Signals  
 3826 Laboratory Analytical Instruments  
 3827 Optical Instruments and Lenses  
 3829 Measuring and Controlling Devices, Not Elsewhere Classified  
 7371 Computer Programming Services  
 7372 Prepackaged Software  
 7373 Computer Integrated Systems Design  
 7374 Computer Processing and Data Preparation and Processing Services  
 7375 Information Retrieval Services  
 7376 Computer Facilities Management Services  
 7377 Computer Rental and Leasing  
 7378 Computer Maintenance and Repair  
 7379 Computer Related Services, Not Elsewhere Classified  
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Appendix 4.2 
Initial survey to academic experts 
In the following pages, you will find the definitions of three dimensions of strategic 
orientation followed by pairs of statements. The statements describe various aspects of 
organizational strategy. We would like you to read the definitions and statements and tell us: 
1. which set of statement corresponds to which dimension of strategic orientation. Please 
write the corresponding dimension acronym in column 1 of each row 
2.  the extent to which you think the two statements in the pair are opposite ends of the 
same dimension  
 
Alliance Orientation (AO) 
 
Alliance orientation refers to the organizational posture towards its partners in 
interorganizational relationships. 
 
Leadership Orientation (GO) 
 
Leadership orientation refers to the way the top management of an organization makes decisions 
and acts to lead by engaging in innovative activities, undertaking risky ventures, and competing 
proactively in the market.  
 
Learning Orientation (LO) 
 
Learning orientation refers to the willingness of an organization and its management team to 
bring about relatively stable changes in their way of thinking about the strategic issues and 
challenges facing the organization 
 
Knowledge Management (KM) 
 
Knowledge Management refers to the creation and transfer of knowledge across a variety of 
areas, including product development, and management techniques.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 248
Please write AO, GO, LO or KM in column 1 and rank each set of statements on a scale of 1-5 
to the extent that you think the two statements in the pair are opposite ends of the same 
dimension 
 
 Our organization competes by being flexible and 
encouraging multiple strategic options  
Our organization competes by conducting a detailed 
analysis of available alternatives and sticking to one which 
offers the best returns 
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
 The introduction of new technologies or new products is 
always an iterative process for our organization  
The introduction of new technologies or new products is a 
well-defined process for our organization 
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
 The top management of our organization assesses the 
means that it can mobilize and sets abstract goals for the 
future that allow it to adapt to changing conditions 
creatively  
The top management of our organization sets clear goals 
and tries to figure out a clear path that will take it there 
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
 The top management of our organization tries to 
proactively create new product markets that do not exist 
yet  
The top management of our organization tries to compete 
by improving our performance in our existing markets 
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
 The top management of our organization tries to introduce 
new products and enter new markets even when it is 
uncertain about the outcome  
The top management of our organization adopts a cautious 
‘wait and see’ posture so as to minimize the probability of 
making costly decisions when faced with uncertainty 
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
 The top management of our organization actively seeks 
new ideas that push out the boundaries of current product 
concepts  
The top management of our organization tries to stick to 
our current strategy by making improvements to our 
existing products and services 
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
 The top management our organization tries to be the first 
to introduce new, breakthrough innovations, 
products/services, technologies etc. to the market  
The top management of our organization tries to avoid 
being the first mover in a new product or market 
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
 The existing values, beliefs, and assumptions of our 
organization can be redefined, if need be  
The existing values, beliefs, and assumptions of our 
organization are ‘set in stone’ and can not be changed 
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
 The top management of our organization believes in doing 
in-depth critical reflection of the way we do business and 
make drastic changes based on the reflection  
The top management of our organization is willing to 
reflect on the way we do business as long as it is within 
their current way of doing things 
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
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 Employees in our organization are encouraged to question 
the very way they perceive the business we are in  
The top management believes that the way we see our 
business is well suited to the business we are in 
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
 Our management places a high value on open-mindedness 
and encourages employees to ‘think outside the box’  
Our top managers emphasize holding fast to tried and true 
management principles 
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
 Our organization places a strong emphasis on adapting 
freely to changing circumstances without too much 
concern for how things were done in the past  
Our organization allows adaptation to market change as 
long as it is compatible with the way things were done in 
the past 
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
 After every failure or success, the top management of our 
organization conducts a detailed ‘post-mortem’ and tries 
to understand what can be learned from having failed or 
succeeded  
Our top management focuses on figuring out the reasons 
for failure and not repeating them in the future 
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
 Our top management is open to changing the very 
definition of our organization  
Our top management is resistant to change in the 
definition of our organization 
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
 Our organization rewards top managers and employees to 
have as much concern for our partner organizations as for 
our own  
In dealing with partner organizations, our employees are 
encouraged to think about our organization first and 
foremost 
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
 The top managers of our organization believe that we 
must create value for both our organization and our 
alliance partners  
Employees in our organization are encouraged to ‘get’ 
much as possible from our partners as fast as possible 
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
 We expect our alliance relationships to last a long time  
We do not expect our alliance relationships to continue for 
a long time 
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
 Our top managers believe that our organization and our 
partners share a common future  
The top managers of our organization believe that the 
future needs of our organization take precedence over 
those of our alliance partners 
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
 Our top management encourages us to interact with 
employees of our partner organization in informal settings 
even outside of work  
Our top management restricts our interaction with 
employees of our partner organization to formal, official 
settings 
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
 The top managers of our organization do not want us to 
engage in actions that may be harmful for our alliance 
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
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partners even if those actions are beneficial for our 
organization  
The top managers of our organization believe that we 
must maximize the benefits available to our organization 
even at the cost of our alliance relationships 
 Our top managers encourage us to devote more time to our 
alliance partners when they need help  
Our top managers discourage us from devoting more time 
to our partners than the minimum necessary 
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
 We believe that there should be a high sense of unity 
between us and our partners  
We do not believe in having a feeling of oneness between 
us and our partners 
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
 The top management of our organization encourages 
employees to share their opinion even if it does not agree 
with that of the top management  
The top management of our organization encourages 
employees to share their opinion but only if it is not 
opposite to that held by the top management 
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
 The top management of our organization believes that 
disagreements or confrontation of ideas (no personal 
attacks) between employees can be useful for the 
organization  
The top management of our organization does not believe 
that disagreement among employees can be beneficial 
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
 The top management of our organization allow their “view 
of the world” to be questioned  
The top managers of our organization do not allow their 
“view of the world” to be questioned 
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
 The collective wisdom in our organization is that once we 
stop questioning, we endanger our future  
The collective wisdom in our organization is that 
consensus is necessary for future survival 
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
 We try to develop close relationships with our partners  
We do not try to have close relationships with our partners 
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
 We try to achieve a very high level of understanding 
between us and our partners  
We believe in monitoring every aspect of transaction with 
our partners to ensure that we are not being looted 
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
 We try to make many business decisions together with our 
partners  
We make all our business decisions entirely on our own 
without consultation with our partners 
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
 We believe that we should treat our partner fairly and 
justly 
We believe that we need to be very cautious and careful in 
dealing with our partners 
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
 We feel that we are always willing to dedicate whatever 
people and resources it takes to make our collaborative 
efforts with our partners a success  
We are always watchful about the people and resources 
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
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we are willing to invest in any of our collaborative efforts 
 We try to achieve a close alignment between our strategic 
plans and that of our alliance partners  
We decide our strategic plans without any particular 
attention to our partners 
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
 We believe in maintaining strong, healthy relationships 
with our partners  
We do not believe that we can have strong, healthy 
relationships with our partners 
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
 We are always frank and truthful in our dealings with our 
partners  
We try to be secretive and deceptive in our dealings with 
our partners 
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
 We encourage our employees to care about what happens 
to our partners  
We do not encourage our employees to care about what 
happens to our partners 
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
 We encourage our employees to go out of their way to 
make sure that our partners are not damaged or harmed in 
our relationship  
We discourage our employees from trying to protect our 
partners from damage or harm from our relationship  
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
 We have introduced a new generation of products that 
were not available in the market earlier by working 
together with our partner 
We have introduced products similar to those that were 
being sold by our partner due to our relationship with 
them 
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
 Our relationship with this partner has allowed us to extend 
our product range into areas that none of us were working 
in earlier 
Our relationship with this partner has allowed us to 
expand our product range into areas that only our partner 
was serving earlier 
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
 Our relationship with our partner has allowed us to enter 
into new technological fields that none of us was working 
in earlier 
We have been able to acquire valuable technological 
expertise from our partner 
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
 We work closely with this partner to explore new 
knowledge domains that both of us were not familiar with 
earlier 
We have been able to acquire valuable knowledge from 
our partnership with this firm 
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
 We have been able to develop knowledge of new 
managerial techniques through our partnership with this 
firm 
We have been able to acquire valuable knowledge of 
useful managerial techniques from our partnership with 
this firm 
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
 Our relationship with our partner generates new 1 Not  
3 
Sufficiently  
5 
Completely 
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knowledge that can be used by both of us for mutual 
benefit 
Our relationship with our partner is a way to acquire 
knowledge that will be useful for our organization 
opposite opposite opposite 
 Our relationship with our partner has helped us generate 
knowledge about new work processes that we did not 
know existed earlier 
Our relationship with our partner has helped us acquire 
knowledge of their work processes  
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
 The top management of our organization takes bold 
decisions and then tries to deal with the risk through their 
determination and will power    
The top management of our organization tries to minimize 
the risk associated with their decision before they decide 
which path to follow  
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
 The top management of our organization is primarily 
concerned with overlooking, missing, or losing an 
attractive opportunity if they do not act on it in time 
The top management of our organization is primarily 
concerned with minimizing the risk associated with an 
opportunity if things go wrong 
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
 The top management of our organization is driven by their 
imagination and is not constrained by the resources they 
possess  
The top management of our organization is most 
concerned with the best utilization of the resources we 
control 
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
 Our top management does not need resources to 
commence the pursuit of an opportunity allowing us to 
commit resources in stages  
Since our objective is to make the best use of our 
resources, we usually invest heavily and rapidly 
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
 Our organization has many more promising ideas than 
what our time and resources allow us to pursue  
We find it difficult to find a sufficient number of 
promising ideas to optimally utilize our resources 
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
 We never experience a lack of ideas that we can convert 
into profitable products/services  
We have limited ideas that can be converted into 
profitable products/services   
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
 We are always trying to create new technologies or 
products/services to introduce in the market  
We are cautious about any new technology or 
product/service that we introduce to the market 
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
 What drives us is the chance to create new technologies, 
new products, and new markets that are not yet known to 
people  
What drives us is the long-term survival of our 
organization through taking well-calculated risks 
1 
Not 
opposite 
 
3 
Sufficiently 
opposite 
 
5 
Completely 
opposite 
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Appendix 4.3 
Survey administered to practitioners 
(a) Customer Alliance 
The Project on Business Strategy in the 21st Century 
College of Business 
University of Missouri-Columbia 
 
Hello, 
 
In today’s hyper competitive world, companies are being forced to continuously innovate to 
stay competitive. We are conducting a program of research to understand top executive’s 
perceptions of their firm’s competitive activity. The enclosed survey asks you to tell us how 
descriptive some statements are about your firm.  
 
The survey should take about 40-50 minutes to complete.  All information collected will be kept 
strictly confidential and will be grouped together with the information collected from other 
business executives so that your responses can not be identified.      
 
We know that you are taking time from your busy day to complete this survey, so we have tried 
to make it as short as possible.   
 
A NOTE ON CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
All information collected will be kept strictly confidential.  Only members of the University 
research team will have access to your information.  After all the information has been collected, 
identifying information will be deleted and your information will be entered into a database. 
Please note that (a) your participation is voluntary, (b) you are free to withdraw from this study 
at any time, and (c) you do not have to answer a question if you do not wish to do so 
 
Please retain this consent letter for your records. Please note that completion of the enclosed 
questionnaire is reflective of your agreement to participate in this study.  If you have questions 
regarding your rights as a participant in research, please feel free to contact the University of 
Missouri-Columbia Campus Institutional Review Board at (573) 882-9585. 
 
Thank you in advance for participating in this study.  If you have any questions, please contact 
us. 
 
Vishal K. Gupta     Dr. Douglas Moesel 
Department of Management    Associate Professor of Management 
University of Missouri-Columbia  University of Missouri-Columbia 
573-882-7659 573-884-0926 
vkgnn7@mizzou.edu    moeseld@missouri.edu 
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We would like you to think of an organization that you have worked for in the past or are 
currently working in (at a strategic top executive level). The following items describe various 
aspects of an organization’s strategy. Some of these statements may describe your organization’s 
strategy while others may not; that is, there are no right or wrong answers. We would like you to 
use these statements to describe your organization’s strategy. Please rate each statement in 
terms of how characteristic it is of your organization using the following scale: 
 
5 - Characteristic of my organization 
4 - Somewhat characteristic of my organization 
3 - Neither characteristic nor uncharacteristic of my organization 
2 - Somewhat uncharacteristic of my organization 
1 - Not characteristic of my organization 
  
Place the number (1, 2, 3, 4, or 5) which most closely represents your judgment next to each 
statement.  
 
1. The following items refer to the way the top management of an organization makes decisions and 
acts to lead by engaging in innovative activities, undertaking risky ventures, and competing 
proactively in the market 
 
___ The top management of our organization competes mostly by being flexible and pursuing multiple 
strategic alternatives at the same time.  
___ The top management of our organization competes mostly by conducting a detailed analysis of 
available alternatives and devotedly pursuing one of them 
___ The top managers of our organization prefer adopting an iterative, trial and error process when 
introducing new technologies and/or products  
___ The top managers of our organization prefer adopting a carefully defined, well thought plan to 
introduce new products and technologies 
___ The top managers of our organization have a broad vision based on their dream and imagination 
which does not contain a specific, detailed action plan that the firm is expected to implement  
___ The top managers of our organization have a carefully developed vision which details, on a step-by-
step basis, a number of specific actions and programs the firm is implementing or will implement in 
order to achieve its objectives 
___ The top management of our organization mostly competes through the creation of new products/ 
technologies/markets that do not exist yet  
___ The top management of our organization mostly competes through improving our existing products/ 
technologies/markets in our current markets 
___ The top management of our organization mostly tries to introduce new products or new markets even 
when there is great uncertainty about the nature and/or outcome of the product and/or market  
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___ The top management of our organization mostly adopts a cautious ‘wait and see’ when deciding 
about new product/market introductions so as to minimize the uncertainty around the product or 
market 
___ The top management of our organization tries to compete mostly by pushing out the very boundaries 
of existing products and/or technologies 
___ The top management of our organization tries to compete mostly by making small improvements to 
existing products and/or technologies 
___ The top management of our organization tries to be the first to introduce new, breakthrough 
innovations in products, technologies, markets, and/or processes 
___ The top management of our organization tries to move into new products, technologies, markets, 
and/or processes only after other firms have already entered there 
___ The top management of our organization takes bold decisions and then tries to deal with the risk 
through their determination and will power    
___ The top management of our organization makes decisions that are associated with the least risk after 
careful analysis 
___ The top management of our organization is always trying to minimize overlooking, missing, or losing 
an attractive opportunity if they do not act on it in time 
___ The top management of our organization tries to wait before acting on any opportunity to reduce risk 
even if it means missing some opportunities in the process of waiting 
___ Our top management does not need resources to commence the pursuit of an opportunity allowing us 
to mobilize and commit resources in stages 
___ Our top management mobilizes all the necessary resources before it acts on exploiting an opportunity 
___ The top management of our organization always has many more promising ideas than our time and 
resources allow us to pursue 
___ The top management of our organization find it difficult to come up with a sufficient number of 
promising ideas to utilize our resources 
___ The top management of our organization primarily emphasizes effectiveness through introducing as 
many new product/technological/process introductions as possible 
___ The top management of our organization primarily emphasizes efficiency through achieving the 
lowest costs possible 
___ The top managers of our organization are primarily driven by the chance to create new technologies, 
products, and markets that are not yet known to people 
___ The top managers of our organization are primarily driven by the chance to introduce known and 
‘safe’ technologies, products, and markets that will serve existing needs 
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2. The following items refer to organizational willingness to bring about changes in the way of 
thinking about the organization and the strategic challenges it faces.  
 
___ Our organization is open to making radical changes to its existing values, beliefs, and assumptions, if 
need be.  
___ Our organization considers its existing values, beliefs, and assumptions as ‘chiseled in stone’ such 
that they can be changed only slightly 
___ Our organization believes that all employees can and should question the very way we perceive the 
business we are in so that we do not become obsolete  
___ Our organization believes that our employees should not question our perception of our business 
because the way we see our business is compatible with the business we are in 
___ Our organization values ‘open-mindedness’ and encourages employees to think in new and different 
ways 
___ Our organization values compliance and encourages employees to stick to tried and tested ways 
___ Our organization allows radical change without too much concern for how things have been done till 
now  
___ Our organization allows only minor change because the way things have been done till now is 
considered really important 
___ After every failure or success, our organization conducts a detailed ‘post-mortem’ to understand in 
depth the lessons that can be learned from having failed or succeeded  
___ After every failure or success, our organization conducts surface inspection to figure out quick-fix 
solutions to our problems and issues 
___ Our organization is generally open to making changes to the way in which it defines itself  
___ Our organization is generally resistant to making changes to the way in which it defines itself 
___ In our organization employees are encouraged to share their opinion even if it does not agree with 
what the top executives think  
___ In our organization employees are encouraged to share their opinion as long as it is consistent with 
what the top executives think 
___ In our organization it is believed that disagreement or confrontation of ideas (no personal attacks) 
between employees can be beneficial to the organization  
___ In our organization it is believed that disagreement or confrontation of ideas between employees can 
not be beneficial to the organization 
___ In our organization, employees are allowed to question the ‘world view’ of top executives  
___ In our organization employees can ask questions about the ‘world-view’ of the top executives but not 
question it 
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___ In our organization we believe that once we stop questioning, we endanger our future  
___ In our organization, we believe that questioning destroys the unity of organization endangering its 
future 
We would now like you to think of a customer or user with which your organization has or had 
had a strategic alliance that helped your organization gain knowledge about products/processes/ 
technologies etc. This alliance should have had a life of at least six months. It is important that 
you have been sufficiently involved with this alliance (directly or indirectly) to have good 
knowledge about it.  
 
Place the number (1, 2, 3, 4, or 5) which most closely represents your judgment next to each 
statement. 
 
5 - Characteristic of my organization 
4 - Somewhat characteristic of my organization 
3 - Neither characteristic nor uncharacteristic of my organization 
2 - Somewhat uncharacteristic of my organization 
1 - Not characteristic of my organization 
 
3. The following items refer to the posture that organizations may adopt towards their strategic 
alliance partner. This posture is reflected in the way the organization treats its partner and 
expects its employees to treat the partner organization. 
 
___ Our organization encourages us to have as much concern for our partner as for our own  
___ Our organization encourages us to think about our organization first and foremost when dealing with 
our partner 
___ Our organization encourages us to be ‘giving’ in our relationships with our partner so that they can 
benefit from the relationship too  
___ Our organization encourages us to ‘get’ as much as possible from our partner as fast as possible so 
that only we can benefit from the relationship 
___ In our organization we are expected to give equal importance to the future needs of our organization 
as well as our partner organization  
___ In our organization we are expected to give more importance to the future needs of our organization 
compared to the future needs of our partner organization 
___ Our organization encourages us to think that we and our partner share a common future  
___ Our organization encourages us to think that our future is distinct from the future of our partner 
organization 
___ Our organization encourages us to interact with employees of our partner organization in informal 
settings even outside of work  
___ Our organization restricts our interaction with employees of our partner organization to formal, 
official settings 
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___ Our organization does not want us to engage in actions that may be harmful for our partner even if 
those actions are beneficial for our organization  
___ Our organization wants us to maximize the benefits available to our organization even if our actions 
are detrimental to our partner 
___ Employees in our organization are encouraged to devote more time to our partner organization if and 
when our partner needs help  
___ Employees in our organization are discouraged from devoting more time to our partner organization 
than the minimum necessary to keep the relationship going 
___ Our organization emphasizes a high sense of unity between us and our partner 
___ Our organization does not consider it important to feel a sense of oneness between us and our partner 
___ Our organization does not try to monitor our relationship with our partner  
___ Our organization closely monitors every aspect of our relationship with our partners 
___ Our organization makes important business decisions together with our partners  
___ Our organization makes important business decisions entirely on our own without consultation with 
our partners 
___ Our organization is always willing to dedicate whatever people and resources it takes to make our 
relationships a success  
___ Our organization is always watchful and careful about dedicating more people and resources than the 
minimum necessary to make our relationship work 
___ Our organization tries to achieve a close alignment between our strategic plans and that of our partner 
organizations  
___ Our organization decides our strategic plans without any particular attention to our partners 
___ Our organization is willing to forgive or overlook minor mistakes and problems in close relationships 
with our partners 
___ Our organization tries to hold our partners responsible for any mistakes or problems on their part 
___ We are always frank and truthful in our dealings with our partner organizations 
___ We try to be secretive and deceptive in our dealings with our partner organizations 
___ Our organization encourages employees to care about what happens to our partners  
___ Our organization does not encourage employees to care about what happens to our partners 
___ Our organization encourages employees to go out of their way to make sure that our partners are not 
damaged or harmed in our relationship  
___ Our organization discourages employees from trying to protect our partners from damage or harm 
from their relationship with us 
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4. The following items refer to the management of knowledge in this alliance so as to embody it 
into process, product, technological, and market innovations. 
 
___ Due to our relationship with our partner, we have been / were able to introduce new products, the 
majority of which were not available in the market earlier  
___ Due to our relationship with our partner, we have been / were able to introduce new products, the 
majority of which were already being sold by our partner 
___ Due to our relationship with this partner, we have been / were able to extend our product range into 
new areas, the majority of which neither of us were working in earlier 
___ Due to our relationship with this partner, we have been / were able to extend our product range in 
new areas, the majority of which our partner was serving earlier 
___ Due to our relationship with our partner, we have been / were able to enter into new technological 
fields, the majority of which neither of us was working in earlier 
___ Due to our relationship with our partner, we have been / were able to enter into new technological 
fields, the majority of which only our partner was working in earlier 
___ The majority of the knowledge gained from our relationship with this partner has been / was in 
knowledge domains that both of us were not familiar with earlier 
___ The majority of the knowledge gained from our relationship with this partner has been / was in 
knowledge domains that our partner was working in earlier 
___ Due to our relationship with our partner, we have been / were able to gain new administrative and 
managerial knowledge the majority of which neither of us had earlier  
___ Due to our relationship with our partner, we have been / were able to gain new administrative and 
managerial knowledge the majority of which our partner had earlier 
___ Our relationship with our partner generates new knowledge that can be used by both of us for mutual 
benefit 
___ Our relationship with our partner is a way to acquire knowledge that will be useful primarily for our 
organization 
___ Our relationship with our partner has helped us generate knowledge about new work processes, the 
majority of which neither of us possessed before  
___ Our relationship with our partner has helped us generate knowledge about new work processes, the 
majority of which our partner possessed before 
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Please tell us about yourself to help us understand you better: 
 
I am 1. Male 2. Female   
     
My age: (in years) _________ 
 
My ethnic background is (If other please specify your ethnicity below “other”): 
 
African American/ 
Black 
1 
American Indian 
 
2 
Asian/Pacific 
Islander 
3 
Caucasian/White 
 
4 
Latino/Hispanic 
 
5 
Other 
 
6 
 
My highest level of education is:  
1. High School (or equivalent) 2. Bachelors 3. Masters 4. PhD or beyond   
 
I have worked for _________ years 
 
I have mostly worked in the following industry (If other please specify the industry type below “other”) 
 
Automotive 
1 
Aviation 
2 
Insurance 
3 
High-Technology 
4 
Pharmaceutical 
5 
Restaurant 
6 
Academic  
7 
Other 
8 
 
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME 
 261
(b) Supplier Alliance 
The Project on Business Strategy in the 21st Century 
College of Business 
University of Missouri-Columbia 
 
Hello, 
 
In today’s hyper competitive world, companies are being forced to continuously innovate to 
stay competitive. We are conducting a program of research to understand top executive’s 
perceptions of their firm’s competitive activity. The enclosed survey asks you to tell us how 
descriptive some statements are about your firm.  
 
The survey should take about 40-50 minutes to complete.  All information collected will be kept 
strictly confidential and will be grouped together with the information collected from other 
business executives so that your responses can not be identified.      
 
We know that you are taking time from your busy day to complete this survey, so we have tried 
to make it as short as possible.   
 
A NOTE ON CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
All information collected will be kept strictly confidential.  Only members of the University 
research team will have access to your information.  After all the information has been collected, 
identifying information will be deleted and your information will be entered into a database. 
Please note that (a) your participation is voluntary, (b) you are free to withdraw from this study 
at any time, and (c) you do not have to answer a question if you do not wish to do so 
 
Please retain this consent letter for your records. Please note that completion of the enclosed 
questionnaire is reflective of your agreement to participate in this study.  If you have questions 
regarding your rights as a participant in research, please feel free to contact the University of 
Missouri-Columbia Campus Institutional Review Board at (573) 882-9585. 
 
Thank you in advance for participating in this study.  If you have any questions, please contact 
us. 
 
Vishal K. Gupta     Dr. Douglas Moesel 
Department of Management    Associate Professor of Management 
University of Missouri-Columbia  University of Missouri-Columbia 
573-882-7660 573-884-0926 
vkgnn7@mizzou.edu    moeseld@missouri.edu 
 
 
 
We would like you to think of an organization that you have worked for in the past or are 
currently working in (at a strategic top executive level). The following items describe various 
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aspects of an organization’s strategy. Some of these statements may describe your organization’s 
strategy while others may not; that is, there are no right or wrong answers. We would like you to 
use these statements to describe your organization’s strategy. Please rate each statement in 
terms of how characteristic it is of your organization using the following scale: 
 
5 - Characteristic of my organization 
4 - Somewhat characteristic of my organization 
3 - Neither characteristic nor uncharacteristic of my organization 
2 - Somewhat uncharacteristic of my organization 
1 - Not characteristic of my organization 
  
Place the number (1, 2, 3, 4, or 5) which most closely represents your judgment next to each 
statement.  
 
1. The following items refer to the way the top management of an organization makes decisions and 
acts to lead by engaging in innovative activities, undertaking risky ventures, and competing 
proactively in the market 
 
___ The top management of our organization competes mostly by being flexible and pursuing multiple 
strategic alternatives at the same time.  
___ The top management of our organization competes mostly by conducting a detailed analysis of 
available alternatives and devotedly pursuing one of them 
___ The top managers of our organization prefer adopting an iterative, trial and error process when 
introducing new technologies and/or products  
___ The top managers of our organization prefer adopting a carefully defined, well thought plan to 
introduce new products and technologies 
___ The top managers of our organization have a broad vision based on their dream and imagination 
which does not contain a specific, detailed action plan that the firm is expected to implement  
___ The top managers of our organization have a carefully developed vision which details, on a step-by-
step basis, a number of specific actions and programs the firm is implementing or will implement in 
order to achieve its objectives 
___ The top management of our organization mostly competes through the creation of new products/ 
technologies/markets that do not exist yet  
___ The top management of our organization mostly competes through improving our existing products/ 
technologies/markets in our current markets 
___ The top management of our organization mostly tries to introduce new products or new markets even 
when there is great uncertainty about the nature and/or outcome of the product and/or market  
___ The top management of our organization mostly adopts a cautious ‘wait and see’ when deciding 
about new product/market introductions so as to minimize the uncertainty around the product or 
market 
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___ The top management of our organization tries to compete mostly by pushing out the very boundaries 
of existing products and/or technologies 
___ The top management of our organization tries to compete mostly by making small improvements to 
existing products and/or technologies 
___ The top management of our organization tries to be the first to introduce new, breakthrough 
innovations in products, technologies, markets, and/or processes 
___ The top management of our organization tries to move into new products, technologies, markets, 
and/or processes only after other firms have already entered there 
___ The top management of our organization takes bold decisions and then tries to deal with the risk 
through their determination and will power    
___ The top management of our organization makes decisions that are associated with the least risk after 
careful analysis 
___ The top management of our organization is always trying to minimize overlooking, missing, or losing 
an attractive opportunity if they do not act on it in time 
___ The top management of our organization tries to wait before acting on any opportunity to reduce risk 
even if it means missing some opportunities in the process of waiting 
___ Our top management does not need resources to commence the pursuit of an opportunity allowing us 
to mobilize and commit resources in stages 
___ Our top management mobilizes all the necessary resources before it acts on exploiting an opportunity 
___ The top management of our organization always has many more promising ideas than our time and 
resources allow us to pursue 
___ The top management of our organization find it difficult to come up with a sufficient number of 
promising ideas to utilize our resources 
___ The top management of our organization primarily emphasizes effectiveness through introducing as 
many new product/technological/process introductions as possible 
___ The top management of our organization primarily emphasizes efficiency through achieving the 
lowest costs possible 
___ The top managers of our organization are primarily driven by the chance to create new technologies, 
products, and markets that are not yet known to people 
___ The top managers of our organization are primarily driven by the chance to introduce known and 
‘safe’ technologies, products, and markets that will serve existing needs 
2. The following items refer to organizational willingness to bring about changes in the way of 
thinking about the organization and the strategic challenges it faces.  
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___ Our organization is open to making radical changes to its existing values, beliefs, and assumptions, if 
need be.  
___ Our organization considers its existing values, beliefs, and assumptions as ‘chiseled in stone’ such 
that they can be changed only slightly 
___ Our organization believes that all employees can and should question the very way we perceive the 
business we are in so that we do not become obsolete  
___ Our organization believes that our employees should not question our perception of our business 
because the way we see our business is compatible with the business we are in 
___ Our organization values ‘open-mindedness’ and encourages employees to think in new and different 
ways 
___ Our organization values compliance and encourages employees to stick to tried and tested ways 
___ Our organization allows radical change without too much concern for how things have been done till 
now  
___ Our organization allows only minor change because the way things have been done till now is 
considered really important 
___ After every failure or success, our organization conducts a detailed ‘post-mortem’ to understand in 
depth the lessons that can be learned from having failed or succeeded  
___ After every failure or success, our organization conducts surface inspection to figure out quick-fix 
solutions to our problems and issues 
___ Our organization is generally open to making changes to the way in which it defines itself  
___ Our organization is generally resistant to making changes to the way in which it defines itself 
___ In our organization employees are encouraged to share their opinion even if it does not agree with 
what the top executives think  
___ In our organization employees are encouraged to share their opinion as long as it is consistent with 
what the top executives think 
___ In our organization it is believed that disagreement or confrontation of ideas (no personal attacks) 
between employees can be beneficial to the organization  
___ In our organization it is believed that disagreement or confrontation of ideas between employees can 
not be beneficial to the organization 
___ In our organization, employees are allowed to question the ‘world view’ of top executives  
___ In our organization employees can ask questions about the ‘world-view’ of the top executives but not 
question it 
___ In our organization we believe that once we stop questioning, we endanger our future  
___ In our organization, we believe that questioning destroys the unity of organization endangering its 
future 
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We would now like you to think of a supplier with which your organization has or had had a 
strategic alliance that helped your organization gain knowledge about products/processes/ 
technologies etc. This alliance should have had a life of at least six months. It is important that 
you have been sufficiently involved with this alliance (directly or indirectly) to have good 
knowledge about it.  
 
Place the number (1, 2, 3, 4, or 5) which most closely represents your judgment next to each 
statement. 
 
5 - Characteristic of my organization 
4 - Somewhat characteristic of my organization 
3 - Neither characteristic nor uncharacteristic of my organization 
2 - Somewhat uncharacteristic of my organization 
1 - Not characteristic of my organization 
 
3. The following items refer to the posture that organizations may adopt towards their strategic 
alliance partner. This posture is reflected in the way the organization treats its partner and 
expects its employees to treat the partner organization. 
 
___ Our organization encourages us to have as much concern for our partner as for our own  
___ Our organization encourages us to think about our organization first and foremost when dealing with 
our partner 
___ Our organization encourages us to be ‘giving’ in our relationships with our partner so that they can 
benefit from the relationship too  
___ Our organization encourages us to ‘get’ as much as possible from our partner as fast as possible so 
that only we can benefit from the relationship 
___ In our organization we are expected to give equal importance to the future needs of our organization 
as well as our partner organization  
___ In our organization we are expected to give more importance to the future needs of our organization 
compared to the future needs of our partner organization 
___ Our organization encourages us to think that we and our partner share a common future  
___ Our organization encourages us to think that our future is distinct from the future of our partner 
organization 
___ Our organization encourages us to interact with employees of our partner organization in informal 
settings even outside of work  
___ Our organization restricts our interaction with employees of our partner organization to formal, 
official settings 
___ Our organization does not want us to engage in actions that may be harmful for our partner even if 
those actions are beneficial for our organization  
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___ Our organization wants us to maximize the benefits available to our organization even if our actions 
are detrimental to our partner 
___ Employees in our organization are encouraged to devote more time to our partner organization if and 
when our partner needs help  
___ Employees in our organization are discouraged from devoting more time to our partner organization 
than the minimum necessary to keep the relationship going 
___ Our organization emphasizes a high sense of unity between us and our partner 
___ Our organization does not consider it important to feel a sense of oneness between us and our partner 
___ Our organization does not try to monitor our relationship with our partner  
___ Our organization closely monitors every aspect of our relationship with our partners 
___ Our organization makes important business decisions together with our partners  
___ Our organization makes important business decisions entirely on our own without consultation with 
our partners 
___ Our organization is always willing to dedicate whatever people and resources it takes to make our 
relationships a success  
___ Our organization is always watchful and careful about dedicating more people and resources than the 
minimum necessary to make our relationship work 
___ Our organization tries to achieve a close alignment between our strategic plans and that of our partner 
organizations  
___ Our organization decides our strategic plans without any particular attention to our partners 
___ Our organization is willing to forgive or overlook minor mistakes and problems in close relationships 
with our partners 
___ Our organization tries to hold our partners responsible for any mistakes or problems on their part 
___ We are always frank and truthful in our dealings with our partner organizations 
___ We try to be secretive and deceptive in our dealings with our partner organizations 
___ Our organization encourages employees to care about what happens to our partners  
___ Our organization does not encourage employees to care about what happens to our partners 
___ Our organization encourages employees to go out of their way to make sure that our partners are not 
damaged or harmed in our relationship  
___ Our organization discourages employees from trying to protect our partners from damage or harm 
from their relationship with us 
4. The following items refer to the management of knowledge in this alliance so as to embody it 
into process, product, technological, and market innovations. 
 
___ Due to our relationship with our partner, we have been / were able to introduce new products, the 
majority of which were not available in the market earlier  
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___ Due to our relationship with our partner, we have been / were able to introduce new products, the 
majority of which were already being sold by our partner 
___ Due to our relationship with this partner, we have been / were able to extend our product range into 
new areas, the majority of which neither of us were working in earlier 
___ Due to our relationship with this partner, we have been / were able to extend our product range in 
new areas, the majority of which our partner was serving earlier 
___ Due to our relationship with our partner, we have been / were able to enter into new technological 
fields, the majority of which neither of us was working in earlier 
___ Due to our relationship with our partner, we have been / were able to enter into new technological 
fields, the majority of which only our partner was working in earlier 
___ The majority of the knowledge gained from our relationship with this partner has been / was in 
knowledge domains that both of us were not familiar with earlier 
___ The majority of the knowledge gained from our relationship with this partner has been / was in 
knowledge domains that our partner was working in earlier 
___ Due to our relationship with our partner, we have been / were able to gain new administrative and 
managerial knowledge the majority of which neither of us had earlier  
___ Due to our relationship with our partner, we have been / were able to gain new administrative and 
managerial knowledge the majority of which our partner had earlier 
___ Our relationship with our partner generates new knowledge that can be used by both of us for mutual 
benefit 
___ Our relationship with our partner is a way to acquire knowledge that will be useful primarily for our 
organization 
___ Our relationship with our partner has helped us generate knowledge about new work processes, the 
majority of which neither of us possessed before  
___ Our relationship with our partner has helped us generate knowledge about new work processes, the 
majority of which our partner possessed before 
 
 
 
Please tell us about yourself to help us understand you better: 
 
I am 1. Male 2. Female   
     
My age: (in years) _________ 
 
My ethnic background is (If other please specify your ethnicity below “other”): 
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African American/ 
Black 
1 
American Indian 
 
2 
Asian/Pacific 
Islander 
3 
Caucasian/White 
 
4 
Latino/Hispanic 
 
5 
Other 
 
6 
 
My highest level of education is:  
1. High School (or equivalent) 2. Bachelors 3. Masters 4. PhD or beyond   
 
I have worked for _________ years 
 
I have mostly worked in the following industry (If other please specify the industry type below “other”) 
 
Automotive 
1 
Aviation 
2 
Insurance 
3 
High-Technology 
4 
Pharmaceutical 
5 
Restaurant 
6 
Academic  
7 
Other 
8 
 
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME 
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Appendix 4.4 
Final survey 
 
P
FIIRM  STRATEGY  AND  IINNOVATIION  ACTIIVIITIIES  IIN  
SUPPLY  CHAIIN  RELATIIONSHII S   
 
This survey is designed to allow us to understand how strategy and inter-organizational 
relationships influence innovation in supply chain relationships. Due to the strategic nature of the 
survey, it is important that the respondent be a member of the top management team directing 
strategy in a high-technology company.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Please find return envelope enclosed 
 
 
 
Return Address: 
 
Vishal Gupta, Director 
High-Technology Business Innovation Project 
Department of Management, 
514 Cornell Hall, 
University of Missouri, 
Columbia, MO 65201 
(573) 882-7659 
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 I. CEO TENURE, FIRM FOUNDING, AND SIZE 
 
Year this firm was founded __________ Total number of employees in this firm _______ 
 
Year the current CEO took office ___________ 
 
II. TOP LEADERSHIP STYLE OF THIS FIRM 
Please answer the following for how characteristic they are of the top management of your organization. 
Circle the number that best approximates the style of your top management.  
 
The top management of our organization …   
 
Competes mostly by being flexible 
and pursuing multiple strategic 
alternatives at the same time.  1 2 
 
3 
Neutral 
4 5 
Competes mostly by conducting a 
detailed analysis of available 
alternatives and devotedly pursuing one 
of them. 
 
Tries to introduce a new, acceptable 
product quickly to beat rivals to the 
market.  1 2 
 
3 
Neutral 
4 5 
Tries to introduce a carefully, 
developed product even if it leads to 
delays relative to competitors.  
 
Mostly competes through the creation 
of new products/ technologies/markets 
that do not exist yet.  
 
1 2 
 
3 
Neutral 
4 5 
Mostly competes through improving 
our existing products/ technologies in 
our current markets 
Tries to introduce new products or 
new markets even when in the face of 
great uncertainty.  
 
1 2 
 
3 
Neutral 
4 5 
Adopts a cautious ‘wait and see’ policy 
to minimize the uncertainty around the 
product or market.  
Tries to be the first to introduce new, 
breakthrough innovations in products, 
technologies, markets, and/or 
processes.  
 
1 2 
 
3 
Neutral 
4 5 
Tries to move into new products, 
technologies, markets, and/or processes 
only after other firms have already 
entered there.  
Takes bold decisions and then tries to 
deal with the risk through their 
determination and will power. 
 
1 2 
 
3 
Neutral 
4 5 Makes decisions that are associated with the least risk after careful analysis. 
Tries to act quickly to avoid 
overlooking, missing, or losing an 
attractive opportunity.  1 2 
 
3 
Neutral 
4 5 
Waits before acting on any opportunity 
to reduce risk even if it means missing 
some opportunities in the process of 
waiting.  
Begins to pursue opportunities quickly 
hoping that it will be able to mobilize 
the resources in stages. 
 
1 2 
 
3 
Neutral 
4 5 Plans & lines up resources before beginning to pursue an opportunity.  
Always have many more promising 
ideas than our time & resources allow 
us to pursue.  
 
1 2 
 
3 
Neutral 
4 5 
Finds it difficult to come up with a 
sufficient number of promising ideas to 
utilize our resources 
Primarily driven by the chance to 
create new technologies, products, 
and/or markets not yet known to 
people.  
1 2 
 
3 
Neutral 
4 5 
Primarily driven by the chance to 
introduce known & safe technologies, 
products and/or markets serving 
existing needs.  
III. RELATIONSHIP STYLE OF THIS FIRM 
 
Please answer the following for how characteristic they are of your firm’s orientation towards its 
alliance partners. Circle the number that best approximates your response.  
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In dealing with our supply chain partners, our organization …   
 
Encourages us to have as much 
concern for our partners’ interests as 
our own interests.  
1 2 
 
3 
Neutral 
4 5 
Encourages us to think about our 
organization first and foremost when 
dealing with our partners.  
Encourages us to be ‘giving’ in our 
relationships with our partners so that 
they can benefit from the relationship 
too.  
 
1 2 
 
3 
Neutral 
4 5 
Encourages us to ‘get’ as much as 
possible from our partner as fast as 
possible so that only we can benefit 
from the relationship.  
Emphasizes balancing the future needs 
of our organization with the future 
needs of our partners.    
 
1 2 
 
3 
Neutral 
4 5 
Emphasizes the future needs of our 
organization more compared to that of 
our partners’ future needs.  
Encourages us to think that we and our 
partner organizations share a common 
future.  
 
1 2 
 
3 
Neutral 
4 5 
Encourages us to think that our future 
is distinct from the future of our partner 
organizations.  
Encourages us to interact with 
employees of our partner 
organizations in informal settings even 
outside of work.   
 
1 2 
 
3 
Neutral 
4 5 
Wants us to interact with employees of 
our partner organizations only in 
formal, official settings.  
Emphasizes a high sense of unity 
between us and our partner 
organizations.  
1 2 
 
3 
Neutral 
4 5 
Does not consider it important to feel a 
sense of oneness between us and our 
partners.  
Does not try to monitor our 
relationship with our partner 
organizations.  
1 2 
 
3 
Neutral 
4 5 
Closely monitors every aspect of our 
relationship with our partner 
organizations.  
Makes important business decisions 
through discussions with our partner 
organizations.  
1 2 
 
3 
Neutral 
4 5 
Makes important business decisions 
entirely on our own without 
consultation with our partners.  
Is usually willing to dedicate whatever 
people and resources it takes to make 
our relationships a success.   1 2 
 
3 
Neutral 
4 5 
Is usually watchful and careful about 
dedicating more people and resources 
than the minimum necessary to keep 
the relationship going.  
 
Tries to achieve a close alignment 
between our strategic plans and that of 
our partner organizations.   
1 2 
 
3 
Neutral 
4 5 
Decides our strategic plans without any 
particular attention to our partner 
organizations.  
Is willing to forgive or overlook minor 
mistakes and problems on the part of 
our partners.  
 
1 2 
 
3 
Neutral 
4 5 
Tries to hold our partners responsible 
for any mistakes or problems on their 
part.  
Encourages employees to care about 
what happens to our partners.  1 2 
 
3 
Neutral 
4 5 Does not encourage employees to care about what happens to our partners 
       
IV. LEARNING STYLE OF THIS FIRM 
  
In the following, please circle the number that best approximates the learning style of your firm.  
 
Our organization …   
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 Is open to making radical changes 
to its existing values, beliefs, and 
assumptions, if needed.  1 2 
 
3 
Neutral 
4 5 
Considers its existing values, 
beliefs, and assumptions as 
‘chiseled in stone’ so they can be 
changed only slightly.  
Believes that all employees can 
and should question the very way 
we perceive the business we are in 
so that we do not become obsolete.   
1 2 
 
3 
Neutral 
4 5 
Believes that employees should not 
question the existing perception of 
our business because the way we 
see our business has and will work 
for us.  
Values ‘open-mindedness’ and 
encourages employees to think in 
new and different ways.  
1 2 
 
3 
Neutral 
4 5 
Values compliance and encourages 
employees to stick to tried and 
tested ways.  
Is open to making changes to the 
way in which it defines itself.  1 2 
 
3 
Neutral
4 5 
Is resistant to making changes to the 
way in which it defines itself.  
Encourages employees to share 
their opinion even if it does not 
agree with what the top executives 
think.  
1 2 
 
3 
Neutral 
4 5 
Encourages employees to share 
their opinion as long as it is broadly 
consistent with what the top 
executives think.  
Believes that disagreement or 
confrontation of ideas between 
employees can be beneficial to the 
organization.  
1 2 
 
3 
Neutral 
4 5 
Believes that disagreement or 
confrontation of ideas between 
employees can not be beneficial to 
the organization.  
Allows employees to question the 
‘world view’ of top executives.  1 2 
 
3 
Neutral 
4 5 
Allows employees to ask questions 
about the ‘world view’ of top 
executives but not question it.  
Believes that once we stop 
questioning, we endanger our 
future.  
1 2 
 
3 
Neutral 
4 5 
Believes that questioning destroys 
the unity of our organization 
endangering its future.  
 
V. INDUSTRY ANALYSIS 
To what extent do the following conditions currently characterize the industry your firm is in?  
The rate of obsolescence is very 
slow (e.g. basic metal like copper) 1 2 
 
3 
Neutral 
4 5 
The rate of obsolescence is very 
high as in some fashion goods 
The product/service technology is 
well-established and is not subject 
to very much change (e.g. steel) 
 
1 2 
 
3 
Neutral 
4 5 
The modes of production/service 
change often and in a major way 
(e.g. advanced semiconductors) 
Demand for the product/services 
of your principal industry is 
growing rapidly  
 
1 2 
 
3 
Neutral 
4 5 
Demand for the product/services of 
your principal industry is not 
growing  
Opportunities for growth and 
expansion are significantly large 
in your industry 
1 2 
 
3 
Neutral 
4 5 Opportunities for growth and expansion are few in your industry 
 
VI. SUPPLY CHAIN RELATIONSHIPS OF THIS FIRM 
 
A. The relationship between your firm and a key supplier. 
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Please read the following statements with reference to your strategic alliance with a supplier or a potential 
supplier that helps your organization gain knowledge. 
 
Please indicate the extent of overlap between your organization and your key supplier on the following factors: 
 Low  High 
product and manufacturing technologies 1 2 3 4 5 
general administrative know-how 1 2 3 4 5 
marketing and distribution expertise 1 2 3 4 5 
R & D expertise 1 2 3 4 5 
organizational resources and competencies 1 2 3 4 5 
employee skills 1 2 3 4 5 
future goals and objectives 1 2 3 4 5 
values and social norms 1 2 3 4 5 
organizational culture 1 2 3 4 5 
personnel management practices 1 2 3 4 5 
 
To what extent has the key strategic alliance between your organization and this supplier enabled you to 
accomplish the following: 
 Low  High 
Introduce new products, the majority of which were not available in the market earlier 1 2 3 4 5 
Introduce new products, the majority of which were already being sold by our partner  1 2 3 4 5 
Extend our product range into new areas, majority of which neither of us were working in earlier 1 2 3 4 5 
Extend our product range into new areas, majority of which our partner was serving earlier 1 2 3 4 5 
Enter into new technological fields, majority of which neither of us were working in earlier 1 2 3 4 5 
Enter into new technological fields, majority of which only our partner was working in earlier 1 2 3 4 5 
Gain knowledge of domains that both of us were not familiar with earlier 1 2 3 4 5 
Gain knowledge of domains that only our partner was familiar with earlier 1 2 3 4 5 
Gain new administrative and managerial knowledge, majority of which neither of us had earlier 1 2 3 4 5 
Gain new administrative and managerial knowledge, majority of which our partner had earlier 1 2 3 4 5 
Generate new knowledge that neither of us had earlier 1 2 3 4 5 
Acquire knowledge from our partner 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 Strongly Disagree  
Strongly 
Agree 
This supplier relationship is core to our firm 1 2 3 4 5 
This supplier relationship affects a large portion of our business 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
Supplier Name: ________________________________________________________________ 
 
Business Address: ______________________________________________________________ 
 
City: _________________ State: _______ Zip: _________ Tel: ______________ 
 274
B. The relationship between your firm and a key customer. 
 
Please read the following statements with reference to your strategic alliance with a customer or a potential 
customer that helps your organization gain knowledge. 
 
Please indicate the extent of overlap between your organization and your key customer on the following factors: 
 Low  High 
product and manufacturing technologies 1 2 3 4 5 
general administrative know-how 1 2 3 4 5 
marketing and distribution expertise 1 2 3 4 5 
R & D expertise 1 2 3 4 5 
organizational resources and competencies 1 2 3 4 5 
employee skills 1 2 3 4 5 
future goals and objectives 1 2 3 4 5 
values and social norms 1 2 3 4 5 
organizational culture 1 2 3 4 5 
personnel management practices 1 2 3 4 5 
 
To what extent has the key strategic alliance between your organization and this customer enabled you to 
accomplish the following: 
 Low  High 
Introduce new products, the majority of which were not available in the market earlier 1 2 3 4 5 
Introduce new products, the majority of which were already being sold by our partner  1 2 3 4 5 
Extend our product range into new areas, majority of which neither of us were working in earlier 1 2 3 4 5 
Extend our product range into new areas, majority of which our partner was serving earlier 1 2 3 4 5 
Enter into new technological fields, majority of which neither of us were working in earlier 1 2 3 4 5 
Enter into new technological fields, majority of which only our partner was working in earlier 1 2 3 4 5 
Gain knowledge of domains that both of us were not familiar with earlier 1 2 3 4 5 
Gain knowledge of domains that only our partner was familiar with earlier 1 2 3 4 5 
Gain new administrative and managerial knowledge, majority of which neither of us had earlier 1 2 3 4 5 
Gain new administrative and managerial knowledge, majority of which our partner had earlier 1 2 3 4 5 
Generate new knowledge that neither of us had earlier 1 2 3 4 5 
Acquire knowledge from our partner 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 Strongly Disagree  
Strongly 
Agree 
This customer relationship is core to our firm 1 2 3 4 5 
This customer relationship affects a large portion of our business 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Customer Name: _______________________________________________________________ 
 
Business Address: ______________________________________________________________ 
 
City: _________________ State: _______ Zip: _________ Tel: ______________ 
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 VII. FIRM PERFORMANCE 
 
This section lists selected performance measures. Some may be very important to your organization, 
while others may be much less important or not important at all. Please use the following scale to rate 
the performance measures to reflect your firm’s performance priorities. If an item is not at all important 
for your organization, please circle the ‘not applicable’ response.  
 
 Minimum, 
Least 
Importance 
 Average 
Importance 
 Maximum, 
Most 
Importance 
Not 
Applicable-  
Don’t Know 
Profitability 1 2 3 4 5 N/A 
Market Share 1 2 3 4 5 N/A 
Revenue Growth 1 2 3 4 5 N/A 
Stock Price  1 2 3 4 5 N/A 
Product development activities  1 2 3 4 5 N/A 
 
Please assess your organization’s achieved performance on the same factors. Consider your 
organization’s performance over the last three years, compared to your competitors.  
 
  
Very much 
lower 
  
About the 
same 
  
Very much 
higher 
Not 
Applicable-  
Don’t Know 
Profitability 1 2 3 4 5 N/A 
Market Share 1 2 3 4 5 N/A 
Revenue Growth 1 2 3 4 5 N/A 
Stock Price  1 2 3 4 5 N/A 
Product development activities  1 2 3 4 5 N/A 
 
Please assess your organization’s expected performance on the same factors. Consider your 
organization’s expected performance over the next five years, compared to your competitors.  
  
  
Very much 
lower 
  
About the 
same 
  
Very much 
higher 
Not 
Applicable-  
Don’t Know 
Profitability 1 2 3 4 5 N/A 
Market Share 1 2 3 4 5 N/A 
Revenue Growth 1 2 3 4 5 N/A 
Stock Price  1 2 3 4 5 N/A 
Product development activities  1 2 3 4 5 N/A 
 
VIII. INDUSTRY KNOWLEDGE 
 
Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about your 
principle industry (Please circle response)  
                                 
 Low    High 
The knowledge required to compete in our industry is quite complex 1 2 3 4 5 
The knowledge required to compete in our industry is difficult to 
understand for an outsider 
1 
 
2 3 
 
4 5 
Competing effectively in our industry requires integration of many different 
types of knowledge 
1 
 
2 3 
 
4 5 
Firms in our industry need to have a wide variety of knowledge 1 2 3 4 5 
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We appreciate your help in completing this survey. Please provide us the following information 
about yourself so that we can send you a summary of the findings of this research. 
 
Your name   ______________________________ 
 
Your position and title ______________________________________________ 
 
Your phone number   (     )______________________  Email  _______________ 
 
May we follow-up briefly by phone __________________ 
 
 
Thank You for your help. We will email you our final report.
 277
VITA 
 
 
 
Vishal K. Gupta was born in the town of Talwara in the state of Punjab (India). He did his 
initial schooling in Delhi, India. He completed his Bachelor of Engineering in Mechanical 
Engineering from Giani Zail Singh College of Engineering and Technology (Bathinda, 
Punjab), receiving his degree from Punjab Technical University in 1998. He joined the 
Department of Management and Marketing at the University of Nebraska – Omaha in the fall 
of 2006.  
 
 278
